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This thesis examines United States detention policy and operations in the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the use of Guantanamo Bay as a key node in detention 
operations between 2001 and 2011, when the US was engaged in counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency operations against various transnational and radical religious 
extremists. 
The purpose of this thesis is to synthesise information from 76 primary source 
interviews and various secondary sources, analyse US detention operations, and provide 
suggestions for detention policy makers for future conflicts.  These first-hand accounts 
facilitate an accurate portrayal of events because of the depth and breadth of the 
experience of the sources from senior policy advisors in the US government to high 
ranking general officers in charge of detention operations to military personnel involved 
in day to day detainee operations and interrogations.  The topic is further elucidated by 
the examination of the many declassified government documents and official 
Department of Defence press releases. 
This thesis illustrates how the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq followed an 
historic detention cycle where mistakes made led to lessons learned and impacted policy 
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The United States (US) has been engaged in more than a decade of war since 11 
September 2001 (9/11).  This research started with the question:  ‘what role does 
detention play in counterinsurgency-counterterrorism operations in the Global War on 
Terror?’  Prior to conducting the research, I hypothesised that detention operations play 
a critical role in conducting successful counterinsurgency-counterterrorism campaigns.  
Academics,
2






 and internal 
political organisations
6
 have accused the US government of allowing the abuse of 
detainees for intelligence collection purposes since 9/11.
7
  This thesis examines this 
issue and in the process separates the myths and misinformation from the reality of US 
detention operations and its tactics in removing combatants from the battlefield and 
extracting intelligence from them. 
An examination of the historical record of US detention operations revealed a 
pattern; one of the key outcomes of this research stems from this pattern. It is a model 
that I characterise as a Historic Detention Cycle (HDC).  This six-stage cycle is evident 
                                                          
1
 Winston Churchill section, Brainy Quotes, Available at:  www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/ 
w/winston_churchill.html, Accessed 13 November 2010 
2
 Alfred McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror, 
(NYC: Owl Books, 2006), Joseph Margulies, Guantanamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power, (NYC: 
Simon & Schuster, 2007), Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on 
Terror, (NYC: NYRB, 2004), Laurel Fletcher and Eric Stover, The Guantanamo Effect:  Exposing the 
Consequences of U.S. Detention and Interrogation Practices, (Berekely, CA:  University of California 
Press, 2009), Stephen F. Eisenman, The Abu Ghraib Effect, (London, UK: Reaktion Books Ltd., 2007) 
3
 Andy Worthington, The Guantanamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal 
Prison, (London: Pluto Press, 2007) 
4
 Trevor Paglen and A.C. Thompson, Torture Taxi, (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House Publishing) 
5
 Mark P. Denbeaux(ed.), Jonathan Hafetz (ed.), The Guantanamo Lawyers: Inside a Prison, Outside the 
Law, (NYC: New York University Press, 2009) 
6
 Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody, Committee on Armed Services, (Washington, 
DC: United States Senate, 20 November 2008) 
7
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in current detention operations in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), and Iraq.  
Although symptomatic of the last stage of the HDC is an institutional lapse of 
operational memory, this dissertation demonstrates that the US military is, in practice, a 
learning organisation
8
 that collects lessons learned for the historical record and usually 
attempts to integrate them into their operations.   
By analysing the development of US detention policy in Afghanistan, GTMO, 
and Iraq and exploring its effect on counterinsurgency-counterterrorism operations, this 
thesis will expose no systemic plan to torture, abuse, or violate the laws of war.  Rather, 
it will demonstrate how policy decisions were dictated by the rapidly-unfolding military 
operations and other events on the ground.  Inevitably, this ad hoc, if perhaps 
unavoidable approach, has meant that the US has got some things right and other things 
wrong while figuring it out along the way. 
Thesis Statement 
This dissertation argues that when the US government fails to conduct detention 
operations according to military doctrine and law, it becomes a strategic liability to the 
objective of counterinsurgency - winning the hearts and minds of the contested 
population.  Many journalists and observers have criticised the detention policies of past 
and present administrations since 9/11, but this dissertation aspires to separate the 
politically charged rhetoric from the historical record and make recommendations for 
future detention policymakers. 
Methodology 
George Santayana said ‘those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat 
it’.9  I chose to apply the historical approach to this dissertation.  There are two main 
reasons for this.  The historical method efficiently orders facts in a linear sequence and 
                                                          
8
 Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline, (NYC:  Currency and Doubleday, 1994), p. 14 
9
 George Santayana, The Life of Reason (NYC: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1905), p. 284 
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cogently provides conclusions to assist policymakers and leaders in applying lessons 
learned to future operations.  The application of the historical method to multiple case 
studies – Afghanistan, GTMO, and Iraq – is especially helpful in the discovery of key 
detention errors that present the greatest liability to counterinsurgency-counterterrorism 
operations. This is vital because of the devastating, violent, and mortal consequences of 
repeating mistakes in counterinsurgency-counterterrorism detention operations.  
Secondly, the policy under examination – US detention policy – evolved over a 
historical timeline as historical events on the ground occurred. For this reason the 
historical approach appeared to be a viable and suitable framework for examining what 
I believe is a difficult story that needs to be told. 
 One challenge of the historical approach in dealing with this topic is the lack of 
access to the official record.  Initially most of the documents were classified, but 
gradually, through Freedom of Information Act requests, many documents were 
declassified; today many are archived in open source websites, as well as the 
Department of Defence’s web page dedicated to detention documentation.  Still, many 
of these documents are redacted and frustrating to critical observers who are insensitive 
to the reality that the US government must protect some information; they must rely on 
other sources to fill in the blanks.   
Central to historical methodology is the comparison of authenticated primary 
accounts with secondary open source media coverage and official government reports.  
Primary sources and eyewitness accounts must be interpreted qualitatively for bias, 
propinquity, competency, and agreement in order to synthesise evidence and establish 
facts. 
 Governments and militaries often engage in action research to address 
immediate problems; crisis action teams, advisory, and assistance teams, special task 
forces, and ‘czars’ are appointed to evaluate issues and solve problems.  Action 
16 
methodology could not be employed in this study without government authorisation to 
conduct onsite research, and is not generalizable because independent variables cannot 
be controlled. Without quantifiable data, the correlation and experimental 
methodologies were ruled out.  Finally, the comparative approach was ultimately 
unsatisfactory because this dissertation was less concerned with social and cultural 
interactions than with the cause and effect of historical events. 
Historical Context 
The US began operationalizing detention policy at the start of the Revolutionary War.  
General George Washington said:  ‘Whatever Prisoners you take, must be treated with 
Kindness and Humanity.  Their private Stock of Money and Apparel to be given them, 
after being strictly searched’.10  He advised his troops: ‘. . . Treat them [prisoners] with 
humanity, and Let them have no reason to Complain of our Copying the brutal example 
of the British Army in their Treatment of our unfortunate brethren . . . Provide every 
necessary thing for them on the road’.11 Washington also struggled to legitimise his 
soldiers as lawful combatants under British law as opposed to being labelled rebels or 
traitors.  The US faced a similar struggle to classify non-state-affiliated detainees in the 
wake of 9/11.   
 In 1785, the US dealt with its first foreign detention crisis, centred in the Islamic 
North African states of Morocco, Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli.  Washington lacked the 
resources to respond militarily, so the US paid the Barbary Pirates for detainee releases 
until 1815 when the US was strong enough to fight back.
12
  Classification issues were 
less relevant in The War of 1812, because England recognised America’s autonomy, 
similar to circumstances after the US invasion of Iraq where classification issues were 
clearer than they had been immediately following 9/11.  Captured Iraqi military 
                                                          
10
 George Washington, Letter to Charles Dyar, 20 January 1776 
11
 David Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, (Oxford, UK:  Oxford Press, 2004), p. 379 
12
 Joshua London, Victory in Tripoli, (Hoboken, NJ:  John Wiley & Sons, 2005), pp. 27-28, 37-38 
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personnel fell under the Geneva Conventions and the classification of enemy 
combatants was applied to foreign fighters and Iraqi insurgents.  
The American Civil War was a watershed for US detention policy for three 
reasons.  First, it had been decades since the last major detention operation and much 
had to be re-learned.  Second, the argument over prisoner status was hotly contested. 
Finally, the war was so massive in scale that prisoners numbered in the hundreds of 
thousands.  The decade of war since 9/11 has also been characterised by the relearning 
of detention doctrine, the detainee classification debate, and the length and cost of the 
war including the care and feeding of massive numbers of detainees.  The incorporation 
of the principles of the Lieber Code in 1863, (Appendix A) by Abraham Lincoln, served 
as a model for prisoner rights in the wars of the next century, as well as the first Geneva 
Convention in 1864.
13
  Likewise, in the post 9/11 era, key detention doctrines emerged 
that clarify and define the treatment, trial, and detainee release process for future 
conflicts.   
The US took few prisoners during World War One (WWI) compared to World 
War Two (WWII), when the US detained almost 500,000 prisoners inside the 
continental US.  As US military personnel were detained and the US detained foreign 
military personnel in each successive detention mission (Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War I), 
US detention policy was further shaped. To date, only the US government knows the 
total number of detainees held during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; it is certain that 
whatever the numbers and wherever the location, this massive contemporary detention 
mission will shape US policy for the rest of the twenty-first century. 
Framework 
Upon examination of the historical record, the pattern that emerges is a model I call the 
Historic Detention Cycle (HDC), a six-phase sequence that represents my original 
                                                          
13
 Development of modern international humanitarian law, ICRC, 13 May 2010, Available at:  
www.icrc.org, Accessed 30 March 2011 
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contribution to the body of knowledge for detention policy in counterinsurgency-
counterterrorism operations. Particularly in counterinsurgency-counterterrorism 
conflicts, it is critical to conduct detention operations legally and humanely or it 
becomes a strategic liability.  Success in a military campaign may very well hinge on 
detention operations, especially in a counterinsurgency-counterterrorism campaign 
where the objective is to win the hearts and minds of the contested population.  In the 
first phase of the HDC, the conflict breaks out and detainees are captured.  In the 
second, mistakes are made in detainee handling and incarceration.  In the third phase, 
detainee operations improve as corrections are made.  In the fourth, detainees are 
released amidst the conflict and at its conclusion.  A release during this phase refers to a 
detainee who has been processed into a US detention facility and has spent several 
months to years in a facility.  Releases of detainees who have been held for a short 
amount of time may occur at any point in phase one and two.  A release may be to a 
host nation government or back to their own home.  In conventional wars where two 
parties are bound by the Geneva Conventions, prisoners of war and other detainees are 
usually held until the end of a conflict.  In a counterinsurgency-counterterrorism 
environment they may be held until the end of a conflict or released throughout the 
conflict to assist with the population centric ‘hearts and minds’ focus.  During the fifth, 
the end-of-conflict detention operational lessons are recorded.  Finally, in the sixth 
phase of the HDC, the peacetime military disremembers how to conduct detainee 
operations effectively. (Appendix B) 
The second phase of the HDC is the most critical during a counterinsurgency-
counterterrorism campaign; it is likely that this is where a campaign will be won or lost.  
The damage done by poorly executed detention operations creates such ill-will among 
the local population, that no matter what tactical successes follow, it may be impossible 
to accomplish the war termination objectives.  The third phase of the HDC comes next 
19 
in terms of significance; during this phase the counterinsurgent-counterterrorist must 
work swiftly to make corrections and attempt to reverse the damage done in phase two.  
This is a challenge, as insurgent-terrorist forces will seek to capitalise on the mistakes 
of the detaining power.  The HDC is evident throughout US military history, but the 
phases may vary slightly from conflict to conflict.  Often phases overlap depending on 
the specific nature of the war; the goal is to avoid getting mired in the chronic mistakes 
of phase two.   
Literature and Sources 
Much has been written about US detention operations historically over the years dealing 
mostly with conventional warfare but there is a dearth of in-depth scholarly research on 
the role of detention operations in counterinsurgency-counterterrorism for the period 
from 2001 to 2011.  I began my research by collecting every book and scholarly article 
available on US detention operations.  From 2009 to 2010, I auto-mined the internet for 
every news article and declassified government document relating to detention 
operations and counterinsurgency/counterterrorism.  What I found was snapshots of 
short articles in journals or books of specific periods dealing with detention operations 
in counterinsurgency-counterterrorism.  More books and papers have been written 
dealing with the legal and policy side of the issue but fewer have been written dealing 
with actual detention operations, the gap my dissertation seeks to fill.  
This is not surprising given the fact that most military personnel are not going to 
write about current operations while they are on-going unless they are directed to by 
their chain of command or have left the military altogether.  Non-government academic 
researchers and lawyers are not bound by the same military guidelines and are generally 
more inclined to write works for publication by virtue of their professions.  Many of 
their writings have been incorporated into this study.   The Afghanistan case study was 
20 
enhanced by the works of former CIA case officers Gary Berntsen
14
 and Gary 
Schroen,
15
 Doug Stanton who wrote a detailed account of the 5
th
 Group Special Forces 
soldiers who were part of the first wave into Afghanistan in 2001,
16
 Peter Bergen’s 
detailed reporting on the Arab Jihadist network,
17
 the memoirs of former Secretary of 
Defence Donald Rumsfeld,
18
 the memoirs of former Central Command commanding 
officer, Tommy Franks,
19
 retired CIA Director George Tenet,
20
 former Under Secretary 
of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith,
21
 author Sean Naylor who detailed Operation 
Anaconda in the spring of 2002,
22
 Chris Mackey (Hogan) who wrote the first detailed 
account of interrogation and detention operations in Afghanistan,
23
 and former Taliban 
Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul-Salam Zaeef.
24
 The GTMO chapter relied on policy 
criticism from New York University law professor Karen Greenberg,
25
 international 
lawyer and professor Phillipe Sands,
26
 former Muslim Army Chaplain at GTMO James 
Yee,
27
 as well as support from retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu,
28
 and 
former head military lawyer at GTMO Kyndra Rotunda.
29
 In the Iraq chapter, books by 
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19
 Tommy R. Franks, American Soldier, (NYC: Harper-Collins Publishers, 2004) 
20
 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm:  My Years at the CIA, (NYC:  Harper Collins, 2007) 
21
 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (NYC: 
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22
 Sean Naylor, Not A Good Day To Die:  The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda, (NYC:  Penguin 
Group, 2005) 
23
 Chris Mackey (Hogan) and Greg Miller, The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against Al Qaeda, 
(NYC: Little Brown and Company, 2004) 
24
 Abdul-Salam Zaeef, My Life With The Taliban, (NYC:  Columbia University Press, 2010) 
25
 Karen Greenberg, The Least Worst Place: Guantanamo’s First 100 Days, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 
26
 Phillippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of American Values, (NYC: 
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27
 James Yee, For God and Country: Faith and Patriotism Under Fire, (NYC: Public Affairs, 2005) 
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 Gordon Cucullu, Inside GTMO: The True Story Behind The Myths of Guantanamo Bay, (NYC: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 2009) 
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 Kyndra Miller Rotunda, Honor Bound: Inside the Guantanamo Trials, (Durham, NC: Carolina 
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retired Iraq expert Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona,
30
 former head of the Coalition 
Provincial Authority in Iraq Ambassador Paul Bremer,
31
 retired Lieutenant General 
Ricardo Sanchez who commanded US forces in Iraq when abuses at Abu Ghraib 
occurred,
32
 award winning journalist Bob Woodward,
33
 retired Colonel Larry James 
who served in detention operations in Iraq and GTMO,
34
 and Iraqi government official, 
Ali Allawi,
35
 were of use. 
The information I gathered helped me to build a base of knowledge as I 
narrowed my focus to the decade after 9/11.  This dissertation fills the lacuna by 
providing a detailed historical account of detention operations in counterinsurgency-
counterterrorism operations for the period between 2001 and 2011.   
 An understanding of the major theories of conventional and irregular warfare is 
essential in framing the debate on detention operations in counterinsurgency-
counterterrorism operations.  While almost no attention is given to the topic of detention 
operations in the existing theoretical literature, the overarching principles are still 
helpful in order to craft an appropriate detention strategy; my research helps fill this 
gap.  Policy makers and operational planners must understand the type of conflict they 
are engaged in in order to minimise the amount of time spent, resources wasted, and 
lives lost in steps two and three of the HDC.  Fewer mistakes ‘inside the wire’ reduce 
the insurgents’ opportunity to gain strength within the detaining power’s own prison 
facilities.   
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The father of modern conventional war theory, Prussian General Carl Von 
Clausewitz, served from 1792 to 1831 in both the Prussian and Russian militaries.   His 
theoretical writings on warfare, published after his death, have been studied by 
generations of military strategists.
36
  Ironically, though he had been a prisoner of war 
for a time during his career, none of his published works discussed detention in military 
operations.  Von Clausewitz defined war as a ‘duel on an extensive scale’,37 or the 
‘continuation of policy by other means’38 in order to force an opponent to submit.  ‘The 
enemy is to be reduced to submission by an act of war, then the enemy must be 
disarmed or put in a position where he feels he will be disarmed.’39  
However, Von Clausewitz did concede that the endgame is determined by 
politicians and not by military leaders.  When examining the crafting of detention 
policy, as I do in this thesis, this political or strategic reality must always be kept in 
mind.  Von Clausewitz also wrote about ‘friction’ or the ‘fog of war’ in combat and said 
the simplest objectives are often difficult to accomplish on the battlefield due to the 
presence of temporary confusion or unforeseen circumstance.
40
  Observations that hold 
very true for the detention operation experience since 9/11 in all theatres. 
Irregular warfare theory was not described by Von Clausewitz in his book On 
War, but many of his theories still apply.  The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) or 
Long War
41
 is an irregular war.  Thomas X. Hammes in his book, The Sling and the 
Stone, explained that conventional wars represented the first, second, and third 
generations of European warfare witnessed during the age of Napoleon, World War I, 
and World War II.
42
  The fourth generation conflicts of today are of an irregular or 
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 and include more complex detention operations than had been seen 
in state-on-state conflicts.
44
  The US Department of Defence (DOD) defines Irregular 
Warfare (IW) as: 
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence 
over the relevant populations.  IW favours indirect and asymmetric approaches, 
though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to 
erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.  IW is a complex, messy, and 
ambiguous social phenomenon that does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or 
precise definition . . . IW is a form of warfare. As such, it encompasses 
insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism . . . 
45
 
Irregular warfare includes:  insurgency, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, 
terrorism and counterterrorism. But it also involves numerous other aspects. These 
include foreign internal defence, stabilisation, security, transition and reconstruction 
operations, strategic communications, psychological operations
46
 (now called Military 
Information Support Operations). Other aspects are information operations, civil-
military operations, intelligence and counterintelligence activities, and transnational 
criminal activities like narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial 
transactions that support or sustain irregular warfare.  Finally, there is also a law 
enforcement angle focused on countering irregular adversaries.
47
 
Insurgency, a subset of irregular warfare, is defined as a movement aimed at the 
overthrow of a legitimate government through the use of subversion.  It is an organised, 
protracted political-military struggle designed to weaken control and legitimacy of the 
established government or occupying power while increasing the power of the 
insurgent.  Counterinsurgency is the military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken by the government to defeat the insurgency.  A 
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further subset of counterinsurgency is counterguerrilla operations, which focuses on the 
active military element of the insurgent movement and nothing else.
48
 
An emerging theory of warfare since the end of end of WWII is lawfare.  British 
Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Scotland who commanded the British interrogation system 
during WWII, described in his book, The London Cage, the addition of ‘legal warfare’ 
in future conflicts.  At the end of the war, his unit was re-designated the War Crimes 
Investigation Unit and its mission changed from collecting intelligence for the war to 
gathering evidence for international war crimes tribunals.  He did not approve of this 
turn of events and suggested that future commanders consider taking lawyers with them 
to battle because the interpretation of international law was not the avocation of an 
intelligence officer.
49
 Today military units do not deploy without their operational law 
lawyers who help vet the legality of operations. 
In 2001, US Colonel Charles Dunlap, an Air Force JAG officer at Harvard 
University, used the term ‘lawfare’ to describe the convergence of war and law in the 
conflict in the Balkans.  He defined it as: 
A cynical manipulation of the rule of law and the humanitarian values it 
represents.  Rather than seeking battlefield victories, per se, challengers try to 
destroy the will to fight by undermining the public support that is indispensable 
when democracies like the US conduct military interventions . . . simply put it is 
the terrorist efforts to use the US legal system against us while waging acts of 
terror against our citizens.
50
 
Lawfare’s goal is to manipulate the government’s source of strength, the people, as a 
centre-of-gravity in order to undermine the government and destroy the symbiotic 
‘trinity’ balance stressed by Von Clausewitz between the people, the government, and 
the military.
51
  Since 9/11, terrorists and their sympathisers have become adept at using 
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lawfare against the US as part of their asymmetric, irregular strategy.
52
  In Afghanistan 
and GTMO, lawfare has been exploited by legal organisations representing detainees.
53
 
In its basest form, terrorism warfare theory is the systematic use of terror, 
violence, and intimidation to achieve a set objective.
54
  It has been used throughout 
history, but for the past 50 years it has become increasingly popular among 
organisations unable to directly confront a superior force.  It can be highly effective and 
very difficult to defeat.  In counterinsurgency-counterterrorism operations terrorism is a 
key enemy tactic and must be countered with the protection of the population in mind. 
David Galula, a former French Army officer, is considered the father of modern 
counterinsurgency doctrine.  He codified counterinsurgency principles in his 1964 book 
Counterinsurgency Warfare,
55
 written while he was a fellow at Harvard University.  
While his work is considered the classic writing of counterinsurgency theory, he failed 
to deal with the treatment of detainees in a counterinsurgency campaign.
56
  As such, this 
thesis complements his seminal work. Galula stated there are four main laws applicable 
to counterinsurgency theory: First, the support of the population,
57
 second, an 
understanding that support is gained through an active minority,
58
 third, an 
understanding that support from the population is conditional,
59
 fourth, an intensity of 
efforts and vastness of means are essential.   
In today’s counterinsurgency environment, David Kilcullen, an Australian Army 
reserve officer and well known COIN advisor to the US military, has spent years in the 
field researching and working in counterinsurgency environments.  In 2006 as the 
insurgency was raging in Iraq, he wrote a paper in the Military Review Journal titled 
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‘28 key points for company level units’ in a counterinsurgency.60 (Appendix C) This 
article was widely read and the principles were applied at a time when this knowledge 
was badly needed but the article failed to address detention.   
In 2009, Kilcullen published his ground breaking book, The Accidental 
Guerrilla but it likewise provided no focus on detention operations.  In the book he 
detailed a new paradigm to look at the current threat environment through and 
summarized his thinking of the way the enemy fights.  Traditionally, counterinsurgency 
was localized and focused on the overthrow of a local government.  The threat 
environment today is much more global than the environment envisioned by Galula.
61
  
The ideology of the radical Islamic Salafi Takfiri movement
62
 subscribed to by Al-
Qaeda has widened the playing field from focusing on the ‘near enemy,’ national 
governments in the Islamic world, to focusing on the ‘far enemy,’ the US both at home 
and abroad.
63
  In essence, Kilcullen says, ‘we are fighting many small wars amidst large 
global confrontations’.64  
Kilcullen described an ‘accidental guerrilla syndrome’ exploited by Al-Qaeda 
and local allies.
65
 In this strategy, Phase one is the infection stage, phase two is the 
contagion stage and phase three is the intervention stage.  During this stage outside 
forces take action against the radical groups directly or through the use of a proxy.  This 
is very relevant to this thesis as it is during this stage that the HDC and the accidental 
guerrilla syndrome intersect. (Appendix D)  If detention operations are not conducted 
properly it can exacerbate the situation and facilitate the growth of many more 
accidental guerrillas in the next and final phase.   
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In Iraq and Afghanistan this was clearly the case as will be shown in the case 
studies in this dissertation.  Phase four is the final stage of the syndrome.  Locals react 
negatively to outside intervention and many become accidental guerrillas.  Not because 
they like the Al-Qaeda ideology and presence but because they do not like the foreign 
presence.
66
    
Some of the best historical examples, good and bad, dealing with detention 
operations in counterinsurgency-counterterrorism come from the British military 
experience in South Africa during the Boer Wars 1880 to 1881 and 1899 to 1902;
67
 
Palestine, between 1936 to 1939 and 1945 to 1948;
68
 the Malayan Emergency 1950 to 
1960;
69
 Northern Ireland from 1969 to 2007;
70
 and Oman from 1970 to 1976.
71
  Today 
many think that the British always applied the ‘soft’ approach they are currently 
associated with. In reality their approach evolved over time after many hard lessons 
learned. The French also provide some valuable lessons from their experiences in 
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Algeria from 1954 to 1962.
72
  The US experienced a rarely studied counterinsurgency in 
the Philippines from 1898 to 1902 also worthy of study.
73
 
Since 9/11, there have been two major schools of thought, and one lesser one, on 
the subject of the detention, classification, and treatment of detainees.  Of the two 
larger, the first favours an intelligence-collection approach as the primary method in 
dealing with detainees. Supporters of this school include John Yoo, Kyndra Miller 
Rotunda, Jeff Azarva, Jeff Bovarnick, Larry James, and Doug Pryer.
74
  The other school 
advocates judicial prosecution or designation as a prisoner of war under the Geneva 
Conventions as the upmost objective in detention operations.  Supporters of this camp 
are Karen Greenberg, Phil Sands, Joseph Margulies, Mark Danner, and Michael Haas.
75
 
The smaller school supports a hybrid option to create a new national security court 
system that addresses the concerns of both camps.
76
  Proponents of this camp are Glen 
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Sulmasy, Ben Wittes, Andrew McCarthy, Philip Bobbitt, and Neal Katyal and Jack 
Goldsmith. The debate has been rancorous and fractious internationally and in 
American politics; the closing of GTMO became a focus of the 2008 presidential 
election.   
The intelligence-collection school-of-thought focuses on the primacy of 
gathering tactical and strategic intelligence to disassemble insurgent/terror networks and 
save lives immediately.  In this approach, detainees are classified and questioned using 
approved interrogation techniques, but the intelligence collected may not be admissible 
in a US court of law.  Under this system, detainees receive justice in military tribunals 
or commissions as opposed to the American judicial system.  Unhampered, military 
justice is typically much swifter and less costly than criminal trials, but one drawback is 
that detainees may ultimately be released when the military mission is over.  Opponents 
critical of this approach argue that this system denies detainees their basic human rights. 
One of the main supporters of this camp is John Yoo, the former deputy 
assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice department for 
President George W. Bush.  Yoo wrote several books propounding this argument: In 
War by other Means,
77
 he set out to explain to the public what the Bush administration 
went through in order to protect the nation after 9/11 and why they enacted certain laws 
such as the military commissions which have long been used throughout US history.  In 
Crisis and Command,
78
 Yoo helped clarify for my research the scope of presidential 
power historically.  While his books focussed on the policy process my research 
focussed on the operational application of the policies he advocated for.  Kyndra Miller 
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Rotunda’ who wrote Honor Bound: Inside the Guantanamo Trials,79 provided 
information for my GTMO case study regarding how the military commissions work 
and what life is like inside the GTMO prison; she argues that the process is much 
improved and the detainees are well cared for which supports my findings related to the 
HDC.   
Jeffrey Azarva published an article in the Middle East Quarterly journal in 2009 
titled ‘Is US Detention Policy in Iraq Working’?80 Here he laid out the successes of the 
new coalition prison system based on the new programme put in place by Iraq 
Detention Task Force 134 commander, Major General Doug Stone.  This information 
was helpful as it supported my thesis that detention is a liability when done poorly but it 
also showed it could become an asset if done correctly.  Army lawyer Lieutenant 
Colonel Jeff Bovarnick wrote ‘Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic 
Liability to Legitimacy’,81 a detailed article published in The Army Lawyer Journal 
about the new processes in place to assist in evaluating detainees for release or further 
detention.  Little information had been made public about these boards previously and 
his article shed the most detailed light on the whole process and assisted my research as 
I worked to understand the review board process.  
Colonel Larry James wrote Fixing Hell: An Army Psychologist Confronts Abu 
Ghraib,
82
 about his initial tour at GTMO and the follow on assignment to Abu Ghraib to 
help fix the challenges there.  James argues the main lesson from Abu Ghraib was that 
good leaders must be present all the time otherwise bad things will happen.  His 
supposition matches with one of my main recommendations that the correct leadership 
be selected for detention operations.   
                                                          
79
 Kyndra Miller Rotunda, Honor Bound: Inside the Guantanamo Trials, (Durham, NC: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2008) 
80
 Jeffrey Azarva, ‘Is U.S. Detention Policy in Iraq Working?,’ Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2009 
81
 Jeff A. Bovarnick, ‘Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy,’ 
The Army Lawyer, 1 June 2010 
82
 Larry C. James, Fixing Hell:  An Army Psychologist Confronts Abu Ghraib, (NYC:  Hachette Book 
Group, 2008) 
31 
Major Doug Pryer wrote his master’s thesis on interrogation titled, The Fight for 
the High ground: The US Army and Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom I, 
May 2003-April 2004, which shed detailed light on the first year of the war’s detention 
in counterinsurgency operations.  Specifically he detailed the poor resourcing and 
failure to plan for an extended detention operation in Iraq; this supported one of my 
main recommendations to have a deliberate long term plan for detention operations.  All 
of these writings were helpful in my research that tied this all together for the period 
adding in new insights from other key detention actors to paint the larger picture.   
The judicial-Geneva Conventions school-of-thought views detainees as innocent 
victims of a corrupt process, as criminals in violation of US law or as prisoners of war 
under the Geneva Conventions.  Proponents emphasise a strict interpretation of keeping 
detainees under the Geneva Conventions whether they qualify or not and giving them 
prisoner of war status or building a legal case in order to prosecute detainees according 
to US terror statutes.  They challenge the legality of the entire US military tribunal 
system and favour the clarity, transparency, and longevity of the US criminal justice 
system or the Geneva Conventions processes; either one will grant the detainee habeas 
corpus, a basic human right.   
This is an idealist rather than a realist approach.  It places legal rights over 
intelligence gathering and arguably national security.  It is costly, time consuming, and 
has proven dangerous for prosecutors and officers of the court involved in trying these 
cases.  But there are many who believe that this is the only legitimate approach.  
Karen Greenberg, Executive Director of the Centre for Law and Security at the 
New York University Law School has written several books supporting this argument.  
Her book The Least Worst Place: Guantanamo’s First 100 Days,83 included some 
important details of the step by step creation of the initial GTMO detention task force 
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160.  Most important she detailed the interactions with the US Southern Command and 
the dysfunction there as GTMO was being stood up. However, looking at the list of 
individuals she interviewed it is apparent that she missed too many of the key players 
involved to make many of the assumptions she does. For example, she asserts that 
Brigadier General Mike Lehnert was correct in his strategy to try and label the detainees 
prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions and that Major General Michael 
Dunlavey was wrong to collect intelligence under the new Pentagon guidance and not 
recognize the detainees under the conventions but rather as enemy combatants.  This 
dissertation challenges these claims by adding additional information from other 
sources that show General Lehnert hampered the intelligence collection mission of the 
GTMO task force and the detainees were well cared for and received a level of 
treatment as good or better as the soldiers who were guarding them. 
Greenberg also edited two other books. The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu 
Ghraib,
 84
 that laid out many of the primary source documents that led to the detention 
policies of the Bush administration. They are the same documents that Yoo and his 
colleagues looked at and worked on but each came to different conclusions based on the 
school of thought they used to view the policy making process through. My research 
looked deeper at operational sources.  In her book The Torture Debate in America,
85
 she 
brings together a series of articles on detention, interrogation, and the rule of law by 
many who opposed the Bush administration policies.  The book is a good reader of this 
camps position.    
A similar focus is at the heart of Phillippe Sands book Torture Team: 
Rumsfeld’s MEMO and the Betrayal of American Values.86 Here Sands, like Greenberg 
in, The Least Worst Place: Guantanamo’s First 100 Days, attempts to reconstruct the 
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step by step policy moves made by the Bush administration in regards to the treatment 
and classification of detainees.  He focussed less on the operational side of the detention 
task force in GTMO and more on the decision making of the key policy makers.  His 
world view was that what was taking place was wrong under international law and he 
wanted to prove how and why it happened.  His work compliments Greenberg’s and is a 
good resource to understand this camps point of view.  Like Greenberg, he laid out the 
dysfunction at the US Southern Command which had operational responsibility for the 
GTMO detention task force.  This very important piece of information is key in 
understanding how the policy made at the national level flowed down to the command 
at GTMO.   
In Guantanamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power,
87
 Joseph Marguilies 
builds on the research of Greenberg and Sands to show the US detention system is 
illegal and needs reform.  His work as an attorney representing GTMO detainee 
Mamdouh Habib, an Egyptian born, Australian detainee, helped shape his viewpoint.  
He also spent time in Iraq during the worst days of the insurgency.  While his book has 
no earth shattering revelations it reiterated the viewpoint of this ideological camp.   
In Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror,
88
 Danner, 
like Greenberg and Sands, focused on the trail of Bush administration documents 
dealing with detention and interrogation.  He adds nothing new to the debate other than 
to show one more individual who is opposed to the Bush era policies.  Lastly, Michael 
Haas in, George W. Bush, War Criminal?: The Bush Administration's Liability for 269 
War Crimes, lays out this camps most detailed argument against the Bush 
administration.  Yoo, as my research also shows, would disagree with the legal 
arguments posed nevertheless to those looking at the entire debate one will find the 
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book of value.  The value in this source is that it provided yet again another viewpoint 
from this camp to understand their interpretation of the law as it relates to detention. 
Glen Sulmasy, author of The National Security Court System: A Natural 
Evolution of Justice in the Age of Terror,
89
 represents the third, albeit small school of 
thought.  He propounds the hybrid option of the two main schools of thought to create a 
new national security court system that allows for both trials and for the collection of 
intelligence.  He argues that the US court system is not well enough equipped to handle 
terrorism cases while military commissions have been very ineffective. As such an 
alternative to both is necessary.  Benjamin Wittes, a fellow with the Brookings Institute 
agrees and wrote in Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of 
Terror,
90
 that Congress must act and create new laws to meet the needs for terrorism 
cases that cannot currently be met under the existing system. 
 Former terrorism federal prosecutor Andrew McCarthy, also supports this 
approach.  In his book Willful Blindness: A memoir of the Jihad,
91
 he details the 
challenges of obtaining convictions of terrorists under the current system.  Current 
Obama appointee and US deputy solicitor general Neal Katyal
92
 also favours a new 
system where terrorists who do not fall under the Geneva Conventions or our domestic 
laws can be detained and tried.  Finally, Philip Bobbitt in his book Terror and Consent: 
The Wars for the Twenty-First Century,
93
 argues that there must be a way to bring the 
law and military strategy together going forward or we stand to be defeated in future 
conflicts. Having a national security court where intelligence detainees can be tried 
under laws that protect classified sources and methods yet upholds the rule of law 
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supports my main thesis to conduct detention operations properly in order to support the 
broader goal of prosecuting terror detainees.  
Limited though it is, the secondary literature on detention and interrogation 
operations has provided a useful background for this dissertation.  Some of the most 
useful secondary sources came from news reports from in-country.  Articles from the 
Washington Independent, the Wall Street Journal, the BBC, Newsweek, National Public 
Radio, the Independent, and others provided essential insights into the detention story.  
These articles provided a counterbalance to the official US military press releases and 
documents.   
As already discussed, the subject of detention operations arouses much passion 
and great debate.  All those who address it, including this author, face the possibility of 
being accused of bias by those with whom they disagree.  However, throughout this 
thesis I have looked to be as objective as possible. The one area where there may appear 
to be obvious bias is in my choice of interviewees.  Admittedly the vast majority of my 
76 interviews represent the American official government/military position.  However, 
the reason for this is not because I have chosen to ignore those holding an opposing 
view. The reason is a lack of access to primary opposing actors in the battlefield and the 
availability of being able to meet with busy opposing sources. 
The main primary sources were interviews with participants who shaped policy 
or were involved with US detention policy and operations from WWII to the present.  
Interviews with three Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defence (DASD) for Detainee 
Affairs and the first Iraq detainee policy official were crucial to clarifying the 
emergence of current US detention policy.  Interviews with several general officers over 
key detention operations, including Joint (inter-service) Task Force (JTF)-170 and JTF-
GTMO commanding officer General Michael Dunlavey and JTF-435 Iraq detention 
commanding officer General Douglas Stone were also crucial because of where and 
36 
when they served. Retired soldiers including Vietnam War Medal of Honour recipient 
Robert Howard, US Army and Defence Intelligence Agency veteran Paul Rester, 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operations Officers Robert Baer and Antonio, 
helped complete the historical picture. 
  Andy Worthington, a GTMO detainee advocate, provided criticism of US 
detention operations. I corresponded with Philippe Sands, author of Torture Team, but 
he could never work me into his schedule.  Mathew Waxman, the first Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defence for Detainee Affairs for the Bush Administration and a critic of 
many of the Executive office policies on detainees, was interviewed and he provided 
detailed information regarding his struggle against high level Bush administration 
appointees who did not want to officially apply the Geneva Convention common article 
three standard of humane treatment to the detainees.  Other critics were on my extensive 
list of potential interviews but none came to fruition.  Instead I relied on their published 
works and articles.   
I also had no opportunity to talk to detainees.  Other than several accounts by a 







 there are very few authenticated first-hand accounts published thus far.  
As more detainees are released and additional government documents are declassified, 
more data will become available for future research.  Another obstacle to the gathering 
of primary information for my research was my limited access to the battlefield and the 
Afghan and Iraqi populations affected by US detention policy and operations.   
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Much of their views are found in secondary sources
97
, but I did not do any social 
science fieldwork or data collection from among indigenous populations in warzones.  
My focus from the outset was to examine the issue from the perspective of US 
policymakers and detention operators.  My goal was to provide an accurate picture 
using the historical approach so that future actors will understand the HDC and avoid 
becoming mired in mistakes that are devastating to their campaign objectives. 
 In addition to interviews, this study reviewed hundreds of government 
documents available to the public via various archives and organisations who requested 
them under the Freedom of Information Act.  These comprised executive orders, 
correspondence between key policy makers, detention studies, memorandums, and 
investigations.  The US Department of Defence Armed Forces Press Service releases 
filled in gaps in the detention saga not covered by traditional media outlets.  
 Another valuable resource of historical detention documentation was the 
Library of Congress, where primary source documents from George Washington, 
Thomas Jefferson,
 
and Abraham Lincoln were recently transcribed and released.  These 
letters provided details of the birth of US detention policy and provided insight into the 
maturation of prisoner protocols.  Additional documents relating to detention policy 
during WWII also provided useable background data. 
Structure 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters; the introduction, conclusion, and three 
core case study chapters.  Each case study is broken down along the phases of the HDC 
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and mostly unfolds chronologically as per the historical method.  The Afghanistan case 
study chapter, examines US detention operations in Afghanistan between September 
2001 (9/11) and December 2011.  It covers pre-9/11 and all Department of Defence 
Operation Enduring Freedom designated phases that include the start of battlefield 
detention operations to the creation of long term theatre holding facilities. 
The GTMO case study chapter examines detention operations from December 
2001 through December 2011.  It includes a brief history of the US Naval base, a 
description of the standing up of JTFs 160 and 170 and their eventual consolidation into 
one JTF, and accounts of the initial Afghan war OEF phases that affected GTMO 
through detainee transfers and detailed the command tenures of the 11 general officers 
responsible for detention operations at GTMO as they passed through the phases of the 
HDC. 
The Iraq case study chapter examines detention operations from March 2003 to 
December 2011.  It maps the tenures of the primary detention commanders who served 
through the five phases of the HDC. Because the Iraq conflict has ended, it has 
advanced to the fifth HDC phase.  The chapter sets the historical context before the 
launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and then describes detention operations 
through all six operational phases of OIF and the final mission Operation New Dawn, 
which began 1 September 2010 when President Barak Obama declared major combat 
operations were over. 
The dissertation concludes with a chapter on major lessons learned from the 
three case studies and provides recommendations for future planners, leaders, and 
policy makers to consider. 
Summary 
Getting detention operations right from the start of a military operation is crucial to the 
success of the operation.  If it is done incorrectly then detention operations in 
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counterinsurgency-counterterrorism operations will become a liability to the overall 
success of the campaign.  The HDC is a model that is of value in looking at the 
detention lessons learned of past wars as well as organizing the phases of detention 
operations in an on-going conflict.   
This dissertation’s contribution to the field is the fact it is the first 
comprehensive examination of detention operations in a counterinsurgency-
counterterrorism operation for the period 2001 to 2011.  The current study contributes 
to the body of knowledge vital to the retentiveness of US detention history and thus, 
progress in the development of a cohesive detainee policy and productive operations.  It 
attempts to enrich the accounts and lessons learned as they are catalogued by calling 
attention to the HDC and warning against the evident tendency of the sixth phase (when 
all is forgotten during peacetime).  
Finally, this dissertation hopes to underline the importance of crafting policy 
that reflects the advances that can be made by overcoming challenges of the past.  The 
US will surely face detention crises in future conflicts and may avoid grave errors by 
learning from the historical record.  In the final account there is no escaping the fact that 
US policymakers, operational planners, and military personnel must ‘[l]earn from the 
past, prepare for the future, [and] live in the present’.98 This dissertation, by addressing 
an important but previously under-examined subject, will hopefully form a contribution 
to the literature that can make this not only possible but likely.  
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Afghanistan Case Study 
Detention, if not done properly, can actually harm the effort.  We are a learning 
organization . . . we believe transparency is certainly going to help the effort, and 
increase the credibility of the whole process. 
- CJIATF-435 Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mark Martins99 
It is essential to who we are as a fighting force that we get [detainee treatment] right. 
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen100 
Introduction 
US involvement in detention operations in Afghanistan began in October 2001 and thus 
far has followed the first four phases of the HDC.  In the first phase, conflict broke out 
when Al-Qaeda attacked the US on 9/11 and the first Al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners 
were captured when the US invaded Afghanistan.  War planners and policy makers 
were ill prepared for the paradigm shift in detention operations that emerged as part of a 
counterterrorism kill-capture programme.  The ensuing debate focused on detainee 
classification, rights, and treatment under international law.  Furthermore, there was 
little thought for holding detainees long term as the US military and its allies scrambled 
to assemble the resources needed to detain, care for, and interrogate them.  Initial 
holding facilities in Bagram and Kandahar were inadequate for large numbers of 
detainees and they were quickly overwhelmed. 
In phase two, mistakes were made in the detainee handling and incarceration 
process.  When prisoners were transported from their point of capture to the rear, there 
were inadequate facilities, insufficient numbers of translators and interrogators and they 
were not adequately segregated.  Lack of trained detention personnel, proper oversight, 
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and confusion about detainee procedural policy led to the deaths of several detainees 
and US government agents; these deaths were a catalyst for change. 
In phase three of the HDC, the US began to correct problems in detainee 
handling and policy, and US detention facilities were improved to house a greater 
number of prisoners. The strategic long term holding facility at GTMO was 
commissioned with the intention of accommodating detainees with the highest 
intelligence value from the Afghanistan theatre.  Legal debate over classification and 
treatment of detainees continued in Congress, the executive branch, and the courts.  The 
Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq and the investigations that followed spurred 
reforms in Afghanistan and other US detention sites and are discussed at length in the 
chapters on Iraq and GTMO.  Phase four operated simultaneously with phase three as 
detainees were reintegrated back into their home communities first under a US release 
program and finally under an Afghan government sponsored program. 
Detention operations improved slowly until summer 2009, when 
recommendations from newly retired Marine General Douglas Stone were 
implemented.  These reforms dramatically alleviated the rapidly deteriorating Afghan 
prison system and called for the creation of a new task force (TF) that centralised all US 
detention operations.  The new JTF-435 paved the way for establishing a more effective 
detention process and improved rule of law in Afghanistan.  The US projected a 
turnover of detention operations to the Afghans in January 2011 that partially occurred.   
Historical Context 
On 9/11, Special Agent Wong was on duty in New York City when American Airlines 
Flight 11 hit the North Tower of the WTC at 8:46 AM.  Initially, he assumed it was an 
accident.  When he arrived on the scene, he thought the National Transportation Safety 
Board was in charge, but the New York Fire Department had set up a command post 
42 




When United Airlines Flight 175 hit the South Tower at 9:03 AM, Wong heard 
and felt the impact.  A fireman staggered into the centre and said the other tower had 
been hit.  In an instant, Wong realised the country was at war.  He phoned FBI 
headquarters in Washington, DC and learned at least two other planes were 
unaccounted for.
102
 Within the hour, Wong spoke briefly with O’Neill in the lobby of 
the North Tower.  O’Neill was on his cell phone with Frances Townsend, a former 
Justice Department official who would eventually become the Homeland Security 
Advisor to President George W. Bush.
103
 Wong was one of the last people to see 
O’Neill alive.104 After chasing Bin Laden for six years, O’Neill died in the South 
Tower; New York Police Department officers found his body 21 September.
105
 
 When President Bush learned of the attacks, he determined the US would fight 
those responsible.
106
 He received the news from Chief of Staff Andrew Card, in front of 
a group of elementary school children and reporters in Sarasota, Florida.
107
 On 14 
September, Bush visited the WTC site.  He was moved by the destruction and the raw 
emotion of the rescue workers.  In a watershed moment of his presidency, he stood on a 
burned out fire truck to speak to the workers.  As he yelled into a bullhorn his message 
was swallowed up by the vastness of the rubble.  Several shouted that they couldn’t hear 
him.  Bush responded:  ‘I can hear you.  The rest of the world hears you.  And the 
people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon’!108 For hours, he met 
with families of victims who still hoped their loved ones would come out of the rubble 
alive.  His determination to act deepened and the understanding that this would be the 
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focus of his presidency began to sink in.  Of the terrorists, he said:  ‘the doctrine is, if 
you harbour them, feed them, house them, you’re just as guilty, and you will be held to 
account’.109  He decided the war would be fought on many fronts including:  
intelligence, financial, and diplomatic, as well as by the military. 
US law enforcement and the intelligence community were caught unawares and 
shortly would be at odds over what approaches were best suited to respond.  Wong said: 
‘if, pre-9/11, it was suggested terrorists could “hijack airplanes with box cutters and fly 
them into the WTC”, we would have just laughed.  We would’ve said, “what are you 
nuts”?  But yet somehow they thought of it.  They were able to come up with a plan’.110 
Reportedly, even Bin Laden was surprised the towers had collapsed; he expected only 
the top floors would come down.
111
 
Former Soviet soldiers were some of the first to comment on the imminent 
combat the US was about to undertake.  The Soviet’s spent a decade in Afghanistan 
fighting a tough, determined, and elusive enemy.  Almost 15,000 Soviet soldiers were 
killed in the conflict that began in late 1979, and hundreds of thousands were 
wounded.
112
 Veteran Alexei Parfyonov said he understood Americans’ anger and 
eagerness to avenge the attacks of 9/11, but warned:  ‘America now may think they can 
defeat anyone, but when the first coffins arrive in America, they will lose their 
arrogance’.113 
Lester Grau, an expert on Soviet tactics and strategy in Afghanistan, speculated 
the Soviet Policy terrorised the people instead of winning them over.  Soviet soldiers 
were discouraged from interacting with local Afghans, which further isolated the two 
peoples.  During combat operations, the Soviets launched artillery on villages with no 
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warning.  Most of what they did seemed to harden the resolve of the resistance much 




Before the Russians, the British suffered the greatest humiliation in the history 
of their Empire in Afghanistan in 1842.
115
  Even Alexander the Great’s military 
struggled to subdue the Afghan tribes in 327 BC.
116
  Afghanistan’s reputation as ‘the 
graveyard of empires’ was richly deserved.117 
HDC Phase I:  The Conflict Starts and Detainees Are Captured 
On 9/11, shortly after what Al-Qaeda called ‘the planes’118 operation hit the World 
Trade Center, US Army General James Marks assumed command of the US Army 
Intelligence Centre at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.  He acquired one aircraft to move the 
highest-ranking senior Army intelligence officers, on post for an Army-wide 
Intelligence Conference, off his post in preparation for the pre-war planning.
119
 At 
Huachuca, analysts and interrogators were trained to work detention operations.  Marks 
had just returned from three and a half years overseas supporting operations in South 
Korea and Bosnia and he understood the importance of making training relevant for 
personnel bound for a war zone.  But Huachuca’s instructor base lacked experienced 




US Central Command (CENTCOM) Combatant Commander Army General 
Tommy Franks was en route to a meeting in Pakistan on 9/11 when he got word of the 
attacks.  Immediately, he knew Bin Laden was responsible.  The 9 September 
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assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud suddenly made sense; 
Bin Laden needed Massoud out of the way before Al-Qaeda launched its attack.  Franks 
knew the US would go after both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.  He ordered the aircraft to 
reverse course for MacDill Air Force Base in Florida.
121
 
On 12 September, Franks arrived at his Tampa headquarters and spoke with 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Hugh Shelton.  Shelton asked 
how long it would take to get a full range of courses of action (COAs).  Franks returned 
a day later with an overarching concept and provided a full range of options ten days 
later.  The goal was to destroy Al-Qaeda and the Taliban through the use of technology 
and combat ground troops.  Frank’s staff started from scratch; there was no pre-
developed strategy for a full-scale, ‘boots on the ground’ invasion of Afghanistan.  This 
would have entailed diplomatic discussions for basing, staging of troops and equipment, 
and aircraft fly-overs with countries bordering Afghanistan, but during the Clinton 
Administration there was no appetite to prepare for such operations.
122
 
Franks based his plans on the understanding the President was committed to 
using the full force of the US military against the perpetrators of 9/11.
123
 Tomahawk 
land attack missile strikes would destroy the Taliban’s integrated air defence system, 
softening the battlefield for ground forces, followed by B-2 stealth bomber strikes using 
precision-guided joint direct attack munitions.
124
 After the bombing campaign, the 
ground war phase would employ special operations forces (SOF), made up of Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Special Activities Division personnel, Army Green Berets, 
Navy SEALs, Air Force combat controllers, and special mission operators from the 
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).
125
 The use of SOF had been highly 
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encouraged by Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz
126
 and Secretary Rumsfeld 
on 15 September in a conversation with General Franks and on 21 September the plan 




The SOF would stage the invasion from the USS Kitty Hawk, a converted US 
Navy aircraft carrier in the North Arabian Sea.  The Kitty Hawk would act as a ‘lily pad’ 
allowing SOF to leap frog into Afghanistan from the carrier, thus avoiding the 
complicated issues of establishing basing rights in neighbouring countries.
128
 In 
December 2000, the CIA had laid out a plan to go after Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.  
Agency officers were ready to execute just hours after the first plane hit on 9/11, but 
they had to wait for the military planners to catch up.
129
  
On 9/11, Gary Schroen, the former Deputy Chief of the Near East and South 
Asia Division in the Directorate of Operations at the CIA, had just begun a 90-day 
retirement transition programme.
130
 He had worked in Afghanistan intermittently since 
the late 1970s and personally knew many senior Northern Alliance commanders.
131
 On 
13 September, CIA Director George Tenet laid out the agency’s plan to attack Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban to Bush and this War Cabinet.  The operation called for CIA 
paramilitary teams to link up with the Northern Alliance to pave the way for SOF to 
enter the country.
132
  From the outset, the Bush administration showed its propensity 
towards the intelligence-collection school-of-thought. 
On 14 September, Schroen was called into a meeting with Cofer Black, head of 
the CIA’s Counterterrorism Centre and asked to delay retirement for one more mission.  
He would lead a seven-man team into Afghanistan, link up with the Northern Alliance, 
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and convince them to work with the US in their fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.  
Black assured him all the resources he needed would be at his disposal to accomplish 
the mission. 
133
 On 15 September, Tenet further detailed his plan to the War Cabinet in 
a brief entitled ‘Destroying International Terrorism’.  A cornerstone of the strategy was 
the ability to ‘detain AQ operatives unilaterally anywhere in the world’.134 This was the 
beginning of the post 9/11, combined US intelligence ‘Kill-Capture program’,135 that 
would eventually ‘find, fix and finish’ Bin Laden and many others136 and would rely 
heavily on the ability to collect intelligence from any source available. 
 Schroen’s team was officially known as the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team 
but went by the code name ‘Jawbreaker’.137 This moniker had been used for teams 
going inside Afghanistan since early 2000.
138
 After assembling his men and making 
preparations to leave, the team gathered their equipment, US$3 million in cash and 
departed 19 September for Germany.
139
 Prior to their departure, Black clarified the 
mission for his men: 
You are to convince the Northern Alliance to work with us and to accept US 
military forces into the Panjshir Valley so we can utilise the area as a base of 
operations.  Beyond that, your mission is to exert all efforts to find Usama bin 
Ladin and his senior lieutenants and to kill them . . . I do not want bin Ladin and 
his thugs captured, I want them dead.  Alive and in prison here in the United 
States, they’ll become a symbol, a rallying point for other terrorists . . . They must 
be killed . . . I want bin Ladin’s head shipped back in a box filled with dry ice . . . 
Have I made myself clear?
140
 
                                                          
133
 Schroen, pp. 15-19 
134
 Tenet, p. 177 
135
 Stephen Grey and Dan Edge, ‘Kill/Capture,’ PBS Frontline, May 2011 
136
 Eric Rosenbach and Aki Perits, ‘New Find-Fix-Finish Doctrine,’ JFQ, Issue 61, 2nd Quarter 2011, (St. 
Louis, MO:  NDU Press:  April 2011), p. 96 
137
 Schroen, p. 22 
138
 Gary Berntsen, JAWBREAKER, (NYC:  Crown Publishers, 2005), p. 45 
139
 Schroen, pp. 28-29 
140
 Ibid., p. 38 
48 




 On 18 September 2001, the US Congress passed Public Law 107-40, a joint 
resolution known as the Authorisation for Use of Military Force.  The law cited the 
‘acts of treacherous violence’ on 9/11 and reiterated the right of the US to defend itself 
and protect its citizens abroad.  Section 2 specifically stated: 
That the President is authorised to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organisations, or persons he determines planned, authorised, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harboured such organisations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 




This law gave the President the authority and legal basis for killing or detaining 
individuals involved in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
143
 
 On 20 September, Bush delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban government of 
Afghanistan:  deliver to US authorities all Al-Qaeda leaders, release all foreign 
nationals including imprisoned American citizens, protect all journalists, diplomats, and 
aid workers, close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp, hand 
over every terrorist and every person in the terrorists’ support structure to appropriate 
authorities and give the US full access to terrorist training camps.
144
 
In response, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar said he would never turn 
Bin Laden over to the US.  Interviewed on the Voice of America, he claimed it would be 
a violation of Islam and against his duty as a Muslim to deliver Bin Laden to infidels.
145
 
He told Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusefzai: 
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I will never deliver bin Laden . . . I know I can’t fight the Americans, but if God 
helps me I will survive.  I don’t want to go down in history as someone who 
betrayed his guest.  I am willing to give my life, my regime, since we have given 
him refuge, I cannot throw him out now.
146
 
The US government continued to work UN diplomatic channels before the invasion.  
UN Secretary General Kofi Anan’s Special Envoy Francesc Vendrell met with the 
Taliban’s Ambassador to Pakistan Abdul-Salam Zaeef in Islamabad and Mullah Omar 
in Kandahar on several occasions in an effort to pressure the Taliban to detain and turn 
over Bin Laden.
147
 His efforts were unsuccessful. 
On 26 September, Jawbreaker arrived in the Panjshir Valley and met with 
Northern Alliance leaders in the village of Barak.
148
 Schroen made it clear to Engineer 
Aref, the Chief of Northern Alliance Intelligence, the US would support them in 
destroying the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and US military forces were preparing to invade 
the country.  As a gesture of good faith, Schroen handed him US$500,000 in cash and 
guaranteed further payments.  Over the next 40 days, Schroen paid out US$5 million to 
ensure the collapse of the Taliban.
149
 
 The US bombing campaign officially launching Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) began the evening of 7 October; US planes hit 31 targets across Afghanistan, but 
only three bombs were dropped near Kabul and nothing touched Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
positions on the front lines.  This was not enough to help the Northern Alliance break 
out of their lines and take Kabul..
150
 That night, Bin Laden released his first public 
statement accepting responsibility for the attacks on 9/11.
151
 Over the coming weeks, 
more CIA and SOF personnel were inserted into Afghanistan to mark bombing targets.  
As the future of Kabul was debated in Washington, DC, the pace of air attacks remained 
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a trickle.  Northern Alliance General Mohammed Fahim estimated it would take two or 




 The first use of US ground forces against the Taliban took place 19 and 20 
October when SOF and Army Rangers attacked an airfield (Objective Rhino), and a 
compound (Objective Gecko), outside of Kandahar that belonged to Mullah Omar.
153
 
US forces left calling card pictures of New York fire-fighters hoisting the US flag at the 
World Trade Centre site and fire fighters and military raising a flag at the Pentagon.
154
 
The sites had been mostly abandoned,
155
 but the psychological purpose was to 
demonstrate US capability in the heart of Taliban territory.
156
 Like the 1942 Doolittle 
Raid on Tokyo after Pearl Harbour,
157
 US forces showed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda they 
were vulnerable.  These missions ended the Clinton-era reticence to use US combat 
ground troops to fight an enemy. 
 During the first week of November, the US stepped up air raids; with multiple 
CIA and SOF teams on the ground working with the Northern Alliance, the US began 
systematically destroying enemy strongholds.
158
 On 10 and 11 November, the US 
launched 25 air strikes killing more than 2,000 fighters and taking out 29 tanks and six 
command bunkers.
159
 By 12 November, the battle on the Shomali Plains was in full 
swing.  The ground offensive to take Kabul began with 15,000-pound BLU-82 ‘Daisy 
Cutter’ bombs dropped on enemy positions; the Northern Alliance entered Kabul the 
morning of the 13th.  By 14 November the Taliban had fled south.
160
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 Jawbreaker was in a hurry to get to Al-Qaeda safe houses and foreign fighters 
for intelligence purposes, but the Northern Alliance captured many of them first, 
holding them at a schoolhouse prison, and it was difficult to gain access.  From the start, 
the Arab and Pakistani prisoners provided cover stories.  They ‘fit the same profile: 
poor, uneducated, seemingly clueless young men’ who ‘parroted the same stock 
answers:  They had come to Afghanistan recently for the purpose of doing business or 
working for a charitable organisation and had been trapped by the outbreak of fighting.’  
The Arab prisoners were ‘all scared to death’ of the Northern Alliance and appeared 
willing to trade any information they had for their lives.
161
 
Intelligence collected by Jawbreaker indicated one group of Al-Qaeda went 
south into Logar province, while Bin Laden and another contingency moved east 
towards Jalalabad near the Tora Bora Mountains, where he had developed an extensive 
cave complex during the 1980s while fighting the Soviets.
162
 These reinforced caves 




To the north and west, US air strikes and Northern Alliance ground attacks were 
crushing enemy forces; on 24 November, 600 Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters who had 
fled Konduz unexpectedly showed up at the Mazar-e-Sharif airport to surrender.
164
 
Most of the small US ground force had already moved to positions near Konduz and 
were unable to assist in the surrender to Northern Alliance Generals’ Atta Mohammed 
Noor and Abdul-Rashid Dostum.  It took the Northern Alliance two hours to conduct 
the full surrender and collect the enemy’s weapons, but only ‘about every fifth Taliban 
fighter was getting a cursory pat-down’.165 Dostum, a former communist union leader-
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turned militia commander, fought the US-backed mujahedeen during the 1980s.
166
 He 
had a history of switching sides when politically expedient, and despite his concession 
to keep the prisoners at the airport, he delivered them to the Qalat-e-Janghi, a fortress 
south of Mazar-e-Sharif where a cache of weapons, ammunition, RPGs, rockets, and 
rifles were stored awaiting demolition.
167
 
At Qalat-e-Janghi, the Northern Alliance divided the prisoners into two groups:  
the first, comprised of Afghans, was given the prerogative to swear allegiance to the 
Northern Alliance and return home to their villages or join the Northern Alliance in the 
fight.  The other group encompassed the foreign fighters.  They included Chechens, 
Pakistanis, Chinese (Uyghurs), Uzbeks, Arabs, a few Westerners and their hard-core 
Al-Qaeda allies.  These ‘would-be martyrs’ were to be detained and interrogated.168 
The next morning, 25 November, CIA officers Michael Spann and David 
Dawson
169
 travelled to the fortress to begin debriefing prisoners.
170
 As they left their 
base in Mazar-e-Sharif, several SOF offered to provide security for them, but Dawson 
refused.
171
 These SOF were from US Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 595, 5
th
 
Special Forces Group, and had been with Dostum’s forces when the prisoners 
surrendered.
172
 They were concerned that the prisoners had not been adequately 
searched and believed many had weapons and explosives still on them; prisoners had 
killed at least two Northern Alliance commanders already.
173
 
Spann and Dawson were looking for foreign fighters with knowledge of Bin 
Laden’s whereabouts or information about future attacks.  As Spann walked through the 
rows of prisoners bound and seated on the ground of the inner courtyard, he stopped to 
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53 
speak to the Western looking John Walker Lindh.
174
 He questioned Lindh in English, 
but Lindh kept his head down and refused to answer.  Spann and Dawson sifted through 
prisoners until 11:15 AM, when one of the prisoners detonated a grenade, sending the 
courtyard into chaos.  Within minutes, the prisoners killed at least 20 guards and 
Michael Spann, secured the makeshift armoury stockpiled with weapons, and controlled 
half the fortress.
175
 The Northern Alliance’s failure to search and properly screen 
prisoners had enabled the revolt. 
President Bush said the calamity at Qalat-e-Janghi underlined the need for a US 
detention facility away from the battlefield.
176
 In response to Spann’s death, CIA 
headquarters forbade all teams in the field from entering prisons to interrogate 
detainees.  Gary Berntsen, who replaced Schroen as Jawbreaker’s leader, told his team 
they would not obey the order because it would severely hamper their efforts to collect 
vital intelligence.
177
 This was clearly an overreaction from leadership and he would not 
let it hamper their efforts to do their jobs. 
Members of the international media observed the surrender of Taliban forces in 
Mazar-e-Sharif, accompanied Dostum to the fortress, documented the uprising, and 
witnessed the deaths of more than 300 prisoners.  ODA-595’s interaction with Dostum’s 
forces was heavily scrutinised and they were accused of using disproportionate force.  
By 28 November, Northern Alliance troops had reclaimed most of the prison except for 




When they finally surrendered, survivors were loaded into shipping containers 
on 1 December with other prisoners from Konduz and sent to Sheberghan Prison west 
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 An estimated 150 prisoners were crammed into each container.  
Along the way, many suffocated and others were killed when Dostum’s guards opened 
fire into the containers.  The bodies were reportedly buried with the dead from the 
Qalat-e-Janghi battle in the Dasht-e-Leili desert outside Sheberghan.
180
 Dostum claimed 
the deaths were unintentional,
181
 but the killings called into question the safety of 6,000 
other Taliban prisoners in Northern Alliance custody.
182
 
Prisoners had been arriving at Sheberghan Prison since the fall of Konduz on 22 
November.  US SOF and intelligence screening teams were in the area when the 
prisoners arrived from Qalat-e-Janghi.  US 5th Group estimated 40 prisoners had died 
from their combat wounds en route, but survivors put the number as high as 1,000.
183
 In 
2002, a declassified US State Department report estimated as many as 1,500 died in the 
containers.
184
 In July 2009, President Obama ordered an investigation into the US’s role 
in the alleged cover-up.
185
 
The US Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in Kuwait,
186
 
the headquarters for the ground war, ordered Lieutenant General Franklin Hagenbeck, 
Commander of the 10
th
 Mountain Division, to assist the Northern Alliance with the 
screening of prisoners at Sheberghan.  Hagenbeck created TF Commando, led by 
Brigade Commander Colonel Kevin Wilkerson.  Wilkerson assembled a team of 
infantry, security, military police (MPs), interrogation, and medical personnel to screen 
the prisoners and arrived 28 December.  He also developed a working understanding 
with Dostum and instituted a strict screening process in order to avoid another prisoner 
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revolt.  For more than two weeks prisoners were screened and those deemed to have 
high intelligence value were sent to Kandahar for further detention and exploitation.
187
 
On 13 November 2001, Bush, in anticipation of holding detainees long term, 
signed executive order Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism that laid the foundation for military commissions.  The order 
affected all aspects of US detention policy that followed.
188
 It placed the Department of 
Defence (DOD) over all detention and military commissions, something that had not 
been done in over 50 years.  Much of the language used in the order (which referred to 
commissions) came directly from President Franklin Roosevelt’s order to establish 
military commissions in 1942.
189
  
Opposition to the order began immediately; on 19 November when the director 
for the Centre for National Security Studies published a memorandum stating the 
military detention order was unconstitutional and violated the separation of powers.
190
 
On 5 December, a letter was sent to Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary committee, signed by 500 American law professors who disapproved of the 
military order and favoured using the US court system instead.
191
 Opposition continued 
to intensify as the war progressed.  From this moment on, the two ideological camps 
were defined; the Bush administration favoured the intelligence-collection school-of-
thought versus the judicial-Geneva school-of-thought.   
The inception of formal military detention and interrogation operations in 
Afghanistan began with General Franks’ request to Secretary of Defence Donald 
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Rumsfeld and CJCS General Meyers to create an interagency coordination cell.
192
  On 
20 November, CENTCOM approved a Joint Interagency Task Force for 
Counterterrorism (JIATF-CT) to be led by Harrell.  Franks wanted the JIATF-CT to 
fuse the intelligence stream together to be ‘stove piped’ and sent directly back to him.  
He trusted Harrell implicitly and dubbed him ‘the quarterback’.193  
The team was comprised of 30 military personnel, primarily from CENTCOM 
and SOF.  Additional members were provided by the CIA, the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA), the FBI, the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), the US Customs 
Service, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
the Justice, Treasury, and State Departments, and New York’s Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTF).  An advance team was sent to Afghanistan at the end of November and 
the remainder deployed throughout December.
194
 By the end of 2001, JIATF-CT was 




The JIATF-CT’s primary function was to maintain real-time communications 
between Afghanistan and Washington and serve as an intelligence fusion centre while 
jointly operating the prison and interrogation facility at Bagram.
196
 Instead of selecting 
an active duty asset, Marine Intelligence Reservist Master Sergeant John Nichols was 
pulled out of the Individual Ready Reserve and mobilised as the non-commissioned 
officer in charge of TF-Bowie.  Responsible for detention and interrogation operations, 
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The TF identified 11 of the top 25 Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets sought by the 
US and established Afghanistan’s first border security programme using multi-agency 
resources to collect biometric data.  The intelligence obtained by TF-Bowie in the early 
months of the war ‘saved American lives and led to some critical, time sensitive special 
ops missions’.198 CJCS General Meyers praised TF-Bowie’s interrogation facility as 
‘the most capable in the theatre’199 and affirmed that the JIATF-CT functioned just as 
he and Rumsfeld envisioned when they authorised its creation.
200
 
On 25 November 2001, US Marine Corps (USMC) TF-58, commanded by 
Brigadier General James Mattis
201
 captured Mullah Omar’s airfield and the compound 
originally attacked by SOF and Rangers on 10 October and established Forward 
Operating Base (FOB) Rhino.
202
 Rhino, 55 miles southwest of Kandahar at Dolangi, 
was a remote airstrip renovated by Bin Laden and used by wealthy Saudis.
203
 TF-58 
established Camp Rhino, the first major US base in Afghanistan, as a logistics hub and 
staging base.  A month later, CFLCC ordered the establishment of a prisoner holding 
facility at the base
204
 large enough to hold 100 prisoners.
205
 Ultimately, the only 
prisoner to be held at the facility was Lindh,
206
 and he was eventually  transferred to the 
brig aboard the USS Peleliu
207
 positioned off the coast of Pakistan.
208
 Taliban 





 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and the Navy Seabees kept 
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Camp Rhino in working order,
210
 but the FOB was closed 4 January 2002 when 
Kandahar fell and operations were transferred there.
211
 
During autumn 2001, the US Army mobilised a group of interrogators to support 
combat operations; reservists from the 325th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion in 
Hartford, Connecticut were deployed in October to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to assist 
their active duty parent unit, the 525th MI Brigade, and to provide intelligence support 
to the XVIII Airborne Corps also at Fort Bragg.  This group ultimately became TF-500, 
responsible for detention and intelligence collection in Kandahar.
212
 
 By December 2001, US SOF had pinned Bin Laden and his forces in Nangarhar 
province in the Tora Bora Mountains.
213
 This area had been Bin Laden’s base of 
operations during the war against the Soviets and he had spent years turning the 
limestone into an impregnable fortress.
214
 The US sustained a weeklong bombing 
campaign that pushed the Al-Qaeda fighters into the mountains, killing approximately 
500 in the process.
215
 At one point, SOF recovered a radio tuned to an Al-Qaeda 
frequency and listened in on communications outlining their desperate need for food 
and water and heard Bin Laden inspiring his men to keep fighting.
216
 The CIA’s top Bin 
Laden voice analysis expert was on the ground and authenticated his voice.
217
 They also 
learned Bin Laden had grown fearful of betrayal by his own men; he ‘no longer trusted 
the Taliban or other non-Arabs and had surrounded himself exclusively with Saudis and 
Yemenis’.218 He peeled off from the Algerian, Kuwaiti, Egyptian, Pakistani, Chechen, 
Libyan, and Afghan forces that fought in the mountains.  Afghan forces captured 22 Al-
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Qaeda fighters who confirmed they had recently shared tea with Bin Laden who urged 
them to continue fighting.
219
 
 On 15 December, SOF heard Bin Laden apologise to his men for their ordeal 
and led them in prayer.  Finally, they split up again with 135 men heading east into 
Pakistan while Bin Laden and 200 Saudis and Yemenis took a more difficult route 
into the Pashtun tribal areas of Parachinar, Pakistan.
220
 A Pashtun guide who 
sheltered Bin Laden as he recovered from his battle wounds was captured by SOF 
and confirmed that he had escaped into Pakistan.
221
 Pakistani forces captured ‘very 
large numbers’ of prisoners fleeing Afghanistan and on 10 December Secretary 
Rumsfeld said the US would be ‘deeply involved in interrogation and intelligence 
gathering . . . [from the] treasure trove’ of detainees.222  
The first phase of the war concluded 17 December, when the Northern Alliance 
publicly declared victory.
223
 It took just over two months and US$70 million to help the 
Northern Alliance liberate Afghanistan.  But even with 110 CIA officers, 350 SOF,
224
 
and US airpower, the main objective of killing or capturing Bin Laden was not 
achieved.
225
 The US clearly showed the focus the administration had on placing troops 
on the ground to deal with terrorists and collecting intelligence. 
On 12 December 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz testified 
before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on behalf of Rumsfeld regarding the 
historical use of military commissions from the Revolutionary War to the post-WWII 
era.
226
 He said of the 1,672 Germans prosecuted for war crimes by US military 
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commissions, convictions were obtained in 1,416 cases.  In Japan, the rate was similar; 
of 996 suspected war criminals, 856 were convicted.
227
 
Wolfowitz laid out a compelling case for keeping unlawful belligerents out of 
the civilian courts.  First, he said, military commissions protect judges, jurors, courts, 
and the trials from terrorist threats and provide quick, safe, and secure trials.  Second, 
they have more flexible rules of evidence based on battlefield conditions that do not 
always allow for the forensic collection of evidence and chain of custody requirements 
that are required in the civilian courts.  Third, they allow for the use of classified 
information without risking the sources and methods used to obtain the information.
228
 
Wolfowitz would prove prophetic.  He juxtaposed coalition forces storming a 
Taliban compound or an Al-Qaeda safe house and then providing a search warrant.  In 
previous wars, military commissions were held at the end of the conflict rather than 
during it.  This added a layer of complexity to the process but explained to the world 
how the US was going to deal with the terrorists who had perpetrated 9/11. 
In December 2001, US forces began taking and holding their own prisoners.  
Detainees were typically hooded and zip-tied for transport and remained so until they 
were imprisoned away from the battlefield.
229
 DOD doctrine and standard operating 
procedure (SOP) dictated that capturing units affix a capture tag to each detainee 
detailing the circumstances of each prisoner’s apprehension including:  the date and 
time of capture, a field-assigned temporary serial number, the detainee’s name, date of 
birth, prisoner’s unit or organisation, capturing unit, location of capture (in eight digit 
grid coordinates), physical condition at the time of capture, and any weapons, 
equipment, or documents he may have had on his person at the time of detainment.
230
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 Failure to obtain any of this critical information rendered many detainees in an 
on-going state of detention limbo, a premature release before a proper intelligence 
debriefing, or, as often was the case, an interminable cycle of ineffectual interrogation.  
Capturing units were instructed to follow the SOP of search, silence, segregate, 
safeguard, speed, and tag (five Ss & T),
 




At Camp Rhino, General Mattis received word the 15
th
 MEU would return home 
and the 26
th
 MEU would move to the Kandahar airport to provide security to Seabees 
building the new detainee holding facility.  Speed of construction was hampered by 
unmarked Soviet-era mines, unexploded ordnance, garbage, and limited space.  
Members of the Army’s TF-500 arrived 19 December 2001 to assist with the arrival of 
the first prisoners.
232
 By 21 December, the Kandahar Short-Term Holding Facility 
(STHF), also known as the Kandahar Holding Area, was ready to support 200 detainees, 
but CENTCOM ordered capacity increased to 500.  On 27 December, Assistant 
Secretary of Defence for Public Affairs Torie Clarke confirmed that 37 detainees were 
in custody at the STHF and another eight were aboard the USS Peleliu.
233
 The next day, 
28 December, 25 additional prisoners were transferred from Pakistan to US custody in 
Kandahar.
234




On 28 December 2001, five teams of Russian, Arabic, and Farsi-speaking 
interrogators arrived at the STHF to work with the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) 
at the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF).  Most of the 40 detainees were foreign Arab 
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 Canadian Special Forces assigned to JTF2 in Kandahar also turned their 
battlefield detainees over to the SHTF for processing which caused some Canadians 
concern over US assurances to comply with the Geneva Conventions.
237
 The ICRC was 
invited into the STHF and conducted regular visits.
238
 
 Mattis was security-conscience and mindful of the revolt at Qalat-e-Janghi as 
well as other attacks on guards in Pakistan.  He was determined there would be no 
prisoner breakouts at the Kandahar STHF and ordered his personnel to follow the 
Geneva Conventions, but instructed that any prisoner caught trying to escape be shot.  
To minimise attempts at mass breakouts, each prisoner holding area was limited to 20 
detainees.  Like the TF-Bowie prisoner facility in Bagram, the Kandahar STHF was 
open to military, coalition, and US government agencies to interrogate prisoners as long 
as any information collected was shared immediately with TF-58.  Those who failed to 
comply were escorted out of the country.
239
 
An influx of detainees from all over Afghanistan and Pakistan arrived in late 
December and early January 2002.  The TF strained to manage their care and feeding 
requirements.  Army MPs and additional interrogators arrived with supplies, which 
improved conditions for the detainees.
240
 Interrogators found the detainees fell into two 
groups:  a small number of ideologically committed Al-Qaeda fighters or the majority 
who claimed to have been coerced into fighting.  Those who pleaded for non-combatant 
status had myriad excuses for being in Afghanistan:  to marry local brides, to work for 
charitable organisations, or to study the Qu’ran.241 CENTCOM was eager to remove all 
prisoners from the combat theatre of operations and relinquish their care, feeding, and 
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interrogation to the Pentagon.
242
 Franks felt that given his limited amount of troops, he 
did not have the resources to dedicate to prisoner detention operations in theatre.
243
 
Rumsfeld was ‘displeased to have the Defence Department take on the detention 
mission and protested the idea repeatedly’, but he understood how vital the intelligence 
collected from detainees would be to saving American lives.  He also realised the US 
‘could not count on any other country to perform the mission and no other agency of the 
US government was ready to do it’, so Rumsfeld accepted the task, recognising the 
mission would ‘be a source of more trouble and more criticism than anyone could 
predict.  It proved every bit as bad as he anticipated’.244 
His hesitancy stemmed from the fact that the DOD had no experience dealing 
with long-term detention and incarceration for an unlimited amount of time with an 
asymmetric, unconventional enemy.  The DOD was used to interrogating and detaining 
prisoners who followed the internationally accepted rules of war as lawful combatants 
who met the standards for POW status.
245
 The drafters of the Geneva Conventions had 
not envisaged the rules to be applied to a group of terrorists who fought asymmetrically 
and provided no reciprocity.
246
 This very issue would be at the heart of the ensuing 
debate on detention. 
The US needed to prevent another terrorist attack and unlike the Cold War, 
where satellite technology could warn of impending aggression, the GWOT depended 
on human intelligence (HUMINT) to discover mujahadeen capabilities, plans, and 
locations.  Until counterterrorism (CT) operators could penetrate terrorist cells, the best 
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HDC Phase II:  Mistakes Are Made in Detainee Handling and Incarceration 
After 9/11, the Pentagon went to work to identify a potential holding site for the 
detainees in order to remove them from the battlefield and start the intelligence 
collection process ensued.  Both the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defence (OSD) developed plans and looked at facility sites.
248
 Navy Commander Kirk 
Lippold, the skipper of the USS Cole in October 2000 when it was attacked by Al-
Qaeda off the coast of Yemen, was working at the Pentagon on 9/11.  Assigned to the 
Joint Staff in the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5), Global Division, Lippold was on 
the team tasked to handle detention policy.
249
 
 The division leadership had no experience dealing with detention policy and 
operations.  The officer in charge was an Army infantry officer, J-5 Deputy Director 
Brigadier General Chuck Jacobi, and his assistant was US Air Force (USAF) Colonel 
Michael Spencer, an A-10 pilot.  They relied heavily on the counsel of operational law 
attorney Kathy Knowls, whose expertise was the law of armed conflict.  Her team 
recommended all high-level Taliban and Al-Qaeda members be taken into US custody, 
but advised that Taliban foot soldiers be removed from the battlefield and held until the 
new Afghan government could assume responsibility for them.
250
 
The staff considered various locations for detention centres including:  Diego 
Garcia, Tinian, Guam, Kwajalein, and Guantanamo Bay (GTMO).  Other foreign 
governments also volunteered to host detention facilities, but the staff decided that 
changing political situations would be problematic if detainees were located in those 
countries and determined that sending detainees to US territories like Guam would 
trigger constitutional issues.  British-controlled Diego Garcia was a good option, but it 
lacked the infrastructure to support detention operations.  The assets on Kwajalein, a 
small Pacific Island, were already committed to other missions.  The team concluded 
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GTMO, a US-controlled base on Cuban territory, was the best of all the options.
251
 




 At the OSD, Rumsfeld initially assigned detention policy to Matt Vaccaro, the 
Director of the Office of Peace Operations in the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defence for Policy.
253
 His work laid the foundation for what became a new position, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence (DASD) for Detainee Affairs.
254
 Rumsfeld also 
relied on Paul Butler, a former federal prosecutor from the Southern District of New 
York who was the DASD for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 
(SOLIC).
255
 Butler tried USA v. Usama Bin Laden, which led to the conviction of four 
members of Al-Qaeda for their roles in the bombing of US Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania.
256
 Rumsfeld was so impressed with Butler’s work on detention matters, that 
he eventually made him his personal assistant.
257
 Lastly, Rumsfeld depended on DOD 
Office of General Counsel Attorney Eliana Davidson and made her the legal point 
person on detainee affairs.  She reported directly to William ‘Jim’ Haynes, the 
Pentagon’s senior lawyer who signed memos that went directly to Rumsfeld.258 Both 
Butler and Davidson clearly understood the differences in the two emerging ideological 
camps and supported the SECDEF as he moved forward with the intelligence-collection 
focus. 
In addition to the Joint Staff and the OSD, the State Department also developed 
recommendations on the detainee issue.  The day after 9/11, with war imminent, Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage contacted another lawyer, Pierre-Richard Prosper, 
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the State Department’s Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, to discuss the 
holding of POWs.  On 19 September 2001, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez 
appointed Prosper to head an interagency group to make recommendations on legal 
issues applying to Taliban and Al-Qaeda prisoners.  Separately, Gonzalez had another 
group of White House lawyers working on detainee issues and, on 13 November, 
President Bush signed the Executive Order on Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.  Prosper was blindsided by the 




 Prosper’s team examined approximately 16 sites for detainment facilities, taking 
into consideration whether they were US-owned or controlled, capable of expansion, 
and secure.  Of those, 15 sites had significant drawbacks, but during a meeting an 
unnamed Justice Department official suggested GTMO.  Immediately, it appeared to fit 
every criterion and did not even require a treaty with Cuba.
260
 Ultimately, Rumsfeld 
made the final decision; after weighing recommendations from the State Department, 
the Joint Staff, and his own people, he announced 28 December 2001 that HVDs would 
be sent to GTMO as the ‘least worst place’.261  
During the first week of January 2002, CFLCC ordered TF-58 to ready 
detainees for transfer to GTMO.  On the evening of 10 January, the Kandahar airport 
was attacked by small arms fire just as the first planeload of 20 detainees took off.
262
 
As US-held detainees in Afghanistan were transferred to GTMO, lawyers in the 
White House, State Department, the OSD, and Joint Chiefs debated their status and 
classification under the law with both the legal and intelligence camps making their 
points known to decision makers.  Because they were captured on the battlefield, 
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prisoners were initially labelled ‘enemy fighters captured in war’, but that was a 
temporary status.  The Bush Administration determined that legally, the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 did not apply to Al-Qaeda since they were not a party to the 
agreement.  Afghanistan, on the other hand, had signed the Convention, but some 
lawyers in the administration felt that because the government of King Mohammed 
Zahir Shah no longer existed, the Taliban regime was illegitimate, operating a failed 
state, and did not meet the legal burden of the signatories.
263
 
At the Pentagon, CJCS General Richard Myers strove to convince Rumsfeld the 
Geneva Conventions were the ‘gold standard’, and key to US military culture.  He was 
adamant all US held detainees be treated according to the fullest measure of the 
Conventions.  Rumsfeld agreed.
264
 
Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith argued that applying the 
Convention’s standards to Al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners was not the same as deciding 
that Taliban detainees were entitled to POW status.  Under the Conventions, in order for 
captured soldiers to merit POW status, they must fight overtly, respect non-combatants, 
wear recognisable uniforms, carry arms openly, fight under a chain of command, and 
respect the laws of war.  POW status was a privilege granted only to lawful combatants 
as an incentive for following the internationally accepted rules of warfare.  Feith 
contended that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban did not meet this standard but they should be 
given humane treatment as called for in the Conventions.
265
 POW privileges not 
accorded to the detainees included:  the rights to keep their ‘effects used for feeding’, be 
‘associated with the preparation of their meals’, (have KP privileges/duties), be 
provided with mess halls, run canteens and manage the profits, be provided with sports 
and games, but they would also be required to salute officers of the detaining power.  
Most importantly, POWs were protected from ‘physical or mental torture’, and ‘any 
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form of coercion’ to secure from them information of any kind whatever.  Those who 
refused to answer were not to be ‘threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or 
disadvantageous treatment of any kind’.266 
The classification debate over terrorist and non-nation state actors was not new.  
In the 1970s, several third world liberation movements fought to obtain recognition as 
legitimate combatants and be awarded the status of POW when captured. 
Representatives from President Gerald Ford’s Administration attended talks to amend 
the Conventions and President Jimmy Carter signed the two new protocols.
267
 Protocol 
1, articles 1, 44 and 45, broadened the scope of those who traditionally received POW 
status and legitimised those ‘fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’.268 
In 1987, President Ronald Reagan ruled against ratification of Protocol 1 
because he felt it would have granted the same rights to guerrilla-insurgent fighters and 
terrorists as nation state combatants who followed the laws of war.
269
 When the Bush 
Administration looked for guidance on classification the State Department’s legal 
advisor, William Taft wrote ‘the lawyers agree that al Qaeda or Taliban soldiers are 
presumptively not POWs’.  Secretary of State Colin Powell, a moderating voice in the 
administration due to his military background, agreed that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda 




The US could have followed the model crafted by Major General George Prugh 
during the Vietnam War and recognised the Taliban as the legitimate government of 
Afghanistan and then state that Al-Qaeda forces were a proxy force of the Taliban and 
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had the same rights as government Taliban forces.  This would have been similar to the 
US recognising the North Vietnamese government and granting the Viet Cong the same 
rights as regular prisoners in accordance with the principles of the Geneva 
Conventions.
271
 Had Reagan signed protocol 77, it would have granted Convention 
rights to foreign terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda.  
To settle the issue of detainee classification and status, President Bush met with 
the National Security Council (NSC) on 4 February 2002.  National Security Advisor 
Condaleeza Rice advocated treating detainees according to the principles of the Geneva 
Conventions regardless of their status as POWs.  Attorney General John Ashcroft 
disagreed.  He believed strict adherence to the Conventions would impede the 
interrogation process since the Conventions clearly stated prisoners could not be 
pressure into talking.  The President agreed with Rice.
272
 
On 7 February, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer announced the White 
House position on detainees:  the Geneva Conventions would apply to the conflict in 
Afghanistan against the Taliban but not the worldwide conflict against Al-Qaeda.  The 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda detainees would not be granted POW status, as they did not meet 
the standard of the Geneva Conventions, but they would be treated ‘humanely and 
consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention’.273 As to POW status, he 
explained: 
To qualify as POWs under Article 4, al Qaeda and Taliban detainees would have 
to have satisfied four conditions:  They would have to be part of a military 
hierarchy; they would have to have worn uniforms or other distinctive signs 
visible at a distance; they would have to have carried arms openly; and they 
would have to have conducted their military operations in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war . . . The war on terrorism is a war not envisaged when 
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70 
the Geneva Convention was signed in 1949.  In this war, global terrorists 
transcend national boundaries and intentionally target the innocent.
274
 
This announcement supported the official DOD policy implemented by Rumsfeld in his 
19 January memorandum reiterating that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were not entitled to 
POW status under the Geneva Conventions, but they were still to be treated humanely 
and consistently with the Geneva Conventions;
275
 basically the provisions of common 
article three of the conventions but not actually classifying them under Geneva. The 
detainees would receive food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment, religious books, 
correspondence materials, toiletries, and clothing, but they would not have access to a 
canteen to buy food, soap, and tobacco, receive monthly pay, musical instruments, and 
scientific equipment as called for in the Geneva Conventions.
276
 
In Afghanistan, interrogation and detention operations remained an integral part 
of the mission.  The Pentagon’s plan was for TF-500 to collect tactical battlefield 
information vital to troops on the ground, then send detainees to GTMO for long-term 
holding and strategic exploitation. CENTCOM issued criteria for capturing and holding 
detainees:  all Al-Qaeda prisoners, Taliban leaders, non-Afghan Taliban foreign 
fighters, anyone deemed a threat to US interests, anyone deemed to have intelligence 




 Interrogators at the Kandahar STHF categorised each detainee according to 
these guidelines and sent the list to CFLCC at Camp Doha in Kuwait where a detainee 
review board (DRB), a HDC phase four mechanism, decided which detainees would be 
transferred to GTMO.
278
 The DRB members consisted of Army intelligence, MPs, 
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civilian agencies, and the FBI.  Each group had its own motive for wanting prisoners 
moved to GTMO, but once a detainee was put on the transfer list by the CFLCC DRB 
and consigned into Army bureaucracy, it was next to impossible to have him removed 
from a transfer flight manifest.
279
 
Even as detainees were removed, others continued to arrive at the Kandahar 
STHF.  The TF-500 mobile interrogation team screened thousands of Northern Alliance 
prisoners at Sheberghan Prison and sent all non-Afghan detainees to Kandahar.  Others 
were captured by the Pakistani military or by Coalition SOF TF-Hatchet who worked 
alongside the Northern Alliance.
280
 Early in the war, SOF rarely turned capture reports 
over to interrogators explaining the circumstances surrounding the detainees’ capture.  
This massive influx of prisoners without paperwork was a huge problem for 
interrogators, who typically had to begin questioning by asking the detainee why he 
thought he had been detained.
281
 This gave the prisoners a gross advantage.  Of course, 
interrogators assumed if SOF had someone in custody, it was for good cause, but they 




The CIA, also known as the ‘other government agency’, (OGA)283 dumped 
detainees off at the STHF.  They ran their own interrogation facility in Kabul and when 
they finished with their prisoners, they would transfer them to the Kandahar STHF.
284
 
Their initial facility was constructed out of shipping containers set up on the corner of 
the base at Bagram surrounded by concertina wire,
285
 but they eventually moved to a 
ten-acre abandoned German built brick factory warehouse just north of the Kabul 
business district. 
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Codenamed the ‘Salt Pit’, in addition to a prison and interrogation centre, it was 
also used to train the new Afghan CT force.
286
 It became the first ‘black’ detention site 
authorised under the 17 September 2001 presidential finding signed by President Bush 
granting the CIA the power to prosecute the GWOT.  The finding allowed for the 
creation of a global network of ‘black’ detention sites to house terrorists seized by the 
CIA as part of their extraordinary rendition programme.
287
 In addition, Bush signed a 
memorandum of notification that allowed the CIA to conduct renditions with no prior 
approval from the White House, Department of Justice (DOJ), or State Department for 




The rendition of suspects from foreign countries to the US or from one state to 
another was upheld in 1886 by the Supreme Court ruling in Ker v. Illinois.  Subsequent 
rulings have supported its application to suspects apprehended in foreign countries.  The 
practice of extraordinary rendition, ‘the transfer of the suspect not back to the United 
States but to a third country, usually the suspect’s native home, for the incarceration and 
imprisonment there’ in order to be interrogated under laws not applicable in the US was 
a new adaptation of the practice.
289
  
The origin of the rendition programme dates back to National Security Directive 
77 (NSD) signed by President George H. W. Bush in 1992, which stated ‘return of 
suspects by force may be affected without the cooperation of the host government’.290 
Under President Bill Clinton, the programme was expanded on the basis of Presidential 
Decision Directive 39 signed 21 June 1995, which said: 
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When terrorists wanted for violation of U.S. law are at large overseas, their return 
for prosecution shall be a matter of the highest priority and shall be a continuing 
central issue in bilateral relations with any state that harbors or assists them.
291
  
Because the Clinton Administration had cut the intelligence budget to 20 to 30 per cent 
from the previous administration
292
 (US $26.7 billion in 1997
293
) and refused to exploit 
sources with questionable records, the CIA was forced to create the extraordinary 
rendition programme in 1995 to outsource the job of capturing, interrogating, and 
imprisoning terrorists.
294
 In 1998, the CIA realised the cuts had gone too far and 
requested funds to restore its core HUMINT capabilities.
295
 Until 2007, the total US 




The ‘Salt Pit’ building was labelled as an Afghan Military area and considered a 
host nation facility, but it was managed and financed by the CIA.
297
 While the agency 
had a tremendous amount of experience running debriefing facilities during the Cold 
War interviewing defectors and voluntary walk-ins, CIA interrogators were not 
accustomed to dealing with non-willing participants.
298
 Historically some CIA 
personnel had been trained to conduct hostile interrogations as described in the 1963 
Directorate of Operations KUBARK counterintelligence interrogation document.
299
 In 
general however, interrogating resistant sources was not their mission.
300
 Few agents 
were trained to conduct counterterrorism interrogations.
301
 The CIA was woefully 
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inexperienced running a prison for HVDs and because few seasoned agents wanted to 
be involved, the task fell to relatively junior officers.
302
 
Al-Qaeda members were trained in resistance techniques to help them navigate 
detention and interrogation.  This information gave them the advantage over their 
captors at the STHF.  In February 2002, when US forces entered the Al-Farooq Al-
Qaeda training camp abandoned when the Taliban government fell, they collected many 
documents including a 60-page photocopied manual.
303
 
 The pages were similar to the last two chapters of an official Al-Qaeda training 
manual recovered in 2000 in Manchester, England.  Discovered in the computer files of 
a known Al-Qaeda cell member, its contents were used as evidence in the 2001 trial of 
terrorists accused of bombing the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
304
 The 
‘Manchester Document’, as it came to be known, was an ideological guide on how to 
carry out terrorist operations.  Chapters one through 16 covered various tactics, 
techniques, and procedures from setting up safe houses and forging documents to 
making bombs and planning assassinations.  Chapters 17 and 18 explicitly instructed 




 The Al-Farooq version was exploited by TF-500 analysts.  It had an Al-Qaeda 
symbol stamped on the cover and the handwritten words:  ‘Brothers, this is the book 
about prisoners’.306  Protocol included passive resistance and instructed those captured 
to deflect, stall, and delay interrogation for at least 24 hours in order to give Al-Qaeda 
time to adjust their plans.  It instructed operatives to use false names and dates from the 
Islamic calendar to add confusion, tell stories out of sequence, and exploit any bruises 
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or capture wounds if ICRC representatives were accessible.  The manual claimed the 
US would not use torture because ‘the West didn’t have the stomach for such things’ 
and condescended ‘they are weak and are not warriors’, but warned that Arab 
governments would likely engage in torture.
307
 
 Some of the Al-Qaeda training appeared to be based on US Army Field Manual 
34-52 Intelligence Interrogation (FM 34-52), an unclassified, 177-page US military 
manual that described interrogation tactics and was available online.
308
 The manual 
specifically detailed the rules, techniques, and guidelines interrogators must follow 
under US and international law.
 309
 FM 34-52 was the interrogators’ ‘school house 
manual’ that governed interrogation operations during the early phase of the war.310 
Interrogators discovered most of the tactics in FM 34-52 were completely ineffective 
against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.  At Kandahar, interrogators recognised the prisoners 
were well trained in every ploy and tactic outlined in the document.  According to one 
senior interrogator: 
The most infuriating thing about the Al-Qaeda manual was that its core diagnosis 
was dead-on:  the Americans would keep you in a cage eating halal MREs and 
giving you showers a couple of times a week.  But when it came down to it, you 
could lie to them, refuse to talk, switch your story from one session to the next, 
and there wasn’t anything they could do about it.  In the long run, that was our 
strength.  But at the time it felt like a terrible weakness.
311
 
The greatest challenge for HUMINT collection was the dearth of cultural and linguistic 
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The second phase of the war began in February 2002 with Operation Anaconda.  
CENTCOM’s mission was to flush out the reported 200 to 250 enemy fighters 
reportedly hiding in the Shah-e-Kot Mountains near the Pakistani border.  Historically, 
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda did not fight in the winter so US forces planned a pre-
emptive strike on their strongholds.
313
 US intelligence detected a significant spike in 
Arabic cell phone coverage in the region and identified SUVs (the Arab fighters’ 
vehicle of choice) in the area, leading analysts to believe several high value targets 
(HVTs) might be wintering in the mountains.
314
 CENTCOM war planners strategized 
contingencies for HVTs to cross the terrain into Pakistan and put forth priority 
intelligence requirements for interrogators to find out from prisoners at Kandahar STHF 
which routes the targets would likely use to cross the mountains.
315
 
 Between 28 February
316
 and 18 March 2002,
317
 a force of 2,000 troops (a mix of 
conventional, SOF, local, and civilian agencies) attacked in the Shah-e-Kot 
Mountains.
318
 After the fighting, Afghan villagers said Al-Qaeda forces had been in the 
area for months preparing for a spring offensive but had recently left for Pakistan.  On 6 
March, Australian SOF witnessed a small group of well-armed enemy soldiers escorting 
‘a man with a cane who appeared older than the others’ and called in an A-10 air strike, 
‘but, frustratingly, no allied forces were able to conduct any bomb damage 
assessment’.319  Unconfirmed reports stated Al-Qaeda HVT second in command Ayman 
Al-Zawahiri suffered a head injury in the attack, but successfully crossed the border.
320
 
By 18 March, the battle was over and there were reports of ‘hundreds of enemy dead, 
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although the Pentagon claimed not to have kept count.  No prisoners from Anaconda 
were delivered to [the] Kandahar [STHF]’. 321 
On 15 February 2002, GTMO’s Camp X-ray reached maximum capacity of 312 
detainees.  Prisoner transfers from Kandahar ceased until the new Camp Delta facility 
was completed.
322
 The commander of JTF-170 at GTMO, Army General Michael 
Dunlavey, took advantage of the lull in prisoner transfers to visit the Kandahar STHF.  
Dunlavey expressed concern over the number of detainees sent to GTMO who should 
have remained in Afghanistan.  He requested an improvement in the evaluation process 
determining who should be transported.
323
 
 The set-up at the STHF appalled Dunlavey:  prisoners were housed in open 
holding pens in 12-man groups.  They had access to other prisoners to corroborate and 
strategize, and many of their real identities were still unknown.
324
 He recognised the 
layout of the STHF undermined the interrogators’ ability to collect useable intelligence 
and figure out which prisoners should be sent to GTMO.  He realised the existing 
screening process was ‘virtually worthless’.325 
After Dunlavey’s visit, CFLCC Camp Doha in Kuwait requested the creation of 
a dossier for every prisoner at the Kandahar STHF as well as a recommendation on the 
holding status of each detainee.  Some were to be sent to GTMO, others held by the 
Afghan government, and the rest were to be sent home.
326
 Interrogators began making 
recommendations on which prisoners to send home and CFLCC staffers reviewed the 
requests, but instead of following the recommendations, they decided to send all the 
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 No officer wanted to be blamed for signing a release order on a 
detainee who ended up right back on the battlefield, so they ultimately kept everyone.
328
 
Camp Delta, the new detention facility at GTMO, opened on 29 April 2002.  
Prisoners from Camp X-ray and the Kandahar STHF were transported to Camp Delta 
and the STHF was ordered to shut down.
329
 Detainees in Afghanistan hereafter were 
processed at Bagram.  Although several members of TF-500 were transferred to assist 
with operations there many were sent home instead of to GTMO where they were 
desperately needed to help with the barrage of new arrivals.
330
 Only one veteran of TF-
500 was sent to GTMO.
331
 
Bagram airfield was built in 1976 and later used by the Soviets as a staging area 
during their occupation of Afghanistan.
332
 It had survived decades of war and by the 
time TF-500 started using an old machine shop for detention operations in autumn 
2001, it was a run down, cement-block building with metal sheets covering the 
windows.
333
 The facility, known as the Bagram Collection Point (BCP), had been fitted 
with five large, wire, holding pens and six plywood isolation cells.  It held between 40 
and 80 prisoners and was used as a screening facility where interrogators determined 
whether to forward detainees to GTMO or release them.
334
 
There were stairs on each side of the facility with a landing overlooking the 
main prison area.  On the first floor were six rooms used for administration and 
interrogation.  The rooms were spartan, concrete enclosures with plywood over the 
windows and contained a wooden table and cheap plastic chairs.
335
 The cells were five 
by ten metres with a bucket toilet and blankets for bedding.  Each cell housed between 
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ten and 15 prisoners and was separated from other cells by a wire fence.  The cellblock 
was in the middle of the hangar with guards on duty outside.
336
 Prisoners at the BCP 
were much more hostile than those who had been processed through the Kandahar 
STHF.  Ideologically, they were aligned more closely with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.  
Many had eluded US forces initially and had been caught re-entering the country from 
Pakistan.  Detainees threatened and cursed interrogators and spit at them; these factors 
combined to make the bleak facility and harsh environment even more difficult.
337
 
The Geneva Conventions required signatories to the treaties operate a national 
information bureau to track prisoner information.  On 12 August 1949, the DOD created 
the Centre for War Prisoner Information.  During the first Gulf War, (1990 - 1991), the 
centre was known as the National Prisoner of War Information Centre.  On 7 January 
2002, the centre’s name was official changed to the National Detainee Reporting 
Centre.
338
  This renaming of the centre was to more accurately reflect the current nature 
of the war where captured prisoners were all detainees but did not necessarily qualify 
for POW status. 
The US detention system assigned every prisoner a ten-digit capture sequence 
internment serial number (ISN).
339
 Additionally, at Bagram the interrogators assigned 
each prisoner a source number in order to prevent prisoners from being identified in 
reports when they provided useable intelligence.  The CIA used their own internal 
numbering system, as did the FBI, and the DEA, so when detainees were discussed at 
interagency levels, it was often a challenge to determine which reports referred to 
whom.  If prisoners were transferred from Kandahar, their numbers did not correspond 
with their order of arrival at Bagram.  GTMO assigned detainees two different numbers.  
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Once detainees were ‘wrapped in this red tape, it was almost impossible to extricate 
them’ from the system. 340 
In the hope of clearing up the confusion, TF-500 leadership created a prisoner 
category called ‘persons under US control’ or PUC.  Under this new designation, 
prisoners could be held for 14 days in a temporary screening status.  If interrogators felt 
there was cause to hold a prisoner beyond two weeks, he would then be officially 
entered into the system and assigned an ISN.  If not, the prisoner could be released 
through the Provost Marshal’s Office.  This alleviated the burden of prisoners clogging 
the system and eventually eight out of ten prisoners were released from the BCP.
341
 
At the Kandahar STHF, interrogators realised much of their most useable 
intelligence was collected at the end of lengthy interrogations when prisoners were tired 
and more prone to let information slip.  It was at this time that the adjusted sleep routine 
(ASR) was approved for use on resistant prisoners.  This was the first time the 
methodical use of a non FM 34-52 interrogation technique was introduced.  
Interrogators had to get permission from the OIC of the ICE and were required to 




The group that replaced TF-500 in July 2002 was comprised of interrogators and 
linguists:  13 from the 519
th
 MI Battalion of the 525th MI Brigade out of Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina and six reservists from the 300
th
 MI Brigade, Utah Army National 
Guard.  The new ICE OIC was 32-year old Army Captain Carolyn Wood, who managed 
interrogations at the BCP until December 2003.
343
 Eventually, she would be blamed not 
only for what took place under her command in Afghanistan but also Iraq. 
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 One of the costliest mistakes at the BCP was the excessively brief overlap in 
transition time between experienced and incoming interrogators.  When the new 
interrogators arrived they were only given four days to train with seasoned veterans 
before they went home.  In effect, the new interrogators started from scratch having to 
learn the detainees’ files, what approaches worked best, and important cultural lessons.  




Of his first visit to the BCP, Army Specialist Damien Corsetti of the 519
th
 said: 
The smell’s quite atrocious.  It was a combination of the prisoners only having a 
bath once week, the open sewage barrels that were in the prison . . . it was a 
combination of many things.  It was quiet.  That was the other thing that hit you 
when you walked in, how quiet it was.
345
 
CFLCC in Kuwait was replaced by an in-country command, JTF-180.  They 
established headquarters in Bagram and commanded all US operations in Afghanistan 
after May 2002.
346
 Lieutenant General Dan McNeill commanded JTF-180.  His office 
was near the BCP interrogation facility.
347
 His tenure was marked by controversy over 
the treatment of detainees and the interrogation techniques used.
348
 
From autumn 2001, Special Mission Unit (SMU)-TF operators participated in 
battlefield screening and questioning of detainees in support of their assigned mission 
but left tactical interrogations to the JTF-180 personnel.
349
 In autumn 2002, the SMU-
TF conducted a study of interrogation operations at the BCP and GTMO to determine 
whether they should conduct their own interrogations and what techniques should be 
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 On 26 October, the assessment team told the SMU commander in 
Afghanistan that interrogation methods outlined in FM 34-52 were not producing 
actionable intelligence and were vulnerable to Al-Qaeda resistance training.  The team 
recommended new techniques be introduced including:  degradation by strip search, 
sensory deprivation by hooding, sensory overload through the use of light, darkness, 
noise, and dogs, and manipulation of environment with cold, heat, and water.  In 
essence, the assessment team indicated interrogators were outmatched by the 
sophistication of the Al-Qaeda detainees.
351
 
The team also asserted JTF-180 was more focused on detention rather than 
interrogation, and requested permission from JTF-180’s commander to run their own 
interrogation facility within the BCP.  The SMU facility would employ advanced 
techniques of psychological and physical stress as well as deception with the goal of 
leading detainees to a state of learned helplessness in order to increase compliance.
352
 
The confused state of detention policy and operations led to more reliance on 
operational law attorneys who constantly advised combat leaders on the best COA.
353
 
In November 2002, the CIA put an inexperienced, first-tour officer named 
‘Matt’ in charge of the ‘Salt Pit’.  He ordered guards to strip an uncooperative Afghan 
detainee named Gul Rahman.
354
 Rahman was suspected of working as a go-between for 
the terrorist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Al-Qaeda.  The CIA tracked his cell phone to 
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Rahman was dragged on concrete and chained to the floor of his cell without a 
blanket.
356
 Temperatures dropped overnight and he froze to death in the early hours of 
20 November.
357
 The CIA briefed the heads of the House and Senate intelligence 
committees to explain what had happened.
358
 
A CIA Inspector General inquiry found ‘Matt’, a former Naval Intelligence 
Officer, had exercised ‘poor judgement’ in leaving Rahman in the cold.  A Justice 
Department investigation found ‘Matt’ had previously requested heaters for the prison 
and asked for additional help from headquarters and from ‘Paul’, the CIA Afghanistan 
Station Chief, and had been ignored.  Based on the Justice Department’s three-year 




In December 2002, two prisoners died in US military custody at the BCP.  
Private First Class Willie Brand, an MP from the 377
th
 was charged in the deaths of 
detainees Habibullah and Dilawar, who were chained to their cells overnight with their 
hands above their heads.  Of the 28 MPs and interrogators investigated, 15 were 
charged with detainee abuse or mistreatment including repeated ‘compliance blows’ 
(kneeing detainees in the leg), a tactic that ‘became an accepted way of dealing with 
detainees who were considered combative’.360 At Brand’s court-martial hearing, he 
admitted he had been trained to use ‘minimum force’, but was shown the knee strike 
technique by an outgoing platoon of MPs to be used ‘as a matter of common practise’ 
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These deaths underscored the greatest fears of the judicial-Geneva Conventions 
school-of-thought that without strict adherence to the law, such abuses would take 
place.  After the deaths, both SMU-TF and JTF-180 began developing written 
guidelines.  The SMU-TF Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer advised TF personnel 
not to stray from standard techniques and reiterated the US Army standards for humane 
treatment.  On 10 January 2003, the SMU-TF approved its first SOP for the war in 
Afghanistan; beyond FM 34-52, four others techniques were approved including:  
isolation, multiple interrogators, stress positions, and sleep deprivation.
362
 Development 
of the SOP was influenced by Rumsfeld’s December 2002 approval of the same 
techniques for use in GTMO.
363
 By 2004, a special military prison facility to handle 
HVDs separate from the BCP and the CIA facility was in operation.  An enhanced 
interrogation programme facility was housed in a specially designed building with 
holding cells, open areas, and rooms made of wood and steel used for interrogations.  
Inside the interrogation rooms, there were ‘holding points’ for shackling detainees’ 
arms and legs in stress positions.
364
 
On 10 December 2002, the DOD published guidelines regarding the release or 
transfer of detainees who did not meet the Enemy Combatant status threshold.  
Detainees were interviewed within 90 days of capture and then yearly.  If a detainee 
was deemed to be releasable, his case was reviewed by all relevant organisations.
 365
 
 Under the direction of the Secretary of Defence (SECDEF), the USD for Policy 
(P) was responsible for detainee policy and guidelines.  The USD(P) delegated 
detention matters to the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC), who created a Detainee Policy Group to be the focal 
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point for the release and transfer of detainees.  The group forwarded all relevant files to 
the Secretary of the Army, the DOD General Counsel, and the Director of the Joint 
Staff.  In addition, they provided notice to the Department of State, Office of War 




The Detainee Policy Group served an important function; they were responsible 
for reviewing detainee files and issuing legal opinions for each detainee.  They made 
their files available for review by the Interagency Experts Group, but ultimately 
controlled the agenda and maintained authority for files and action items.
367
 Other 
parties involved in the release of detainees included:  the ASD for Public Affairs, the 
DOD General Counsel, the Director of the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the 




On 15 January 2003, Rumsfeld rescinded his approval of additional 
interrogation techniques pending further review.
369
 He ordered a working group of 
experts from the Joint Staff, the DOD General Counsel’s office, the office of the 
USD(P), and the military departments to study the best way forward.
370
 Chaired by 
USAF General Counsel Mary Walker, they reviewed a spectrum of 36 interrogation 
techniques ranging from the direct approach to water-boarding.
371
 
Water-boarding was used by the military in SERE (survive, escape, resist, 
evade) training, but was never authorised or used as a technique by military 
interrogators.
372
 On 5 February 2008, CIA Director Michael Hayden revealed the names 
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of the only three detainees ever water-boarded in US custody.
373
 Senior Al-Qaeda 
leaders Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn (also known as Abu Zubayda), Abd-al-
Rahim Al-Nashiri, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) were all subjected to water-
boarding as part of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation programme.374 
In September 2002, the CIA briefed four members of Congress including 
California Representative Nancy Pelosi regarding the agency’s overseas detention 
locations and enhanced interrogation techniques.  Two of the members ‘asked the CIA 
to push harder’ and asked ‘if the methods were tough enough’.  The CIA privately 
briefed members of Congress approximately 30 times detailing the specifics of the 
interrogation programme.  Lawmakers raised no formal objections between 2002 and 
2003 when the water-boarding technique was in use.  In 2005, the programme was 
leaked to the news media.
375
 At that time, the CIA ceased coercive interrogation 
methods,
 376
 and Arizona Senator John McCain authored the Detainee Treatment Act 
prohibiting ‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment’.  It applied to all 
prisoners in US custody, including those in GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
377
 In a 2011 
interview, Vice President Dick Cheney said:  ‘I would strongly support using it 
[waterboarding] again if circumstances arose where we had a high-value detainee and 
that was the only way we could get him to talk’.378 
In November 2005, ABC News investigated the enhanced interrogation 
programme and learned of six authorised techniques.  They included:  the attention grab 
(grabbing the shirt front of a detainee and shaking him), the attention slap (an open-
handed slap to cause pain and fear), the belly slap (a hard open-handed slap to the 
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stomach), the long-time standing (detainee is forced to stand, handcuffed, with feet 
shackled to an eye bolt on the floor for 40-plus hours to cause exhaustion and sleep 
deprivation), the cold cell (detainee stands naked in a 10C cell and is doused with 
water from time to time), and water-boarding (a detainee is strapped to an inclined 
board, feet raised and head slightly below the feet, cellophane is wrapped over the face, 
and water is poured over him to create the sensation of drowning).
379
 In 2007 the ICRC 
reported that in their interviews with the 14 CIA HVDs at GTMO that these techniques 
were used on them.
380
  
In 2009, President Obama ordered the declassification of a top-secret 
memorandum that detailed the ten techniques authorised for use by the CIA in 2002.  
They included:  water-boarding, the attention grab, walling, facial hold, facial slap, 




The two psychologists who created the CIA’s enhanced interrogation 
programme, Dr. Bruce Jessen and Dr. James Mitchell, were former military officers 
with experience teaching military personnel to ‘survive behind enemy lines and resist 
enemy interrogation tactics’, but neither had expertise conducting offensive, US-style 
interrogations or any training specific to Al-Qaeda.  The water-boarding technique 
added as the final step in their interrogation programme was more intense than the 
shorter water-boarding sessions used to train military personnel in their SERE 
classes.
382
 Anticipating possible fallout, the CIA granted both psychologists indemnity 
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CIA specialists water-boarded Abu Zubaydah 82 times in August 2002; KSM 
was water-boarded 183 times in March 2003.
384
 President Bush, the leader of the 
intelligence-collection camp, personally signed off on the use of the technique for these 
detainees.
385
 Zubaydah told interrogators that Islam demanded he resist as long as 
possible, but water-boarding brought him to the point where he allowed himself to talk.  
Information gleaned from his interrogations led to the capture of KSM, the architect of 
9/11.  KSM’s sessions with CIA water-boarders also yielded key intelligence including 
information key to the capture of Riduan Isamuddin (also known as Hambali), the 
leader of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, whose brother was responsible for the 2002 Bali 
nightclub bombing that killed more than 200.  KSM also divulged critical information 
on the Al-Qaeda biological weapons programme.
386
 
Though controversial, water-boarding proved useful in preventing attacks and 
saving lives both in the US and abroad
387
 Something the judicial-Geneva Conventions 
camp have a hard time admitting. Although DOJ and CIA lawyers ‘conducted a careful 
legal review’ of the entire enhanced interrogation programme and determined it 
complied with US law, President Bush directed the CIA ‘not to use two more extreme 
interrogation methods, but did not disclose what those were’.388 In May 2010, Assistant 
Attorney General Jay Bybee, who worked in the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, 
testified that his counsel was intended only for Abu Zubadah and that the CIA had 
exceeded the limits of what they were authorised to do.  The CIA interpreted the DOJ 
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The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel advised the CIA that water-
boarding was not in violation of US torture statutes
390
 even though water-boarding had 
been declared illegal by the US military after WWII during the Japanese war crimes 
trials
391
 and again in 1983 when a Texas sheriff was sentenced to ten years in prison for 
using ‘water torture’ to extract confessions.392 
Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz argued that enhanced interrogation 
techniques deemed to be torture should be allowed under certain circumstances with a 
warrant.  ‘An application for a torture warrant would have to be based on the absolute 
need to obtain immediate information in order to save lives coupled with probable cause 
that the suspect had such information and is unwilling to reveal it’.393 The torture 
warrant would legally authorise trained interrogators to use techniques not normally 
allowed.  At an 8 June 2004 Judiciary Committee hearing, Democratic New York 
Senator Chuck Schumer, a member of the party that mostly espoused the judicial-
Geneva Conventions approach said: 
We ought to be reasonable about this.  I think there are probably very few people 
in this room or in America who would say that torture should never, ever be used, 
particularly if thousands of lives are at stake.  Take the hypothetical:  If we knew 
that there was a nuclear bomb hidden in an American city, and we believed that 
some kind of torture, fairly severe maybe, would give us a chance of finding that 
bomb before it went off, my guess is most Americans and most senators, maybe 
all would say, Do what you have to do.  So it’s easy to sit back in the armchair 
and say that torture can never be used.  But when you are in the foxhole, it is a 
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very different deal.  And I respect – I think we all respect – the fact the president 
is in the foxhole every day.
394
 
General David Petraeus, at his CIA director confirmation hearings on 23 June 2011, 
agreed with this point and said in a ticking time bomb scenario there should be a special 
exemption to use additional techniques authorised by the President that are not in the 
Army Interrogation manual.
395
 In respect to warrants for techniques deemed to be 
torture, DASD for Detainee Affairs Mathew Waxman said: 
When something’s illegal, don’t expect it to work well in a crisis, if you then 
suddenly order it.  But one virtue that any system of warrants has is giving a set of 
clear instructions so that those who might be asked to carry out certain tasks have 
some certainty of, I’m allowed to do this or not, I’m authorised to do this or not, 
in a crisis here’s how the decision will be made.  And everybody knows what 
their job in the system is and who has authority to do what.
396
 
 Controversial as they are, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) issued a statement in 2009 that the US detention programme had been critical 
to the success of the US and allied CT efforts against Al-Qaeda around the globe.  
Specifically, new threat information was gleaned and locations of Al-Qaeda operatives 
and safe havens were identified.  Detainees reported that coalition CT efforts have 
degraded the operational capability of the organisation.
397
 
HDC Phase III and IV:  Detainee Operations Improve as Corrections are Made 
In a 24 January 2003 memorandum, JTF-180 Deputy Staff JAG, Lieutenant Colonel 
Robert Cotell, enumerated all the methods used by the JTF interrogators after 9/11 and 
compiled the list of techniques under review by the military.  Five additional techniques 
were included:  clothing deprivation, food deprivation, sensory overload, sensory 
deprivation, and fear of dogs.  CENTCOM Combatant Commander Lieutenant General 
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The working group described each technique and defined conditions under 
which they could be used.  The first 15 or 16 standard techniques from FM 34-52 were 
approved for use with authorisation by the commanders in the field.  Techniques 17 
through 22 were only permitted by authorisation from the Combatant Commander.  The 
last classification, from 23 to 35, could only be authorised by the SECDEF.  The group 
rejected the last technique; no one in the military approved the use of water-boarding.
399
 
Lawyers in the group focused on strict adherence to the letter of the law.  Military 
staffers in the group with operational backgrounds were in favour of a looser 
interpretation so personnel in the field would have leeway to accomplish their 
objectives.  The service chiefs were very cautious.  They did not like what they felt was 
a shifting in the sand of policy and were worried about soldiers getting into trouble.
400
 
Meanwhile in Afghanistan, while the working group analysed interrogation 
techniques, JTF-180 and the SMU-TF implemented the techniques listed in the 24 
January 2003 memo at the BCP.  Cotell later told investigators from the 2005 Vice 
Admiral Albert Church Commission he knew the SECDEF had rescinded approval on 
many techniques while they were under review, but since there was no guidance from 
CENTCOM, CJTF-180 considered them allowable.
401
 
On 11 April 2003, Deputy CENTCOM Commander Lieutenant General Michael 
DeLong sent a message to JCS Vice Chairman General Peter Pace requesting approval 
of the techniques in Cotell’s memo.  The Chairman of the Joint Staff legal counsel, 
Captain Jane Dalton, informed CENTCOM’s Deputy Staff Judge Advocate Barry 
Hammill that the techniques would likely only be approved for GTMO.  This alarmed 
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interrogators at JTF-180.  They believed their ability to complete the mission would be 
degraded without the use of these techniques.  JTF-180 Commander, Lieutenant 
General McNeill, had specifically authorised the use of techniques playing on 
individual fears, using black out goggles, deprivation of light and sound, sleep 
adjustment, threat of transfer to another agency or country, and stress positions.
402
 Even 
though these techniques were authorised, the FBI was in-country looking for violations 
of law and detainee abuse.
403
 
On 15 April 2003, the working group submitted their recommendations.  It 
reiterated the guiding principle that detainees be treated humanely and consistent with 
the Geneva Conventions.  It delineated what was authorised and what was not.
404
 In a 
16 April memorandum to the Commander of CENTCOM, the SECDEF approved 24 
specific interrogation techniques for use strictly at the BCP in Afghanistan.  While most 
of these techniques were already approved in FM 34-52, several were new including:  
change of scenery up, change of scenery down, dietary manipulation, environmental 
manipulation, sleep adjustment, isolation, and false flag.
405
 
The events at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in autumn 2003 put all US prison 
operations under scrutiny including policies in effect in Afghanistan.  MPs guarding 
Iraqis at Abu Ghraib abused, degraded, and photographed prisoners.  In January 2004, 
pictures of the crimes were turned over to Army investigators who launched an inquiry 
on 16 January.
406
 In February, the Office of the Inspector General of the Army ordered 
a vigorous investigation into all US-run detention centres in Afghanistan, GTMO, and 
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 Immediately, the Inspector General for JTF-180 began conducting ‘sensing 
sessions’ with enlisted personnel regarding proper detainee treatment and procedures in 
preparation for the investigation.
408
 The questioners found that detainee treatment was 
guided primarily by what soldiers understood from their Geneva Conventions training 
despite the on-going political discussion revolving around their actual status.  More than 
12 separate investigations were ultimately launched in the hope of discovering the 
causes of the abuse in Iraq and to determine if other facilities were struggling.
409
 
 The Commander of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) 
Lieutenant General David Barno tasked Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-76 
(CJTF-76) Major General Eric Olson to appoint an inspecting officer for the Afghan 
detention operations review.  Deputy Commander CJTF-76 Brigadier General Charles 
Jacoby was ordered to ‘ascertain the standard of treatment provided to persons detained 
by US forces throughout the detention process from apprehension to release or long-
term confinement’.  From 19 May to 26 June, General Jacoby’s team assessed the CFC-
A/CJTF-76 detention operations tactics, techniques, and procedures.  The report found a 
‘near universal understanding’ among the guard force that humane treatment was to be 
given to all detainees but there was a lack of application of detention standards by the 
guard force.
410
 Between May 2002 and June 2003, JTF-180 was authorised to hold 100 
detainees at the BCP; by summer 2003 that number was doubled to 200.
411
 
On 24 February 2004, ASD SOLIC Thomas O’Connell, issued a document 
entitled ‘Global Screening Criteria for Detainees’ which set forth criteria to follow in 
order to ship detainees to JTF-GTMO or to keep them in custody in theatre internment 
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facilities (TIFs) in other locations.
412
 O’Connell included a 22 August 2003 ASD 
SOLIC document ‘Criteria and Guidelines for Screening and Processing Persons 
Detained by the Department of Defence in Connection with the War on Terrorism’413 
and an 8 August 2003 document ‘Detainee Screening in Afghanistan’.414 The guidance 
reiterated that detainees must be screened and meet the specific criteria to be held by the 
US as an enemy combatant (EC).
415
 EC status was given instead of POW distinction, 
because POW demarcation would have given the detainee additional rights under the 
Geneva Conventions.  An EC was defined as: 
Any person that the US or Allied forces could properly detain under the laws and 
customs of war.  For purposes of the war on terrorism, an Enemy Combatant 
includes, but is not limited to, a member or agent of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or 
another international terrorist organisation against which the United States is 
engaged in armed conflict.
416
 
Detainees could also be held if they possessed intelligence of an operational or strategic 
nature, law enforcement information relevant to an investigation, or if they were 
deemed a threat to the US or US interests.
417
 
General Abizaid established a Detainee Review and Screening Team (DRST) 
for Afghanistan to ‘validate the information compiled on each individual for 
completeness and accuracy’.418 If a DRST was unable to screen a detainee, a Mobile 
Detainee Review and Screening Team (MDRST) was requested to conduct the 
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Each EC was assigned an Internment Serial Number (ISN) from the National 
Detainee Reporting Centre in Washington, DC to assist in tracking; the ISN superseded 
any other number the detainee had been assigned previously.
420
 The SECDEF and the 
CJCS were notified of the results of all screenings (transfers to GTMO or other US 
facilities) and also when a detainee was suspected of being a citizen of the US or a 
coalition country, or under 15 years old.
421
 Temporary TIFs were set up to house ECs 
and administer medical screenings before sending them to long-term detention.
422
 The 
ASD SOLIC and the Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs co-chaired a 
Detainee Assessment Team (DAT) at the Pentagon made up of representatives from the 




On 28 June 2004, the US Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v. Bush that foreign 
nationals in custody at GTMO could challenge their detentions in the US civilian court 
system.  The high court’s decision reversed an earlier ruling upholding a 1950 Supreme 
Court precedent, Johnson v. Eisentrager, in which detainees were barred from bringing 
suit against their detentions in US civil courts because they were foreign nationals 
outside US sovereign territory.
424
 As a result, on 14 September 2004, the NSC ordered a 
temporary halt to the transfer of detainees from Afghanistan to GTMO; on 22 
September, ten detainees were transferred before the hiatus.
425
 
By October 2004, the BCP, now known as the Bagram Holding Area (BHA), 
reached capacity at 325 detainees and had no authority to transfer low-level detainees to 
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Afghan facilities or GTMO. Requests to transfer nine detainees in April had yet to be 
approved by the detainee assessment team at the pentagon.
426
 
Rasul v. Bush was the impetus for increasing detainee releases in Afghanistan.  
Because GTMO was no longer open for transfers, US military commanders needed to 
alleviate the overcrowding at the BHA.  By January 2005, the Afghan government had 
instigated a national reconciliation programme, 
427
 and a HDC phase four enabler. 
 In May 2005, President Bush met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai at the 
White House to discuss improvements to the process of releasing non-combatants from 
US detention facilities.
428
 In August, the two governments signed a confidential 
diplomatic agreement to transfer detainees to Afghan custody in exchange for written 
assurances that the detainees would be treated humanely and held in a secure facility.  
The US agreed to build and fund the operation of a new prison as well as train and 
equip the Afghan prison guard force.
429
 The US’s goal was to get out of detention 
operations in Afghanistan by turning over to the Afghan government 100 Afghan 
detainees at GTMO and 350 at the BHA
430
 and thus move from HDC phase four to 
phase five. 
On 2 July 2005, the first 57 of 199 cleared detainees were released under the 
formalised Takhim-e-Solh
431
 or strengthening peace plan, which was run by Mohammad 
Daud under the guidance of the Office of the Afghan National Security Council.
432
 
Under this HDC phase four plan, detainees would be released after they renounced 
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violence, pledged their allegiance to the new government, agreed not to take up arms 
against the government,
433
 and agreed to participate peacefully in Afghan society.  
Detainees were given medical exams, their personal belongings, and transferred to the 
Afghan government’s programme office in Kabul.  After they were registered into the 




By January 2006, more than 350 detainees had been released from the BHA.  
The average length of detention was 14.5 months.  Continued combat operations and 
closure of the Kandahar STHF contributed to the steady rise in the number of detainees 
at the BHA; by February, it held some 500 prisoners.
435
 A new wing, a new medical 
facility, and flushing toilets were added to the BHA, but despite these improvements, 
the prison was bleak compared to GTMO.
436




Detainees’ most common complaint at the BHA was that they had been wrongly 
imprisoned.  Many claimed to have been turned in by their enemies or arrested by 
corrupt Afghan police for failing to pay extortion fees.
438
 Between the summers of 2002 
and 2005, classified, intelligence driven, HDC phase four DRBs were held to review 
detainees’ cases.  Each detainee had an initial board within 90 days of capture and then 
a yearly review.  The boards were made up of roughly ten people from the Criminal 
Investigative Task Force (CITF), MI, MP, and the JAG office.  The DRB was chaired 
by the CJ-2 (the head MI officer), and met twice a week to review cases.  MI analysts 
prepared the files for review focusing on whether the detainee should be placed on the 
‘release list,’ the ‘GTMO list’ or the ‘continued internment list’ for intelligence 
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 Author Unknown, ‘Final Missing SEAL Team Member Found; Four Bagram Detainees Missing,’ 




exploitation.  To be sent to GTMO, a detainee had to be determined to be an EC.  If a 
detainee were deemed not to be an EC, the DRB would contact the capturing unit to 
notify them that the detainee would be released unless they had any additional 
information that might keep him in custody.
439
 
In June of 2005, the BHA’s designation was changed to the Bagram Theatre 
Internment Facility (BTIF) as it expanded to a long-term holding facility.
440
 Afghan 
detainees were no longer sent to GTMO.  Until early 2006, operations at the 
BCP/BHA/BTIF were closed to the international press and humanitarian community 
other than the ICRC.  Many detainees had been in custody for two years without access 




 Construction began on the US$20 million Afghan National Detention Facility 
(ANDF) at the old Pul-e-Charkhi Prison.  Built by Mohammed Daoud Khan in the 
1970s, the facility was used by the Soviets, Afghanistan’s communist-backed 
government, and the Taliban.  Like Saddam Hussein’s Abu Ghraib Prison, the Pul-e-
Charkhi had a ‘bloody history’; thousands of political prisoners were tortured and 
executed there.
442
 Originally, the ANDF was expected to house 628 prisoners, but due 
to a design flaw, that number was reduced to 330.  The US had planned to transfer all 
prisoners from the BTIF to the ANDF, but it was not large enough.
443
 Block D of the 
prison was to be used to house Afghan detainees who would be transferred from 
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Detainees were processed through the new Afghan judicial system, which could 
take more than nine months to determine whether a prisoner would stand trial, be 
sentenced to a prison term, or be released.
445
 Transfers from the BTIF to the ANDF 
began spring 2007.  During that year, there was only one pre-trial release.
446
 
From summer 2005 through summer 2007, the DRBs evolved to Enemy 
Combatant Review Boards (ECRBs).
447
 Composition of the board was reduced to five 
members:  the Deputy G2, the MI Battalion Commander in charge of the BTIF, the MP 
Battalion Commander at the BTIF, the MP Brigade Deputy Commander, and a JAG 
officer.  The boards continued to conduct an initial 90 day review and an annual review 
based on information presented by an MI analyst.
448
 Transfers to GTMO ceased.  
Results of ECRBs were:  release, continued detention, or transfer to Afghan authorities 
for release or prosecution.
449
 The ECRBs did not inform detainees of the accusations 
against them, give them the opportunity to appear at their own defence, or allow an 
advocate to speak for them.
450
 
 As early as November 2005, discussions at OSD were underway to include the 
Afghan government in a collaborative detainee review process.  Under ECRB 
guidelines, Afghan government participation was neither prohibited nor discouraged.  
With the goal of eventually turning detainees over to the Afghan government, the need 




 At the same time, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC), whose members were appointed by President Karzai, requested permission to 
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meet with Afghan detainees under US control.  Previously, access to detainees was 
restricted to law enforcement, intelligence personnel, and the ICRC.  Both the Joint 
Staff and CENTCOM approved Acting Deputy Secretary of Defence Ryan Henry’s 
policy memorandum on 14 December 2005.
452
 
Several key events impacted detention operations in 2006 and 2007.  On 5 
October 2006, ISAF completed the final stage of expansion by assuming command of 
military operations from US forces in eastern Afghanistan.  The UN Security Council 
created ISAF
453
 at the Bonn Conference to help stabilise Kabul after the fall of the 
Taliban in December 2001.  Commanded by British Major General John McColl, ISAF 
worked with President Karzai to protect the city from the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and 
factional warlords.  Command of ISAF rotated every six months and was localised in 
Kabul for the first two years.
454
 In December 2003, ISAF assumed control of the 
northern, southern, and western regions of the country.
455
 On 11 August 2003, the UN 




On 8 November 2006, President Bush announced the resignation of SECDEF 
Rumsfeld.  Rumsfeld had become a political lightning rod and the focus of the ire of the 




On 4 February 2007, General McNeill, the former Commander of TF-180, 
returned to Afghanistan as the Commander of ISAF.
458
 His return was not without 
controversy; some said he should have been held accountable for the deaths and harsh 
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treatment of detainees at the BCP in 2002.
459
 McNeill struggled to get along with his 
coalition force commanders and the Supreme Allied Commander, General John 
Craddock.  In March 2007, Craddock issued an apology at Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe in Brussels, after McNeill launched an offensive without 
informing NATO headquarters.
460




Between February 2007 and September 2009, the next iteration of the detainee 
review boards, a HDC phase four mechanism, was labelled Unlawful Enemy 
Combatant Review Boards (UECRBs).  The number of board members was reduced 
from five to three:  the CJTF Provost Marshal, the BTIF Commander, and the head of 
interrogations.  Beginning April 2008, detainees were not only informed their cases 
were up before the board, but they were allowed to appear without representation and 
make a statement.  Detainees began to receive notification within two weeks of 
processing regarding the basis for their detention.  The initial review was conducted 
within 75 days of detention and then reviewed every six months.
462
 
 MI analysts assisted the boards by recommending either continued detention for 
intelligence purposes or transfer to the Detainee Assessment Branch (DAB) who 
collaborated with Afghan authorities for further prosecution.
463
 The three board officers 
determined if detainees should be placed in one of three categories:  High Level Enemy 
Combatant (HLEC), Low Level Enemy Combatant (LLEC), or threat only.  Those 
recommended for release were labelled No Longer Enemy Combatant (NLEC).  All 
LLEC files were transferred to the DAB and if enough evidence was available, 
                                                          
459
 Margaret Carlson, ‘The Wrong General,’ Huffington Post, 13 August 2005 
460
 Author Unknown, ‘NATO Irritated by new American ISAF Commander, ‘Speigel, 19 March 2007 
461
 Author Unknown, ‘McKiernan Assumes Command of NATO Forces in Afghanistan,’ AFPS, 3 June 
2008 
462




detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities for prosecution.
464
 The sign over the 
door of the DAB office in Bagram articulated their mission:  ‘Turning Taliban into 
productive citizens of Afghanistan one detainee at a time’.465 
Despite detainee releases, by January 2008, the number of prisoners at the BTIF 
had swelled to 630; the number at GTMO had dropped to 275.
466
 The issue of Afghans 
in detention was a continual problem for President Karzai and in April, he created the 
Aloko Detainee Commission to help facilitate prisoner releases.  The commission 
expedited the release (without trial) of 104 detainees that year.  The US military wanted 
some of these detainees to be tried for their crimes, but they were not and pre-trial 
releases continued through 2010.  Many who were transferred to the ANDF with 
assurances of prosecution in Afghan courts were released shortly thereafter.
467
 
In January 2009, the prisoner population at the BTIF had risen to 670; in GTMO 
it had fallen to 250.
468
 The US finally decided to build a larger, more adequate facility 
to replace the BTIF.  Expected to cost at least US$60 million, the new US Theatre 
Internment Facility in Afghanistan (USTIF-A)
469
 was designed to hold 600 detainees 
under normal circumstances, but have the capacity to hold an additional 500 if 




In addition to replacing the BTIF, Acting Commander of CENTCOM 
Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey requested help from the DOD in June 2008 to 
rectify the deteriorating situation at the ANDF.  SECDEF Gates instructed Deputy 
Assistant SECDEF for Central Asian Affairs Bobby Wilkes to request assistance from 
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the State Department to ‘support the reconstruction and refurbishment of the maximum-
security section and blocks one and two of the prison’.471 
After President Obama was elected in November 2008, he received daily 
intelligence briefings.  On 9 December, CIA Director Michael Hayden and Director of 
National Intelligence Mike McConnell briefed Obama and his team in Chicago on the 
CIA’s rendition, interrogation, and detention programme.472 The Agency had closed its 
detention facilities and transferred all prisoners to GTMO in May 2006.
473
 Hayden 
explained the merits of sleep deprivation on hard-core detainees and detailed techniques 
used to keep detainees awake; Obama ‘seemed transfixed’.474 
In his inaugural address 20 January 2009, President Obama repudiated the 
previous administration’s policies (the intelligence-collection school-of-thought) and 
laid out his vision (the judicial-Geneva Conventions school-of-thought) to reclaim 
America’s morale high-ground.475 During the campaign, he criticised President Bush’s 
neglect of the war in Afghanistan and vowed to draw down troops in Iraq and move 
more to Afghanistan.
476
 He also promised to shut down the prison at GTMO and end the 
interrogation and detention policies of the Bush Administration.
477
 On his second day in 
office, Obama signed three executive orders that embodied his new policy:  Executive 
Order 13491 - Ensuring Lawful Interrogation, Executive Order 13492 - Review and 
Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Close of 
Detention Facilities, and Executive Order 13493 - Review of Detention Policy Options.  
(See Guantanamo chapter for discussion on these orders). 
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 In February 2009, President Obama rejected demands from human rights groups 
to extend the same habeas corpus rights granted to GTMO detainees to those in custody 
at the BTIF in Afghanistan.  Acting Assistant Attorney General Michael Hertz stood by 
the Bush Administration’s policy that federal courts had no jurisdiction over cases filed 
by prisoners held in the course of military operations outside the US.
478
 
 In April, Judge John Bates of the US District Court for the District of Columbia 
stated that habeas did extend to some detainees in Afghanistan.  Bates ruled in the case 
of three detainees at the BTIF that Boumediene v. Bush, the right to challenge their 
detention in US court, did apply because the prisoners were captured outside of 
Afghanistan and brought to the BTIF for detention.  Bates found that ‘the factors the 
Supreme Court set out in Boumediene to determine when prisoners have habeas rights 
could lead to different outcomes for different prisoners’,479 especially for Afghan 
prisoners at the BTIF.  The ruling, which affected only about 30 of the 600 prisoners, 
granted the right of federal court review to all non-Afghan detainees captured outside 
the war zone held more than six years.
480
 
 On 9 March, US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A)/ISAF Commander General 
David McKiernan said the Taliban had achieved a stalemate in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan and asked for more troops; President Obama admitted the US was not 
winning.
481
 In May, SECDEF Gates decided to replace McKiernan with former Joint 
Special Operations Command (JSOC) Commander General Stanley McChrystal,
482
 who 
honed and perfected the find-fix-finish targeting strategy
483
 for HVT kill-capture 
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 Gates, who requested the resignation of McKiernan, said it was time 




On 24 March, the new strategy was given a new name; speechwriters and staff 
at the Pentagon were notified the phrases ‘Global War on Terror’ or ‘Long War’ would 
henceforth be replaced by the term ‘Overseas Contingency Operation’ (OCO).  Some in 
the Bush Administration had been averse to the phrase ‘Global War on Terrorism’, in 
fact, SECDEF Rumsfeld had employed the phrase ‘Global Struggle Against Violent 
Extremism’ (GSAVE), but President Bush had dismissed it.486 In hindsight, Rumsfeld 
felt that the administration should have focussed more on the ideology of radical Islam 
to describe the enemy.
487
 By September 2009, OCO was fully ingrained in the Obama 




At his confirmation hearings in June, General McChrystal said that when he 
took command of JSOC detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003, the forces 
involved were inexperienced and the facilities, disorganised.
489
 During questioning, 
McChrystal said he was ‘uncomfortable’ with some of the harsh techniques officially 
approved for interrogations including stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the use of 
dogs.  He also affirmed that after investigation, ‘all substantiated cases of abuse resulted 
in disciplinary action’, and he committed to ‘strictly enforce’ the laws of war for 
battlefield detainees, introduce improvements to detention operations,
490
 and use only 
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interrogation techniques found in FM 2-22.3.
491




In February 2008, US Ambassador Christopher Dell, Afghanistan Deputy Chief 
of Mission, visited Sheik Ahmed, the leader of the ‘Awakening movement’ in Iraq, to 
see if any applicable lessons could be applied in Afghanistan.  Sheik Ahmed’s deceased 
brother and founder of the movement, Sheik Abdul-Sattar, said previously ‘[I will] help 
support the local [Iraqi] police and I'll help you [US] fight all the way to Afghanistan.’  
Sheik Ahmed’s right hand man, Asadaalla Faraj, a former Iraqi Intelligence General, 
was previously stationed in Islamabad working with the Taliban until 2002.  He 
prepared a study of lessons learned and how to fight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and gave 
it to the US.
493
 
In early June 2008, when violence in Afghanistan hit the highest levels since the 
2001 invasion, CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus asserted that COIN-
CT (Appendix E) lessons learned in Iraq should be applied in Afghanistan.  These 
included: having troops live among the population they protect, creating a 
comprehensive interagency approach, pursuing the enemy tirelessly and holding cleared 
areas, separating extremist detainees or ‘irreconcilables’ from ‘reconcilables’ and 
promoting reconciliation, and taking the initiative in communicating and disseminating 
truth.
494
 (Appendix F) 
On 26 June 2009, Gates instructed Petraeus to conduct a thorough review of the 
war in Afghanistan.  On 2 July, McChrystal presented his three main assessment 
questions to his team:  Can ISAF accomplish its mission?  How should ISAF go about 
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it?  And what is required for success?
495
 As a part of the review, Petraeus asked retired 
Marine Major General Douglas Stone, the former head of detention operations in Iraq, 
to lead a six-week comprehensive review of detention operations.
496
  Retired US Army 
Colonel Anthony Lieto, a former detention officer who served with Stone in Iraq, was 
assigned to the team.  Lieto met with two former high-ranking Taliban officials in 
Kabul who had been held at GTMO and the BTIF, Abdul-Salam Zaeef, who was the 
former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, and Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, the Taliban’s 
former foreign minister.  Lieto informed them of a shift in US policy; within 12 to 18 
months the US planned to turn over all detention operations to the Afghan security 
forces and the Ministry of Justice.
497
 
Stone completed his review of detainee operations and presented a 700-page 
classified report to McChrystal and Petraeus.  The report professed that as many as 400 
of the 600-plus detainees in US custody should be released.  It also recommended that 
US and Afghan authorities focus on rehabilitation rather than the warehousing of 
detainees. It suggested many of the strategies Stone had employed successfully in Iraq 
including the separation of Islamic militants from the general prison population and the 
education of the moderate detainees, the ‘accidental guerrillas’, to help them reintegrate 
back into their communities upon release.
498
 The report articulated the goal of 




A key component of Stone’s reform was to not only improve the procedural 
process of detention, but also the structural facilities at the BTIF.  The report 
emphasised the need for a new prison in order to implement the new strategy.  The 
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report insisted that the remodelled Afghan-guarded ANDF at the old Pul-e-Charkhi 
prison was a safe haven for Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders, who ran the interior of the 
facility unchecked, indoctrinating and radicalising the prisoner population.
500
 
On 30 August 2009, McChrystal presented his final assessment to Petraeus and 
Gates and recommended the immediate implementation of a counterinsurgency (COIN) 
strategy.  McChrystal addressed the need for ISAF, a conventional force, to transform 
immediately into a non-conventional force and begin interacting with the local populace 
with the goal of making the Afghan public the centre of gravity (COG) in the effort.
501
 
The report contained an annex of changes to be made in detention operations.  It 
asserted US detention operations in Afghanistan lacked transparency, prevented due 
process, and the facilities themselves were dangerously overcrowded.  These problems 
prevented coalition forces from winning over the hearts and minds of the local 
population; detention operations had become a strategic albatross.
502
 
The assessment team advocated the creation of a Combined (international) Joint 
(interservice) Interagency (cross governmental) Task Force (CJIATF) to prepare the 
Afghan government to assume responsibility for all detention operations as soon as 
possible.
503
 Their report said:   
To reduce the strategic vulnerability that detention operations can create, success 
requires increasing confidence of Afghan citizens and the international 
community that the US and the Afghan government detainee operations are 
humane, legal, legitimate, and necessary to defeat the insurgency.  Transitioning 
detention operations to the Afghan government and assisting the government to 
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Specifically, the team recommended the CJIATF be commanded by a general officer 
with an ambassador as civilian deputy, and at least 120 personnel (70 civilian and 50 




The report named the first line the Operations Brigade, which would provide 
safe, secure, legal, and humane custody and control of all detainees.  The second was 
the Intelligence Group, whose mission would be the coordination of intelligence 
collection and analysis with input from the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Centre 
(JIDC), the Strategic Debriefing Centre, and the field detention sites. The third line was 
the Detention and Prisons Common Program Support Group whose task would focus on 
establishing programmes designed to move detention and correction operations away 
from retribution to rehabilitation, de-radicalization, and successful re-integration of 
prisoners into their home populations.
506
 The Engagement and Outreach Group was the 
fourth line, to focus on creating and implementing a strategic communications message 
to disseminate information about US detention and interrogation practices.  The fifth 
line was the Legal Group to work alongside the Afghan government and the 
international community to identify the gaps in the rule of law that inhibit detention and 
corrections operations and devise solutions.  Finally, the sixth line was the Afghanistan 
Prison Engagement Group who would assist the Afghan government in reforming their 




Key to McChrystal’s strategy was teaching COIN doctrine to military personnel 
and using cultural advisors and linguists to assist in winning the support of the 
population.  Soldiers who could communicate and build bridges of understanding with 
the Afghan people became invaluable to the mission.  Army Major Cory Schulz led a 
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tactical team embedded with Afghan troops in Paktika Province; he said his interpreter 
was more important than his weapon because with his gun he could only defend 
himself, but with an interpreter he could command hundreds of Afghan soldiers.
508
 
Torin Nelson, a former Army interrogator and contractor in Afghanistan, 
stressed the critical need for more Pashto linguists, tribal experts, and individuals who 
understood the history of the conflicts in the region over the last 30 years. (Appendix G)  
Above all, Nelson said it was imperative to develop the ability to build rapport with the 
detainees.  This skill and the aptitude to operationalize culture as a tool was vital to the 
interrogators who sifted through the hundreds of Afghans processed through the 
BTIF.
509
 By late October 2010, more than 20,000 coalition personnel (70% Afghan 
forces) had completed COIN training at Camp Julien in Kabul.  The skills taught would 
be key as Afghans prepared to take over military operations from ISAF.
510
 
During July 2009, President Obama’s newly appointed Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defence (DASD) for Detainee Affairs, Phil Carter,
511
 published updated 
guidance reflecting the administration’s shift in attitude towards detainees from an 
intelligence-collection focus to a judicial-Geneva Conventions focus.  First, verbiage in 
the memo referred to detainees as ‘aliens detained by the Department of Defence at the 
BTIF’ and ‘unprivileged enemy belligerents’.512 The memorandum delineated that only 
individuals suspected of aiding in the 9/11 attacks, supporting the Taliban, or abetting 
Al-Qaeda and associated forces could be detained in the OCO.  It admonished against 
detaining individuals for their intelligence information alone and instructed capturing 
units to make a determination within 72 hours as to whether the detainee met the criteria 
and should be transferred to the BTIF.  The commander was directed to review each 
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detainee within 14 days and inform them orally and in writing (in their own language) 
why they had been detained.  Upon arrival, detainees were to be sent to a DRB, 
accompanied by a personal representative (PR) to act on their behalf.
 513
 
Deputy SECDEF William Lynn signed an order in July
514
 and on 15 September 
2009 Petraeus announced the implementation of the policy granting detainees a US 
military representative to challenge their detentions in front of the DRB.
515
 PRs were 
non-lawyer, commissioned officers trained in the DRB process, who were provided all 
information (including classified information) on detainees in order to act in their best 
interest and help facilitate their release.  PRs signed confidentiality agreements with 
elements of the attorney-client privilege.
516
 The new DRBs resembled those 
successfully implemented in Iraq that allowed detainees to challenge their detention 
within 60 days of incarceration and again after six months in custody.
517
 
Lal Gul, the chief of the Afghan Commission for Human Rights (ACHR), 
praised the policy.
518
 The ICRC also commended the Pentagon’s plan to give regular 
review to the prisoners.
519
 Pushing for more transparency, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) filed suit to have the names of all BTIF detainees released as they had 
been at GTMO.
520
 On 17 January 2010, the names of 645 detainees were released 
521
 
but on 25 October, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York denied 
the ACLU’s request for additional information.  The court stated the CIA and the US 
military did not have to release ‘other vital information including the detainees’ 
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nationalities, how long they have been held, in what country they were detained and the 
circumstances surrounding their capture’.522 
The most significant HDC phase three event occurred on 18 September 2009, 
when SECDEF Gates established JTF-435 to oversee detention operations in 
Afghanistan.
523
 The numbers 4-3-5 represented the place of the letters D (detention), C 
(corrections), and E (exploitation) in the alphabet and stood for the activities the JTF 
would be involved in.
524
  At this point, the BTIF held 639 detainees; by December there 
were 753.
525
 In September, USAF Colonel Paul Eberhart, the Director of the Joint 
Deployable Team of the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), Joint Forces 
Command, was assigned to assist with the creation of the new TF.
526
 The mission of the 
JECC was to deploy a ‘McKinsey-esque’,527 DOD internal consulting team to quickly 
establish a JTF.
528
 Doctrinally, there was no template or precedent for creating a 
detention CJIATF in accordance with the McChrystal plan.  The JECC had to figure it 
out along the way.
529
 Eberhart spent three weeks in Norfolk, Virginia conducting 
mission analysis with his team and seven months working directly with the new TF to 




JTF-435 was initially authorised a compliment of 58 headquarter personnel 
bridged by the JECC’s own 28 personnel until the military could find individual 
augmentees to fill the billets.  They had a 120-day deadline to fill all the positions on 
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the joint manning document.
531
 The first member of JTF-435 was Brigadier General 
Mark Martins, who acted as interim commander from September through November 
2009.
532
 On 15 November Martins gave press tours of the new USTIF-A, also known as 
the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP).
533
 It was furnished with classrooms, 
vocational-technical training areas, and fully equipped medical facilities.  Martins, a 
West Point, Oxford, and Harvard-trained lawyer, was President Obama’s former 
classmate and had worked on Obama’s TF on detention operations and strategy.534 He 
had been the driving force behind the establishment of the new JTF
535
 in order to help 
establish a clear legal basis to hold detainees and turn them over to the Afghan 
government as soon as possible.
536
  
The JTF command believed that in a COIN campaign, it was more costly to 
detain prisoners in-theatre than to send them to a strategic facility outside the country 
because of the challenges of dealing with the demands of the host government as well 
as the local population.  The local media’s coverage of the kill-capture programme 
directly affected the US forces’ ability to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan 
people.
537
 While this may be true the price paid by the US government for the GTMO 
detention facility in global good will would need to be weighed against the price of 
keeping the facility in country.  Arguably, keeping them in country is the lesser of two 
evils. 
SECDEF Gates selected Vice Admiral (SEAL) Robert Harward to lead the new 
JTF-435; he arrived in Afghanistan in November 2009.
538
 A SOF operator, Harward 
understood the importance of COIN and the key role cultural tradecraft played in COIN.  
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Harward, raised in Iran, travelled throughout Afghanistan as a teen; his background 
helped him establish relationships of trust with his Afghan government.
539
 Admiral 
Harward also worked effectively with the DASD for Detainee Affairs office to stand-up 
the new TF and to inform Congress of the changes in strategy.
540
 
TF leaders realised they needed more personnel and spent two weeks working a 
plan to increase slots on the joint manning document to 150.
541
 Convincing other 
organisations to provide individual augmentees was challenging; every command had 
its own mission and none wanted to lend personnel.  CJCS Admiral Michael Mullen 
came through Afghanistan and asked Admiral Harward what his biggest obstacle was.  
Harward replied, ‘The fact that I have yet to receive my first individual augmentee that 
was promised to have been here two weeks ago’.  The CJCS resolved the issue and the 
TF ‘saw a big change in priorities for forces flowing into theatre’.542  Harward 
instructed TF leaders that everything they did to build the organisation was to have an 
‘Afghan flavour’ including tapping an Afghan as one of the Deputy TF Commanders.  
In the end, the goal was to turn the mission over to the Afghans.  ‘Otherwise,’ Harward 
said, ‘we’re going to do this forever’.543 
Harward’s other focus was injecting transparency into the public perception of 
the new detention TF after years of intense media scrutiny on detainee issues.  His staff 
worked to develop an open-door policy with the public and the media. Coordination 
with CENTCOM and the Pentagon sometimes proved challenging.  While CENTCOM 
was in CJIATF-435’s direct chain of command via USFOR-A/ISAF, it was often 
quicker and easier to coordinate directly with the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination 
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On 19 November 2009, President Karzai was re-elected.
545
 In his inaugural 
address he said: 
The detention and prosecution of suspects is the authority and responsibility of the 
Afghan government.  We have to strengthen the security of our prisons and 
detention centres, and expedite further the reform process within our justice 
system.  We will continue to discuss this issue with the United States of America 
to ensure that detention and legal prosecution of suspects will be the responsibility 
of the government of Afghanistan alone.
 546
 
On 1 December, President Obama revealed his new surge strategy to cadets at 
West Point.  Just as President Bush had done in Iraq in 2007, Obama decided to ‘surge’ 
an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan to fulfil his campaign promise to escalate the 
‘right’ war547 which he considered the only legal war the Bush administration had 
engadged in.  He nearly doubled the 42,000 soldiers already in country, but pledged to 
reduce troop levels by June 2011.  Obama reiterated his belief that the region was the 
epicentre or centre-of-gravity for radical Islam and Al-Qaeda power and restated his 
conviction that US national interests were at stake because of Pakistan’s nuclear 
capabilities.  Obama outlined his 18-month plan to pursue a military strategy to break 
the Taliban's momentum while increasing Afghanistan's capacity to self-govern.  He 
vowed to work with NATO, the UN, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective 
civilian strategy in order to improve security.  Obama also promised to act with the full 
recognition that success in Afghanistan was inextricably linked to a partnership with 
Pakistan.
548
 Military advisors welcomed the strategy, but by including a withdrawal 
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timeline in order to appease his political base, they feared the president alerted the 
Taliban to simply wait out the surge.
549
  
 By early December 2009, JTF-435 was fully staffed, operating like a CJIATF,
550
 
and ready to support Obama’s surge.551 With the completion of the DFIP and the 
creation of JTF-435, JTF Protector (the TF formed around the 16
th
 MP Brigade to 
manage the custody, control, and care of detainees at the BTIF) finished its mission 21 
December;
552
 all 753 detainees were transferred to the new DFIP.
553
 
Shortly after the closure of the BTIF, the DOD made plans to demolish the 
facility.  Lawyers for several detainees threatened to sue the US government over the 
destruction of evidence.  In order to avoid litigation, the US government assigned the 
FBI to conduct an operational site survey and create a digital interactive virtual archive 
of the entire facility.  The FBI also agreed to preserve and protect any images, blue 
prints, and other records that showed the interior of the BTIF under DOD possession.
554
 




On 22 December 2009, CJ-2 Major General Flynn released an unclassified 
power point presentation on the state of the insurgency, criticising the ‘failure of his 
own service, US military intelligence, in Afghanistan over the last eight years’.  Flynn 
warned the insurgency was growing at a rapid rate and was capable of sustaining itself 
indefinitely.  He stated the Taliban understands COIN and advised the development of a 
new, clear, properly funded strategy to be implemented immediately.
556
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On 7 January 2010, a mission rehearsal exercise battle drill scenario brought the 
JTF to initial operations capability allowing the task force to conduct command and 
control of subordinate units and operate as a headquarters.
557
 Harward officially 
assumed command on 8 January
558
 and served with a DOD civilian deputy, Michael 
Gottlieb.
559
 His first major act on 9 January
560
 was to sign an agreement with the 
government of Afghanistan pledging to turn over the DFIP to the Ministry of Justice by 
January 2011.
561
 The plan was for the Afghan Ministry of Defence to assume control of 
the facility initially, and help transition it to the Ministry of Justice over the year.
562
 The 
DFIP was to become part of the Afghan Justice Centre in Parwan, the Afghan 
government’s central facility for pre-trial detention, prosecution, and post-trial 
incarceration of all national security suspects.
563
 The Taliban condemned the 9 January 




One of the first studies conducted by JTF-435 was a survey of detainees who 
had been released.  In January 2010, former detainees met in Kabul at a post release 
ceremony, or shura, to discuss the re-integration process.  They said they had positive 
and frequent contact with local tribal leaders, but sporadic communications with the 
national government.  Overall, the re-integration process was successful; the rate of 
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In a 27 January 2010 conference call with reporters, Harward was asked about 
secret ‘black’ detention sites in Afghanistan where unregistered detainees were kept 
away from the ICRC.  He affirmed that all detainees under his control were registered 
and declared to the ICRC, but noted that temporary field detention sites (FDS) existed 
at forward operating bases (FOBs) where detainees were collected from point-of-
capture before transport and processing into the detention system.
566
 
To assist with the evolving HDC phase four DRB process, additional personnel 
were assigned to the TF in order to more efficiently process detainees efficiently 
through the system.  Prior to JTF-435 assuming responsibility for the DRB process from 
CJTF-82 (The TF that ran the BTIF),
567
 DRBs were held just once a week.  In January 
2010, JTF-435 began holding three DRBs per week, and by 15 March, they had the 
capacity to operate two DRBs simultaneously, each reviewing five detainees a day, five 
days a week for a total of 50 cases a week.  By June, the DRBs had released 160 
detainees and transferred another 168.
568
 
On 21 October 2009, AIHRC Chairman Lal Gul requested from USFOR-A 
access to detainees at the DFIP and to observe the DRBs.  On 5 November, USFOR-A 
approved the request conditionally, and on 18 November CENTCOM approved the 
recommendation.  On 15 January 2010, Principle Director for Detainee Affairs Alan 
Liotta asked the USD(P) to approve the request, which he did on 19 January.
 569
 Deputy 
SECDEF Lynn concurred on 19 February.
570
 
Harward approved a DRB policy memorandum that codified rules for DRBs.  
Released in March 2010, it filled in gaps left by the July 2009 SECDEF DRB 
Procedures.  Most critically, it declared inadmissible any information collected through 
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‘torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment’.571 On 6 March, Afghan witnesses 
testified for the first time at a DRB.  The US now exceeded the requirement of the Laws 
of Armed Conflict (LOAC); the new process was key to the release and re-integration 
of detainees from the DFIP.
572
 
In February 2010, McChrystal and Stone’s COIN approach to detention began to 
be operationalised in the field.  Marines in the Spin Ghar region were warned that any 
rough treatment or harsh language aimed at detainees was forbidden.  When taking 
prisoners, Marines were instructed to politely ask detainees to go with them voluntarily.  
Few detainees resisted; most went without a struggle.  Most detainees taken into 
custody were suspected of planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or taking 
sniper shots at troops.
 573
 
As part of Obama’s surge of 30,000 additional troops into Afghanistan, 15,000 
US, British, and Afghan forces assaulted the Taliban-controlled city of Marja in 
Helmand province.
574
 The commencement of the 12-to-18 month campaign to penetrate 
Taliban-held areas began with the February 2010 operation that was undertaken with 
the support of the Marja city council.
575
 At the outset, General Petraeus reiterated the 
importance of treating detainees according to Geneva Conventions and using 
congressionally approved interrogation methods found in US Army Field Manual 2-22.3 
Human Intelligence Collector Operations,
576
 which superseded FM 34-5
577
 in 
September 2006 as the military’s guide for intelligence interrogations.578 He said 
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following the Conventions and ‘living our values’ stood the US military in good stead; 
it also diffused the enemy’s ability to generate propaganda.579 
In February 2010, the new 42-acre DFIP became fully operational.  Under US 
Army Colonel John Garrity 1,200 US military personnel began implementing COIN 
‘inside the wire’ with the goal of rehabilitating insurgents.580 Each cell held up to 20 
prisoners; rubber mats on the floor marked spots where each detainee placed a thin 
sleeping mattress.  Detainees were fed so well they gained an average of 36 pounds 
during their imprisonment.  Some detainees earned the privilege to speak to friends or 
relatives via video link.  Treating detainees with dignity and respect was the hallmark of 
the new strategy; Garrity believed angry prisoners were a threat to his guard force and 
he hoped to ‘change Taliban, one detainee at a time’.581 Some US prison guards felt the 
detainees were treated better than they were.
582
  
Holding areas for ‘negative detainees’ were built to separate them from the 
general prison population.
583
 The facility was slated to house 2,300 prisoners by the 
time the US turned it over to the Afghans.  The annual operating cost was expected to 
be US$5 million, plus additional expenses per detainee.  The detention operations 
command ultimately grew to 1,400 under Garrity,
584
 who planned to add a soccer field 
and prison farm as part of the overall goal of rehabilitating detainees.
585
 
 On 19 February 2010, Deputy SECDEF Lynn issued revised guidance on 
granting access to detainees and detention facilities in Afghanistan. Visits by foreign 
agencies and personnel were to be coordinated by CENTCOM who would provide 
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written notice seven days prior to the visit to the Director of the Joint Staff and 
USD(P).
586
 Any member of a foreign delegation interviewing or debriefing detainees 
was required to sign an agreement to abide by DOD interrogation policies and 
procedures.  The guidance demanded a DOD interrogator supervise and monitor 
interrogations, debriefings, and questioning sessions involving foreign delegations.
587
 
Soldiers from the 202
nd
 MI of Fort Gordon, Georgia, deployed in October 2009 
as part of TF-Deuce to support joint HUMINT collection operations.
588
 The DFIP had 
16 interrogation booths equipped with one-way windows and cameras to allow for 
monitoring.  This type of transparency was crucial to preventing the allegations of abuse 
that had plagued other prisons.  Relying solely on approaches in the FM 2-22.3, 




According to Theatre Intelligence Group Commander Colonel Anthony 
MacDonald, the new facility significantly improved his interrogators’ ability to collect 
information.  At the BTIF, his group could only conduct about 100 interviews per week 
and only ask questions on specific topics; using new procedures at the DFIP, they 
increased interviews by 200% to about 300 per week.  One new procedure adopted at 
the facility was to have guards blindfold and transport detainees via wheelchair 
throughout the complex, whether they went to an interrogation room in a secret part of 
the prison, to the clinic, or to meet visitors.  The practice ensured that detainees never 
knew when or what prisoners actually spoke with interrogators and, thus, some became 
more willing to give information.
590
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Intelligence collected at the DFIP yielded confirmation of the enemy’s 
assessment of the US strategy to step up targeted killings of Taliban leadership; 
interrogators learned the Taliban faced a crisis because potential leaders feared taking 
prominent roles that would make them US targets.  This type of intelligence was vital to 
decision makers.
591
 Although scheduled to be turned over to the Afghan government in 
January 2011, Admiral Harward said the intelligence operations at the DFIP would be 
the last thing turned over and suggested the US partner with the Afghans ‘for a very 
long time’ in collecting intelligence.592 
When detainees were released as part of HDC phase four, US authorities, the 
Afghan government, the detainee’s family, and tribal leaders participated in a highly-
scripted ‘release shura’,593 a ceremony where the detainee signed a pledge to support 
the government and the local authorities agreed to act as guarantor.
594
 Afghan National 
Army (ANA) Commander for Oversight of Detention and Reintegration, Brigadier 
General Mohebur Rahman, worked closely with Harward on the development of a 
reintegration process.
595
 Wording of the release shuras was closely aligned with the 
Pashtunwali code.
596
 Pashtunwali, or ‘way of the Pashtuns’ was the governing ideology 
of the Pashtun tribes that dated back to pre-Islamic times.
597
 
In March 2010, Petraeus and SECDEF Gates reviewed the 96-hour rule, a policy 
unpopular among US soldiers because it forced units to either release or transfer 
detainees to the Afghans within 4 days of capture.  Petraeus extended the deadline to 14 
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days for regular USFOR-A military units,
598
 but non-US ISAF units were still under 
orders to turn detainees over to the Afghan government after 96 hours.  Detainees in 
USFOR-A custody could also be sent to the DFIP for further processing.
599
 
The 96-hour rule was instituted in December 2005 to placate the Afghan 
government because of the increased numbers of citizens being detained.
600
 The rule 
also resulted from NATO’s attempt to create a uniform detention policy among member 
nations.  Prior to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in early 2004, forces fighting alongside 
the US turned prisoners over to the US, who had the only detention facilities in 
Afghanistan.  After Abu Ghraib, other governments would not allow their forces to turn 




The 96-hour rule complicated interrogation operations for USFOR-A; it placed 
tremendous pressure on interrogation teams and translators.  There was not adequate 
time to question detainees and, in many cases, it was logistically impossible to 
physically move detainees to a release location in such a short amount of time.
602
 The 
rule was also devastating to US troop morale and endangered their lives.
603
 Soldiers 
captured combatants but were obligated to release them, only to face them right back on 
the battlefield.
604
 This chronic ‘catch and release’ issue was also a problem in Iraq.605 
The only detainees the 96-hour rule did not apply to were those captured by SOF or TF-
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Paladin, a unit dedicated to defeating improvised explosive device (IED) networks; 
these two groups were allowed to hold HVDs indefinitely.
606
 
Improvements in US detention operations in 2010, as well as the opening of the 
DFIP, increased the confidence level of the British government.  In May, Britain 
announced that officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry 
of Defence would be assigned to US detention teams as a prelude to full cooperation.  
The decision coincided with ‘growing concerns about the fate of detainees held by the 
Afghan authorities’.607 
In early June, Afghan tribal leaders met with President Karzai to approve a plan 
to seek peace with the more moderate faction of the Taliban.  The programme called for 
the removal of militant leaders from UN blacklists, peace talks with those who 
renounced violence, and a review of all 15,000 prisoners held by the Afghan 
government.  Although the plan did not explicitly demand the review of detainees under 
US control, General Martins said the US would enable a review.  On 21 June, the 
Afghan government released the first 14 Taliban prisoners under the new plan.  General 
Martins announced that 25 prisoners at the DFIP would also be released as part of the 




In June 2010, after a year as Commander of US and NATO Coalition Forces in 
Afghanistan, General McChrystal prepared an assessment for NATO and ISAF Defence 
Ministers.  It outlined substantial progress in detention including:  the transition to 
Afghan lead, the replacement of the BTIF by the DFIP, the priming of the Afghan 
Ministry of Defence to assume control of the DFIP in 2011, the new detainee review 
process, the release of 114 prisoners in accordance with 27 Afghan-led reintegration 
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shuras, the promotion of transparency across a spectrum of detention activities, and the 
development of the Afghan government’s biometric data collection effort.609 
On 14 July 2010, Admiral Harward said JTF-435 represented: 
. . . PhD level JTF organizational lessons learned, especially in the evolution from 
a JTF with one mission to a CJIATF with multiple strategic responsibilities, 
significant coalition, IA and Afghan integration, while functioning in a 




The US Embassy in Kabul and the State Department touted it as ‘a model for the 
future’,611 but it had its challenges; Colonel Eberhart compared it to ‘building an 
airplane while in flight’.612 The TF accomplished daily detention missions by taking on 
the existing detention organisations while simultaneously folding them into the new 
organisation. 
The relationship between Obama and McChrystal was tenuous from the start.  
The general’s reputation for ‘saying and thinking what others are afraid to’613 may have 
been a factor in his appointment, but when his staff members’ off-the-record remarks to 
reporter Michael Hastings were published in Rolling Stone in June 2010, McChrystal 
was forced to resign.  The remarks were critical of civilian government officials 
including:  Vice President Joseph Biden, National Security Advisor James Jones, US 
Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, and Special Representative for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke.
614
 
On 22 June SECDEF Gates issued a statement: 
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I read with concern the profile piece on Gen. Stanley McChrystal . . . . I believe 
that Gen. McChrystal made a significant mistake and exercised poor judgment in 
this case.  We are fighting a war against al Qaeda and its extremist allies, who 
directly threaten the United States, Afghanistan, and our friends and allies around 
the world.  Going forward, we must pursue this mission with a unity of purpose.  
Our troops and coalition partners are making extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of 
our security, and our singular focus must be on supporting them and succeeding 
in Afghanistan without such distractions.
615
 
On 23 July upon McChrystal’s retirement, SECDEF Gates said: 
McChrystal’s contributions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were ground 
breaking . . . as the general employed every tool available to create success on the 
battlefield.  Over the past decade, no single American has inflicted more fear and 




McChrystal was later cleared of any wrongdoing by the DOD Inspector General (IG) on 
8 April 2011 who cited failures in the previous investigation to properly investigate 
allegations made against General McChrystal and his staff.
617
 The IG further stated ‘that 
available evidence did not support the conclusion that McChrystal had violated any 
applicable legal or ethics standard’.618 
On 23 June 2010, President Obama nominated CENTCOM Commander, 
General Petraeus, to replace McChrystal as USFOR-A/ISAF Commander.
619
 On 29 
June, Petraeus told the Senate Armed Services Committee ‘Afghanistan is a test of 
wills, and the enemy has to know the United States and its allies have the will to 
prevail’.620 He reiterated the US main effort was a COIN strategy to clear-hold-build; 
clearing the area physically of insurgents by killing or detaining them, holding the areas 
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just cleared by placing US troops in the area to provide security, and building up any 
needed infrastructure to improve the lives of the locals.
621
 While clear-hold-build took 
place, operations to kill, capture, or change insurgent behaviour continued.
622
 
On 24 July, Petraeus met with senior Afghan officials at Camp Phoenix in Kabul 
to reaffirm the agreement to turn the DFIP over to the Afghan Ministry of Defence in 
January 2011.  Several hundred ANA MPs completed training in preparation for the 
transfer of detainee operations.  The first class of soldiers finished the Afghan 
Correction Officer Course in May 2010 and the Advanced Individual Training 
programme in July.  The new Afghan MPs were assigned to the DFIP for on-the-job 
training under the tutelage of US MPs.
623
 
Although progress was made, the detention mission remained dangerous.  On 7 
August 2010, news sources reported a detainee attempting to escape a detention facility 
in Kandahar (not the STHF, which had been closed, but a facility run by Afghan 
National Security Forces) killed two US Marines.  The report indicated the detainee 
slipped out of a room where he was praying and managed to get a rifle.  The Marines 
were killed trying to subdue the detainee who was eventually killed by small-arms 
fire.
624
 Details released under the Freedom of Information Act later described two 
detainees acquiring weapons from an arms room left open.  The detainees grabbed an 
AK-47 rifle and a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and attempted to shoot down an 
Osprey helicopter at the landing zone 100 yards from their cell.  Aboard the helicopter 
was Admiral Harward who had just finished a meeting at the headquarters of the 1st 
Battalion, 2nd Marines, in the Musa Qala district of Helmand province and was leaving 
as the escape took place.  An Irish contractor opened fire on the detainees forcing them 
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On 16 September 2010, two more Afghan detainees were discharged from the 
DFIP under a HDC phase four release shura in Logar province attended by Governor 
Atiqullah Ludin.  He welcomed them back into the community and the Jordanian Army 
General responsible for security in the area reiterated that ISAF was not fighting against 
Islam, but working to help the Afghan government promote peace.  Afghan Deputy 
Commander of CJIATF-435 Major General Marjan Shuja explained his mission to 
work with local Afghan leaders to ensure detainees were treated fairly, received 
education, reintegrated into Afghan society, and did not re-join the insurgency.
626
 
Successful reintegration, according to Petraeus’ COIN strategy, meant ‘removing 
Afghan fighters by bringing those willing to renounce violence and accept the Afghan 
constitution back into their communities with honour and dignity’. 627 The high level 
attendees at the release shuras added solemnity to the detainees’ oaths. 
 On 23 September, 189 ANA MPs became the third group of graduates from the 
Detention Operations Training Centre in Parwan run by the 96th MP Battalion’s TF-
Spartan.  ANA MPs completed two weeks of language training and eight weeks of 
detention operations training (the Detention Operations Transition Course
628
) in 
preparation for assuming guard duties at the DFIP.  An additional 700 ANA MPs began 
training; 100 more were already on duty.  General Shuja and ANA Parwan and Pul-e-
Charki MP Brigade Commander General Safiullah Safi congratulated the new MPs on 
the service they were providing to the nation by working ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with US 
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CJIATF-435’s primary mission was to improve detention operations for the 
growing prisoner population. (Appendix H)  Their secondary duty was to train Afghans 
to take over the mission.  By the end of September 2010, more than 160 Afghan soldiers 
completed training and joined 1,200 US troops assigned to guard the DFIP.  An 
additional 600 ANA soldiers began training for the mission.
631
 
  The newly trained ANA MPs were desperately needed.  While the DFIP was 
continually improving efforts to reform the ANDF, by the end of 2010, support for the 
Taliban among the 5000 inmates was so widespread the Taliban viewed the facility as a 
valuable recruiting centre. Additionally, many prisoners maintained close 
communications with insurgents outside the prison via smuggled contraband cell 
phones and even launched and planned attacks from within the prisons.  Afghanistan’s 
former head of intelligence, Amrullah Saleh, said the prison was ‘eroding battlefield 
gains . . . We are not de-Talibanizing them [prisoners] . . . We are further radicalizing 
them. We are giving them control of the prison.’632   
On 28 September, General Petraeus toured the DFIP and said: 
When I took command of Multinational Force-Iraq in February 2007, we still had 
Camp Bucca with 17,000 detainees at that time and it grew larger . . . We still had 
all of the detainees in huge enclosures.  It was just fenced-in enclosures of about 
800 to 900 detainees per enclosure.  Obviously, we have come a long way since 
then . . . This is about doing it right.
633
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On 30 September 201, seven Afghan teachers were recognised for their efforts at 
the DFIP.  Instructors taught courses in Pashto, agriculture, masonry, carpentry, and 
tailoring.  By arming detainees with basic literacy and a skill or trade, the instructors 
hoped they would be ‘less likely to turn to the insurgency for economic gain’ once they 




 MP Commander TF-
Peacekeeper General Mandi Murray and CJIATF-435 Director of Reintegration Colonel 
Robert Burk presented the awards.  The 46
th
 MP Command, TF-Peacekeeper, a 
subordinate CJIATF-435 command, oversaw detention operations and the transition of 
detention operations at the DFIP to the Afghan government.  The Afghan Ministry of 
Education awarded 66 detainees certification for completing a six month Pashto literacy 
course at the DFIP, where they learned to read and write to a minimum third grade level.  




On 1 October, ANA MPs assumed majority responsibility for one of the four 
detainee housing units (DHUs) at the DFIP.  ANA General Safi encouraged his troops 
on reaching the milestone:  ‘We must prove that we are able to do this without help. . . . 
This is a test for you today and I want you to pass that test.  With the help and training 
you have been given you will be able to perform all of your tasks’.637 Safi said it was a 
great day for Afghanistan as the country prepared to take over full control of detention 
operations in 2011. 
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The ability to protect the local population from insurgents was paramount in the 
success of COIN operations.  In Afghanistan, with population centres scattered across 
more than 650 thousand square kilometres, the building and maintaining of roads to link 
cities was a high priority.  According to Dr. David Kilcullen’s Afghan field study, the 
construction of accessible roads conveyed long term commitment to the local 
population.
638
 Further, Kilcullen said well-maintained roads reduced the frequency and 
success of IEDs because of the difficulty of planting them in pavement and the ease of 
spotting them against blacktop.
639
 
One of the major challenges at the ANDF was the road leading from Kabul to 
the prison.  On 7 October 2010, Afghan and US dignitaries broke ground on a new road 
to improve access to the ANDF and assist local villagers by increasing traffic to their 
businesses.  The project to pave 4km of road was expected to cost US$974,230 and 
scheduled to be completed December 2010.  Once finished, the road allowed family 
members and legal counsel to safely visit detainees. Admiral Harward applauded the 
construction and its impact on Afghan citizens:  ‘the more roads we can build, the better 
. . . It’s important for their families and their future’.  He promised to walk the road with 
villagers upon its completion.
640
 
On 11 October, CJITAF-435 held a corrections conference at Camp Phoenix 
attended by approximately 50 Afghan leaders.  They discussed the state of correction 
operations, prioritised challenges, and discussed facility requirements.  According to 
Director of the Central Prison Directorate General Amir Mohammad Jamsheed, the 
prisons were ‘a very hot issue’ among the Afghan population, and it was important to 
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understand the detention requirements necessary to defeat the insurgency and promote 
the rule of law.
641
  
On 11 October, 13 more detainees graduated from the Afghan-led HDC phase 
four reintegration programme and were released from the DFIP.  General Shuja told the 
men he hoped they would return peacefully to their villages and ‘not allow anything to 
sway [them] again’. 642 Nearly 240 detainees were released from the DFIP between 
January and October 2010 in 40 release shuras. 
Although the US made significant strides in reforming detention operations, 
allegations of prisoner abuse against coalition forces continued to permeate the news 
media.  On 14 October 2010, the Open Society Foundation, funded by liberal activist 
George Soros who resides with the judicial-Geneva Conventions camp, published a 16-
page report detailing instances of detainee abuse.  Allegations involved detainees held 
in a separate facility outside the DFIP in Bagram where they were subjected to 
excessive cold and light, stripped nude upon arrival, given inappropriate and inadequate 
food, deprived of bedding and sleep, denied practice of religious obligations and 
physical exercise, and denied access to the ICRC.
643
 Similar accusations from nine 
former detainees were reported by the BBC in May 2010.
644
 
 Reports claimed the facility, called Tor Prison or the Black Jail, was run by SOF 
or the DIA.  Military Spokesperson Captain Pamela Kunze said the ICRC was aware of 
temporary holding centres and that operations at the centres complied with US and 
international law.  She said the ‘nature of warfare requires that the United States protect 
certain information from public disclosure in order to protect operational security’.645 
Similar allegations were made in January 2010 when two Afghan teens said they had 
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On 27 January 2010, Admiral Harward denied the existence of secret prisons: 
There are no black-jail secret prisons . . . We do have field detention sites we do 
not disclose, but they’re held there for very short periods, and then they’re 
moved--if they’re determined to need additional internment, they’re moved to the 
detention facility at Parwan or released.
647
 
Harward insisted that all detainees under his command had access to the ICRC. 
 On 13 May, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh accused US troops of 
administering ‘battlefield executions’ of captured combatants.  Hersh, who broke the 
Abu Ghraib abuse story, said multiple sources had told him about prisoner executions in 
the field: 
What they’ve done in the field now is, they tell the troops, you have to make a 
determination within a day or two or so whether or not the prisoners you have, the 
detainees, are Taliban.  You must extract whatever tactical intelligence you can 
get, as opposed to strategic, long-range intelligence, immediately.  And if you 
cannot conclude they’re Taliban, you must turn them free . . . if they can’t prove 
they’re Taliban, bam.  If we don’t do it ourselves, we turn them over to the nearby 
Afghan troops and by the time we walk three feet the bullets are flying.
648
 
 On 17 October, an Afghan detainee captured the day before was found dead in 
his cell at a temporary ISAF holding facility in Kandahar.
649
 Later, the detainee was 
identified as Mullah Muhibullah, a senior Taliban leader in the Arghandab district of 
Kandahar province.  A US soldier was accused of the shooting.  Both the US Army 
Criminal Investigation Division and the Afghan government conducted investigations 
as to why the soldier allegedly removed other detainees from the holding cell and shot 
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 The death was the first known execution style murder of a detainee in 
US military custody.  While overall detainee operations in Afghanistan operated 
smoothly according to phase three of the HDC, this incident was a temporary regression 
back to phase two. 
On 3 November 2010, 14 detainees were freed from the DFIP at a Helmand 
province release shura; this further underscored the pace at which HDC phase four 
detainee releases were picking up Helmand Deputy Governor Haji Abdul-Satar 
exhorted the released detainees to do something good for their country.  He invited 
those still at odds with the government to join him in making peace and invited 
insurgents to put down their weapons and ‘join us in the process.  Some are saying that 
because there are foreigners here it is time for jihad, but the foreigners didn’t come here 
to kill innocents.  They came here to help the people build a secure Afghanistan.  Come 
and join us build a better Afghanistan’.651 
On 4 November, two more detainees were released from the DFIP in a Parwan 
provincial shura.  Deputy Minister of Defence Enayatullah Nazari told the men:  ‘May 
God help you in your return to your families and your villages, and I hope that you can 
continue your peaceful ways in the future’.652 
On 4 November, CJIATF-435 announced that more than 500 ANA Soldiers had 
completed training and Afghan forces were guarding two of the four DHUs at the 
DFIP.
653
  On 30 November, Admiral Harward announced the four DHUs were 
‘primarily’ manned by the ANA with US oversight.654 He said that since January 2010, 
of the approximately 5,500 who were detained in Afghanistan, about 1,100 were sent to 
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the DFIP.  Over 11 months, more than 550
655
 had been released from the DFIP and 
more than 300
656
 had participated in one of more than 50 release shuras.
657
 Expansion 
at the DFIP included the construction of three additional DHUs completed March 
2011,
658
 almost doubling capacity at the DFIP from 1,650 to 3,200 detainees.  Harward 
reiterated the transition plan was ‘conditions-based’ and the Afghan transfer of 
responsibility for the DFIP would ‘be at their pace’.659 
The 17 November 2010 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) meeting in 
Lisbon, Portugal, was crucial to stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan.  NATO set the goal 
of turning security over to the Afghan government by the end of 2014, but committed to 
remain in the country well beyond that time.
660
 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen said: 
We will stay as long as it takes to finish our job.  NATO is in this for the long 
term.  We will not transition until our Afghan partners are ready.  We will stay, 
after transition, in a supporting role . . . Let me stress the agreement we have 
signed today is not only a signal to the Afghan people we will stay committed . . . 




Before the summit, President Karzai had been critical of the number 
international troops in Afghanistan, their role in civilian casualties, and the frequency of 
SOF night raids.  General Petraeus said the raids were necessary to execute COIN 
strategy, but pledged to work to address Karzai’s concerns.662 On 28 November 2010, 
CJCS Mullen said the US was on track to begin drawdown July 2011, but assured there 
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would be a large number of US and allied troops in Afghanistan well beyond 2011.
663
 
Secretary Gates reiterated the commitment that US troops would be in Afghanistan after 
the 2014 withdrawal of combat troops.
664
 
On 17 January 2011, the first fully run DFIP Afghan DHU Delta was opened.  
This indicated the most significant benchmark in the process of turning over control of 
detention operations to the Afghanistan government. The Parwan and Pol-e-Charki MP 
Brigades under the direction of the ANA assumed responsibility for DHU Delta, which 
held pre-trial detainees and post-trial convicts.  Although the goal of turning over all 
detention operations by January 2011 was missed, this milestone was part of the 
‘broader conditions-based transition of detention operations’.665 As Afghan capabilities 
continued to increase, the speed of the overall transition also accelerated.
666 
On 19 
January, after a nine-month deployment at the DFIP, the 193rd MP Battalion - TF Force 
Rocky Mountain, completed their tour of duty.  The TF trained the first ANA MP 
soldiers to work at the DFIP and provided for more than 1000 visits by Afghan 
government officials and the ICRC.
667
 
 On 20 January 2011, 143 Afghan soldiers graduated from the 10 week Detention 
Operations Transition Course in Parwan and started six weeks of on the job training 
before beginning detention operations in the DFIP.  They joined 600 Afghan detention 
guards who had previously certified.
668
 Afghan guard training cohort seven graduated 
almost 400 additional troops 2 March, which was the largest training class to date.
669
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Cohort eight graduated 137 guards on 21 April
670
 and cohort nine graduated 63 on 19 
May
671
 bringing the total trained Afghan guard force to roughly 1,343 soldiers.  
Selected ANA troops were tapped to attend the Senior ANA Leadership Course ‘to 
increase their institutional knowledge of DFIP operations’ while others participated in 
the ‘train-the-trainer’ programme to become instructors.672 
Re-education of detainees continued; on 5 February, the first 11 detainees 
scheduled for release completed a new course in civics.  Detainees learned about the 
Afghanistan government structure, the constitution, peace studies, geography, 
demography, health, and wellness.  The objective was to provide graduates with a 
broader understanding of the changes being implemented in their government and to 
help them reintegrate into Afghan society.
673
 Other detainees received instruction in 
farming skills, techniques, and technology at the DFIP Agricultural Centre.  Detainees 




On 7 February 2011, the 201st MI Battalion completed a 12-month tour of duty 
at CJIATF-435.  In addition to supporting US operations, they created the first Afghan 
Debriefing Academy and certified the first group of 15 Afghan government 
interrogators in operations according to international standards.  Admiral Harward 
stated:  ‘You [the 201st] have really put us on this path to transition - to building 
capabilities within the government of Afghanistan, supporting our efforts to move from 
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intelligence-based detention operations to evidence-based detention operations . . . This 
was probably the most challenging part of our work’.675  
 On 5 April, the Afghan Ministry of Defence and the US Rule-of-Law TF signed 
a memorandum of agreement establishing a vocational training programme for selected 
insurgents who agreed to renounce the insurgency.
676
 This programme built on the 
success of the kill-capture programme that was pushing Taliban soldiers to leave the 
insurgency and go through the official process of reintegration into Afghan society.
677
 
According to General David Petraeus: 
These are mid-level fighters and below who have had enough, or are tired of just 
endless fighting, whatever it may be, the pressure and so on, and essentially come 
forward and say, “I'd like to lay down my weapon. I would like to be reintegrated 
into society. I’d like protection as I do that”.  Not a huge number yet, still we 
would say below a thousand total in the various reintegration events that have 
taken place in the course of just recent months. But nonetheless, you see some 
degree of traction and some degree of momentum.
678
 
Since taking office, President Obama authorised a ‘6 fold’ increase in night time 
kill-capture missions against HVTs.  This was in line with his shift from detention-
interrogation centric to kill centric operations.  The proliferation of these raids angered 
the Karzai Government because of civilian casualties associated with the missions.
679
 
The Pushtunwali tribal code concept of badal, or revenge killings, was predominant in 
the areas where much of the collateral damage and deaths occurred.  The US continued 
to implement COIN strategy in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Pashtun 
tribal population over to the coalition.
680
 Although the night time raids were effective in 
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killing and capturing HVTs, they created some enemies among even the moderates in 
targetted areas.   
The US military revised night time raid guidelines to better protect civilians, an 
essential element of COIN-CT strategy.
681
 These guidelines included enhanced 
coordination between high-level US-Afghan military, providing villagers’ lists of 
individuals detained, explanation of who detained them, receipts to catalogue any items 
seized, and claims instructions for compensation for damaged property.  Additionally, 
Afghan security forces were attached to every mission and appointed to establish initial 
contact with the locals on target.  Also Afghan women were only to be searched by 
female soldiers.
682
 At a national assembly of tribal elders held in November 2011, they 
‘advised the Karzai Government to allow the raids to continue as long as they are 
conducted solely by Afghans’.  The government considered training female Afghan 
Special Forces to interact with females on raids.
683
 
At the forefront of the kill-capture programme was the Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC), ‘an almost industrial-scale counterterrorism killing machine’ 
according to Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagle.
684
 From March to May 
2011, JSOC conducted 3,000 missions involving elite SOF against targets on the Joint 
Prioritised Effects List,
685
 composed of thousands of names of bomb makers, 
commanders, fighters, logistics people, and facilitators of money and weapons.  For 
General Petraeus, JSOC became an essential tool that ‘killed or captured more than 
12,000 militants in the last year’.686 
The climax of the kill-capture programme materialised the night of 1 May 2011, 
when JTF Operation Neptune’s Spear launched a mission codenamed ‘Crankshaft’, 
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against top HVT Bin Laden, at a compound near Abbottabad, Pakistan about 35 miles 
from Islamabad.
687
 After a decade long hunt, Bin Laden’s position was finally fixed.  A 
US Navy SEAL team moved in to kill or capture him; Bin Laden was killed and his 
body was airlifted to the USS Carl Vinson where he received an Islamic burial at sea
688
 
after the Saudi government refused to take possession of his body.
689
 Although Bin 
Laden’s death did not end the war in Afghanistan, it did represent a major intelligence 
victory in the kill-capture programme.  
In 2008, then-Senator Obama stated he favoured following the Nuremburg trials 
model as a way to bring Bin Laden to justice,
690
 but 2 May 2011 he announced:  
Today, at my direction, the United States launched a targeted operation against 
that [Bin Laden’s] compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.  A small team of 
Americans carried out the operation with extraordinary courage and capability.  
No Americans were harmed.  They took care to avoid civilian casualties.  After a 
firefight, they killed Osama bin Laden and took custody of his body . . . Yet his 
death does not mark the end of our effort.  There’s no doubt that al Qaeda will 
continue to pursue attacks against us.  We must -- and we will -- remain vigilant 
at home and abroad.
691
 
A few months after the raid, US CT Chief John Brennan laid out the Obama 
Administration’s ‘Bin Laden raid doctrine’ while speaking at Harvard law school.  He 
stated the US preferred to capture and interrogate terrorists, but like the previous Bush 
Administration, the ‘US can protect itself with pre-emptive action against suspects the 
US believes an imminent threat, wherever they are.’692 This was an astounding admition 
by the Obama administration who derided the Bush administration for just such 
policies. 
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Admiral Harward’s command of CJIATF-435 ended shortly after the Bin Laden 
mission, and in July 2011, he was succeeded by another three-star SOF general officer, 
Army General Keith Huber.
693
 Admiral Harward became the Deputy Commander for 
CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida.
694
 
In September, UN investigators found evidence of torture in 16 of the roughly 
100 Afghan prisons.  ISAF immediately halted all transfers of detainees to Afghan 
control.  International law prohibited the US from transferring prisoners until the 
facilities could be recertified.  Afghans officials initially denied the abuse allegations, 
but eventually conceded and worked with NATO to bring the prisons up to standard.  
NATO spokesman General Carston Jacobsen said:   
NATO relies on reports from soldiers in the field and independent groups such as 
the United Nations. We are not responsible to inspect all the prisons. We are 
responsible for the detainees.  When we have reasonable doubt [about abuse] with 




On 16 November 2011, tribal leaders from across the country attend a 
traditional assembly of Afghan Elders in Kabul.  President Hamid Karzai laid out his 
vision for the country and discussed the Afghan government relationship with the US 
after the 2014 drawdown.  He proposed allowing US bases, but expressed concerns 
about Afghan sovereignty, specifically, he argued against the detention of Afghan 
citizens by ISAF forces.  He said:  ‘They [US troops] have no right to operate prisons.  
This is our land.  It is up to the ministries of Justice and Interior to manage the 
prisons.
696
 This defined the baseline for detention policy and the role the US would 
play in Afghanistan post 2014. 
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Conclusion 
US operations in Afghanistan have moved through at four of the six phases of the HDC 
since US and coalition forces launched Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 
2001.  Although mistakes have been made and the cycle is not complete, the US 
military has adapted to a new type of enemy, defined a new status for detainees 
captured in conflict, and determined new methods to reintegrate detainees into society 
according to counterinsurgency doctrine.  
In phase one of the HDC, beginning 9/11, US forces began planning for combat 
operations.  The historical record indicates there was some thought to initial detention 
operations, but no preparation to hold detainees long term or foresight to determine their 
status as fighters for a terror organisation and unrecognised government.  As the US 
military began holding detainees, they scrambled to develop a plan to detain, care for, 
and interrogate the vast numbers of prisoners captured.  The initial two detention 
holding facilities in Bagram and Kandahar were inadequate and quickly inundated by 
the large numbers of detainees who overwhelmed the system. 
In phase two, detainees were moved to GTMO and the initial Kandahar STHF 
was closed, but some detainees languished at Bagram.  A November death of a detainee 
at a CIA facility in Kabul and two detainee deaths at the BCP in December 2002 caused 
by US military abuse brought US detention policy and prisoner treatment under intense 
scrutiny. 
In phase three of the HDC, JTF-180 was charged with improving detention 
operations at the BCP.  The debate over legal status of detainees broiled in the courts 
and policymakers dithered over what techniques beyond the Army field manual would 
be allowed during interrogations.  The military clarified procedure and reasserted 
checks over detention operations.  The watershed moment for US detention operations 
globally was the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq and the ensuing 
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investigations that followed.  Examination of detention operations in Iraq, GTMO, and 
Afghanistan catalysed changes at all US facilities.   
During phase three, phase four detainee releases took place under an Afghan 
government sponsored release and reintegration program. The US military worked to 
get the detention process right for several years.  While care and feeding improved 
quickly at GTMO and facilities in Iraq, reforms in Afghanistan lagged.  Austere 
conditions in detention sites in Afghanistan persisted and negatively impacted CT and 
COIN efforts. The creation of JTF-435, a critical HDC phase three accomplishment, 
helped actualise recommendations from General Stone’s study of Afghanistan’s 
detention operations in the summer of 2009.  Based on changes and policies 
successfully implemented in 2007 in Iraq, the COIN suggestions led to a turnaround in 
a stressed prison system.  Afghan detainees were granted the right to appear before 
DRBs to have their cases heard and reviewed.  In some cases they were accorded trials 
before Afghan courts with legal representation.  Detainees began participating in release 
shuras to ensure proper reintegration back into Afghan society after completing various 
training programmes. 
The endgame leading to the end of phase four and into phase five of the HDC 
began when the US began turning over detention operations to the Afghans in January 
2011.  Although the timetable was extended to complete the turnover, detention 
operations are expected to be fully turned over as soon as the Afghans can assume full 
control of the DFIP. 
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Guantanamo Bay Case Study 
Find information and prevent the next 9/11. That’s my mission. That’s what [the] 
SECDEF said, plain and simple. 
- JTF-170/GTMO Commanding Officer, General Michael Dunlavey, USAR697 
Introduction 
This chapter, broken down along the phases of the HDC, will discuss the history of US 
involvement in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and how the US military came to use the base 
as a detention facility in the GWOT.  In addition, it will cover the tenures of the 
commanders of the prison facility since 2001 and key events that depict a balancing act 
performed by meeting the demands of three agendas:  the responsibility to care for 
detainees’ well-being, the imperative to produce useable intelligence, and the DOD 
Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) mandate to collect evidence to prosecute 
detainees.  These missions were executed before the backdrop of an evolving detainee 
policy.   
Historical Context 
The US presence at GTMO is rooted in the Spanish-American War of 1898 when the 
US helped Cubans revolutionaries obtain freedom from Spain.  In February 1903, the 
US signed a lease with the Cuban government to use 45 square miles of water and land 
as a refuelling base; an official treaty was ratified in December.  In 1934, a new treaty 
reconfirmed the original and granted Cuba and her trading partners free access through 
the bay.  Payment on the lease was set at US$2,000 annually in gold and a termination 
clause was added stipulating the lease could only be terminated if both parties 
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Navy personnel assigned to the base for security and force protection had a 
detention facility which consisted of three, small, square cells inside a security building 
to deal with unruly sailors.
699
  Marines at GTMO manned towers on the base perimeter 
within watch of their Cuban counterparts on the other side of the border.  The main 
cause for tension on base was the Cuban ‘mirrors’ and watching for Cubans trying to 
escape through the minefield.  Some managed to get across; others drifted onto the 
beach in boats with their families trying to escape.
700
  
On 30 September 1991, Haitian insurgents ousted President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide and the country plunged into chaos.  Thousands of Haitians fled in makeshift 
rafts and headed for GTMO, just 80 miles from their shores, where they hoped to 
receive favourable treatment from the US.
701
 Operation GTMO was created to manage 
the influx of Haitian humanity coming onto the island.  On 22 November 1991, Marine 
Brigadier General George H. Walls Jr., Commanding Officer, 2
nd
 Force Service Support 
Group (FSSG) based out of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, was tasked to stand up a 
JTF to provide for the care, custody, and detention of the migrants.  By 3 December 
more than 6,000 Haitians had arrived at GTMO and General Walls was told to prepare 
for 10,000 more.  Wall’s MPs were prepared for the detention mission, as they had 
guarded prisoners during the recent Gulf War.  His new JTF was the most joint, service-
mixed operation in recent history.
702
 When Haitians arrived on the island they were 
placed in detention camps and classified as migrants rather than refugees in order to 
prevent them from assuming legal status to enter the US.
703
  
The JTF housed migrants in a quickly constructed, large facility called Camp 
Bulkeley near Kittery Beach.  The camp was a detention facility and armed foot patrols 
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were conducted around the perimeters to keep the thousands of migrants from escaping.  
They received provisions including clothes, shoes, food, and televisions.
704
 Eventually 
five additional camps were created to house all the detainees.
705
  Base law enforcement 
and JTF security personnel were instructed to treat the migrants with respect while 
detaining them as prisoners, searching them for weapons, and turning them over to 
intelligence personnel for screening.  Occasionally the Haitians become frustrated and 
rioted.  They made makeshift weapons, threw rocks, and destroyed property, including a 
fire truck used to spray the rioters with water.
706
 
In August 1994, 14,000 Haitians were still at GTMO when Castro allowed a 
mass exodus of boat people from his country after a spate of anti-government riots in 
Havana.  The Cuban migrant crisis added an additional 34,000 detainees to the already 
crowded base.  Joint Task Group (JTG) Bulkeley, JTF-160 was tasked to manage 
detention operations as part of Operation Sea Signal.
707
 To alleviate overcrowding at 
GTMO, a second JTF under Brigadier General James Wilson
708
 undertook Operation 
Safe Haven and was authorised by the Panamanian government to hold up to 10,000 
refugees for six months.
709
  
In 1995, USMC Colonel Michael Lehnert arrived from Camp LeJeune, North 
Carolina to command security forces for both the Cuban and Haitian detention 
camps.
710
 Base security worked with USAF and Army security personnel to assist with 
the mission that eventually managed more than 48,000 detainees in makeshift camps.
711
 
McCalla hanger, a golf course, and the Haitian detention facility at Camp Bulkeley 
were used to house the detainees.  Intelligence personnel discovered Castro unloaded 
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his prisons and allowed the criminals to escape to GTMO.  These detainees were 
separated from the rest of the detainee population as quickly as possible and housed at a 
new JTF-160 camp called X-Ray.
712
 
 Bringing detainees to GTMO after 9/11 was a logical course for those who had 
worked previous detention operations in Cuba.  The base was large and situated 
between a minefield and ocean water.
713
  
HDC Phase I: The Conflict Starts and Detainees Are Captured 
Prior to the arrival of 9/11 Enemy Combatants (ECs) recently captured in Afghanistan, 
at GTMO, military assignment detailers regarded tours at the sleepy base as one of the 
best-kept secrets in the Navy.
714
 GTMO was in bare bones maintenance mode; it served 
as a refuelling station, a forward presence for US forces in the Caribbean, an aid and 
assistance point, and caretaker for the bay and land under the US-Cuban agreement.  
Only 750 active duty personnel were assigned to the base with an additional 2,000 
family members
715
 as well as Jamaican, Filipino, and Cuban contractors.  Pre-9/11 
rumours on base hinted GTMO was to be shuttered and handed back to Cuba.  The loss 




Amid heightened security on base in the days after 9/11, personnel at GTMO 
watched military operations unfold in Afghanistan with a growing sense their mission 
was about to change.
717
 In mid-December 2001, Rear Admiral Jan Gaudio, the Navy 
Regional Commander for the Southeast US told Captain Robert Buehn, Commander 
Naval Station GTMO to prepare to receive 300 prisoners within three weeks.
718
 As the 
news spread, many believed detainees would be housed on the leeward side near the 
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airfield.  When plans were announced to hold detainees at Camp X-Ray, near the family 
housing complex, many worried that military dependants would be evacuated.
719
  
HDC Phase II:  Mistakes Are Made in Detainee Handling and Incarceration 
The founding of post 9/11 detention operations at GTMO was complicated by the 
leadership structure installed by the DOD.  Two TFs with separate commanding officers 
of different ranks and overlapping missions were assigned to the island.  This was a 
clear violation of US military joint doctrine:  specifically, the principles of simplicity, 
unity of command, and synchronization of effort.  It lacked the proper command and 
control (C2) structure to be effective.
720
 Due to deficiencies in the C2 organization, the 
mission suffered from conflicting priorities and competing goals.  Illustrative of phase 




On 22 December, USMC Brigadier General Michael Lehnert arrived at GTMO 
to conduct an assessment as the commander of the new JTF-160
722
 responsible for 
detention.  Lehnert was the Commanding Officer of the 2nd FSSGat Camp Lejeune, 
North Carolina,
723
and was selected because his unit was the detention operations 
assigned unit for the contingency plan for Cuba
724
 and Lehnert was in General Walls’ 
unit that had run joint detention operations so effectively at GTMO back in the early 
1990s.  Lehnert commanded the initial set up of the detention operations and served 
from 21 December 2001 to 28 March 2002.
725
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US Army Reserve Major General Michael Dunlavey was the senior Army 
Reserve military intelligence officer and a civilian judge from Erie County, 
Pennsylvania
726
 and although he was initially mobilised to the NSA after 9/11, he was 
tapped to be the first commanding officer of JTF-170 at GTMO.  Dunlavey was a 
tough, confident, straight-talking leader with a background in intelligence and 
interrogation operations during the Vietnam War.  He outranked both Lehnert and 
Baccus and eventually assumed command of both TFs when they were combined into 
JTF-GTMO.
727
 Dunlavey was considered by the judicial-Geneva Conventions camp 
supporters to be the enforcer of the SECDEF and Bush administration’s policies and 
therefore would earn their ire and be much derided in the press. 
Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) Lieutenant General Robert 
W. Noonan, Jr. recommended Dunlavey to the SECDEF based on his experience as a 
combat veteran, intelligence officer with legal expertise, and a background in 
interrogation operations.  Rumsfeld instructed Dunlavey to ‘Find information and 
prevent the next 9-11’.728 Outside the tight fraternity of active duty generals, Dunlavey 
embraced the new assignment, but in hindsight realized he was expendable in case 
things went badly; he had no Pentagon insiders to protect him.
729
 
On 7 January 2002, the US government held 346 detainees in Afghanistan at 
facilities in Kandahar, Bagram, Mazar-e-Sharif, and aboard the USS Bataan.  Those 
sent to GTMO were transferred based on evolving screening criteria.
730
 More than 
1,000 US military personnel were assigned to JTF-160 to stand up and prepare the 
facility for the arrival of the detainees; the majority were MPs.  The first 20 detainees 
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arrived at Kandahar 11 January 2002.
731
 They were initially housed at Camp X-Ray, the 
former criminal facility from the 1995 Cuban detainee crisis, but it was a temporary 
solution while plans for a long-term facility were addressed.
732
 The holding cells were 
open air, chain linked 8-by-8-by-7.5-foot units.  Detainees were given access to warm 
showers, toilets, water, clean clothes, blankets, three halal meals per day, prayer rugs, 
medical care, exercise time, and writing materials.
733
 They were also provided with a 
US Navy Islamic Chaplain who provided a Quran for each detainee, performed the calls 
to prayer, and acted as an ombudsman to the command for the detainees.
734
  
A CT scanner and other high tech medical equipment were shipped to the base.  
Neurosurgeons, cardiovascular surgeons, and other specialists were flown in to treat 
detainees.  Many were in poor condition and needed hospital care.
735
 On 17 January the 
ICRC made their first visit to observe operations and set up oversight.
736
 Shortly 
thereafter on 25 January, SECDEF Rumsfeld and select members of Congress visited 
GTMO to personally thank members of JTF-160 for the work they were doing and 
remind them that although the detainees did not qualify for POW status under the 
Geneva Conventions, they were to be afforded good treatment and proper care.
737
 This 




During this visit, the SECDEF ordered every detainee be screened immediately 
in order to determine whom the US had in custody, utilise the information for decision-
making, and to inform the public.  At this point, detainees were arriving at GTMO on 
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two flights a day from Afghanistan and there were only about 15 interrogators to screen 
them all.  The military interrogators spent 12 hours a day screening detainees in the 
interrogation booths and then wrote reports for several more hours.  This schedule 
persisted seven days a week for the first few months.
739
 These ‘re-screenings’ took 
place despite the fact all of the detainees had been screened in Afghanistan and had 




In addition to the lack of HUMINT trained resources, the majority of military 
interrogators and civilian law enforcement personnel had no training in radical Islamic 
extremism, languages, religion, or cultures of the detainees.  This made screening 
efforts even more challenging.
741
 The JTF J-2 (head intelligence officer) started his own 
training programme in Islam, history, and culture for J-2 personnel
742
 and Stu 
Harrington, a former interrogation officer from the Vietnam War, was brought in to 
provide historical lessons learned.
743
  
Shortly after Rumsfeld’s visit, the JTF-160 J-2, USMC Colonel Ron Bukeima, 
was informed his operations would become part of the new JTF-170’s focus on 
intelligence collection.  The mission would become more robust and receive the full 
backing of the SECDEF and a new, long-term facility would be constructed to become 
the hub for all detainees in the GWOT.
744
  
Due to the dearth of adequate language capabilities among the TF personnel, the 
key resource for the interrogators, analysts, and detention personnel was the large group 
of civilian contractor linguists assigned to the TF.  This group mostly consisted of 
highly motivated naturalised US citizens who had lived many years in their native 
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countries and they were more proficient than any US personnel in the detainees’ 
languages, cultures, and religions.  While they lacked the extensive hard-skills:  military 
speciality training of analysis, interrogation, and detention operations, their soft-skills or 
‘cultural tradecraft’ was the key to accomplishing the mission.  No success was 
achieved without them.  
Managing linguists to support detention operations was a challenge for JTF-160.  
Two contracting companies, Titan Corporation and World Wide Language Resources, 
were awarded contracts to provide linguist support and they did not work well together.  
In addition, the linguists were from all over the Islamic world and some did not work 
well together due to cross-cultural jealousies and differences.
745
 They spent a great deal 
of time together in a large room waiting to assist with detainees.
746
 Most were eager to 
support the mission and anxious to be selected, but military personnel quickly realised 
the linguists had not been vetted well by the contracting companies.  Their skills and 
aptitudes varied widely as well as their language capabilities.
747
  
A military officer assigned to the TF who spoke Dari and Farsi took it upon 
himself to organise the contracted linguists and put a system in place that would support 
both the detention and interrogation missions; he became the first Officer-in-Charge 
(OIC) of the linguist cell.  Some linguists spoke more than one language so the military 
began their own testing to see what resources had been provided by the contracting 
companies.  After vetting and skill set identification, linguists were taught how to work 




As linguist operations expanded, the OIC appointed a newly arrived US Army 
officer, a heritage Arabic speaker and systems designer, to be the Assistant OIC.  His 
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job was to manage relationships between the contracting companies and the linguists 
themselves.  While many were professional and proficient, others were challenging to 
work with due to cultural gaps, high maintenance attitudes, job qualifications, work 
ethics, or education level.  In some cases, the contracting companies failed to complete 
the necessary clearance paperwork and sent un-cleared linguists; one linguist contractor 
site manager was even thrown off the island for lying to the AOIC.
749
 
Changes to linguist operations were made including implementing a dress code 
and improving scheduling coordination with detention operations.  Linguists who 
argued with detainees were trained not to interfere with interrogations and instructed to 
let the interrogators run the interviews while maintaining a supporting role.  The 
eventual creation of tiger teams or interagency combined teams, helped alleviate 
doubling of interviews and also strengthened rapport with detainees by synergising 
linguist, interrogator, analyst, and other agency personnel rather than everyone 




Some linguists worked in the document exploitation cell while waiting for other 
missions.  The few non-heritage speaker military linguists, mostly Arabic speakers, 
were assigned to this mission to keep them busy because their language capabilities 
were not strong enough to conduct anything beyond the basic screening of a detainee.  
A native Arabic linguist could finish in one week a translation assignment that would 
take three months for a Defence Language Institute (DLI) - Monterey trained linguist to 
do.  Native linguists were also helpful in deciphering detainee dialects and determining 
their truthfulness.  Many detainees lied about their country of origin to their non-native 
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military screeners and it was sometimes several months before a native linguist would 
detect the detainee was from another country.
751
  
Because 22 of the detainees spoke Uygur, it was a challenge to find a proficient 
translator.  Very few Americans speak this language (also known as Xinjiang Uygur) 
from Islamic East Turkmenistan, and only a handful of Uygurs had US citizenship, 
which was necessary to obtain a basic security clearance to work at the TF.  Eventually 




Initially, the FBI brought in a behavioural science team with no background in 
Islamic culture and suggested a white-collar criminal approach rather than one 
appropriate for hard-core sociopaths.
753
 They also Mirandized, (the reading of one’s 
legal rights to not answer questions and seek an attorney) detainees until they were 
ordered to stop.
754
 Additionally, FBI agents and other law enforcement personnel only 
stayed at GTMO 10 to 14 days then rotated back to the US, which did not give them 
enough time to familiarise themselves with the detainees’ files. 
Some agents inserted themselves into military interrogations, which affected the 
flow and destroyed rapport between military interrogators and the detainees.  Others 
threatened to throw detainees in prison for the rest of their lives if they did not talk 
before agents had even determined what crimes they were going to be charged with.  To 
alleviate some of the problems, FBI tours were eventually lengthened to 60 days but 
many agents were inexperienced, ill prepared, and satisfied with superficial 
interviews.
755
 A 2008 DOJ Office of Inspector General report praised FBI agents for 
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their role at GTMO, for complying with FBI policy, and reporting military personnel 
who violated FBI policy, even when not in violation of military policy.
756
  
 The FBI’s top radical Islamist interrogator, Ali Soufan, made several trips to 
GTMO early on and like Rumsfeld, stressed the importance of segregating detainees 
quickly.  He wanted to determine which detainees were Al-Qaeda, which were Taliban, 
and which had been erroneously detained.  An important step in positively identifying 
detainees was matching aliases or Mujahid kunyas to real names;
757
Arab and Islamic 
name matching was at the core of detainee identification.  Soufan prophetically stated:  
From here, within Gitmo, we will either win or lose the war.  After we interrogate 
people we need to sort them: who is guilty of crimes and who is innocent.  If 
they’re innocent, or if we’re not going to be able to prosecute them, then we need 
to think of their detention here as a rehabilitation period.  Otherwise we’re 
creating new enemies.  In the process we need to show them what the “real 
America” is, and leave them with good impressions.  And if we fail to process 
detainees, we’ll lower the incentive for other detainees to cooperate, as they’ll see 
cooperation doesn’t change their situation.  As for the guilty ones, we need to 
process them and put them on trial.  Otherwise we are creating living martyrs.
758
 
The FBI treated GTMO as an ideal training ground for personnel with no 
experience in terror investigations.  In reality, agents assigned to the CITF were trying 
to work as quickly as the interrogators, but the military personnel spent much more time 
dealing with detainees and actually learning their files.  After being tapped to command 
the new intelligence TF, General Dunlavey met with Acting Commander Major General 
Ronald Burgess at Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Headquarters in Miami who 
was overwhelmed by the unfolding mission.  Dunlavey next flew to GTMO to assess 
Camp X-Ray detention operations and meet with General Lehnert.
759
 As he stepped off 
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the plane, he was greeted by Lehnert who had arranged a photo opportunity with CNN 
and other media.  Coincidentally, the worst photos to come out of GTMO were DOD 
media photos.  Lehnert’s MP advisor, the Provost Marshal from Fort Hood, was 
competent, but Lehnert didn’t utilise him and preferred to run things his own way.  
Dunlavey also realised there were too few interrogators and none adequately trained to 
accomplish the mission; conditions were in a state of disarray.
760
 
The most discouraging discovery was that General Lehnert was openly 
thwarting the intelligence collection mission.  He dismissed interrogation personnel 
from the area where new detainees were in-processed.  Military interrogation doctrine 
required intelligence personnel to obtain a sense of the detainee’s state of mind during 
in processing in order to select the appropriate interrogation approach.  Although 
interrogators attempted to explain the policy to Lehnert, he refused to work with them 




The rift between General Lehnert and the intelligence operation had deteriorated 
into a power struggle.
762
 In an interview with author and New York University law 
professor Karen Greenberg, Lehnert said his only mission ‘was to detain them and wait 
for a legal process to begin’.763 During his first visit to GTMO, the SECDEF 
acknowledged that some good intelligence had come from the detainees
764
 but he 
needed more actionable intelligence than he was getting from Lehnert’s TF.765 To 
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Dunlavey’s final assessment to Rumsfeld was that JTF-160 was running a ‘dog 
and pony show,’ and that no intelligence organization wanted to send their personnel to 




On 7 February 2002, 153 detainees were being held at Camp X-Ray,
768
 but just 
over a week later on 15 February, it reached its maximum capacity of 312 detainees.  
Prisoner intake via the military airflow from Kandahar halted until the new Camp Delta 
facility could be completed.
769
 
During the lull, General Dunlavey travelled to Afghanistan to address the 
alarming number of detainees sent to GTMO that had no long-term value to the US.
770
 
He met with Colonel Michael Flynn, the J-2 and Director for Intelligence for JTF-180 
in Bagram.
771
 Colonel Flynn said he was sending detainees to GTMO based on the 
guidance from CENTCOM, despite other sources that argued they did not meet the 
screening criteria.  The SECDEF wanted only the most hardened Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
detainees to be sent to GTMO.
772
 Although some were clearly terrorists, others merely 
had useful information and their dossiers from Afghanistan only included a picture, an 
ID number, and a short summary of who they were; this was clearly not the detailed 
analysis required to justify sending them to GTMO.
773
 Some detainees were simply 
foreign nationals innocently living in Pakistan, but when the US government began 
offering bounties, they were captured and turned over to US authorities
774





 Others were Pashtun civilians nabbed by Northern 
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Alliance Tajiks and turned over to the US for US$50 a head.
777
 This represented a large 
sum for many Afghanis and Pakistanis and the potential for corruption was high.
778
 
Other detainees were refugees returned home to Afghanistan after years of exile due to 




In December 2002, an analysis of GTMO detainees indicated close to 10% of 
the detainee population, or 59 detainees, had no intelligence value to the US.  These 
detainees had been recommended for release even before being transferred to GTMO.  
They were Afghani and Pakistani farmers, taxi drivers, and workers conscripted by the 
Taliban.  Despite Colonel Flynn’s assertion the right detainees were transferred, the 
evidence showed there were: 
[F]lawed screening guidelines, policies that made it impossible to take prisoners 
off Guantanamo flight manifests due to a pervasive fear of letting a valuable 
prisoner go free.  Once they appeared on the manifests, sources said, removing 
them proved almost impossible. Doing so required senior intelligence officers in 
Kuwait (CFLCC) or Afghanistan (JTF-180) to work through thickets of military 
red tape. It also required them to trust the judgment of junior intelligence officers, 
something they were loath to do given the stakes.
780
 
By mid-January 2003, personnel at GTMO deemed almost 100 detainees of no 
intelligence value to the US and the number was growing.
781
 
As detention operations unfolded, General Dunlavey was convinced that 
detainees should stay in facilities in Afghanistan or be released back to the Northern 
Alliance.
782
 One detainee, nicknamed ‘Half Dead Bob’, whose skull was partly missing, 
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should never have been sent to GTMO;
783
 after he received extensive medical treatment 
he thanked General Dunlavey, but warned if he got out he would have to kill him.
784
 
Another detainee diagnosed with severe mental illness, who drank shampoo and ate his 
own excrement, cost the Army US$50,000, because the ICRC demanded a civilian 
doctor confirm the Army medical doctor’s diagnosis.785 
Benefits of keeping detainees in Afghanistan included:  facility availability, 
lower transportation costs, fewer arguments over international jurisdiction, and finally, 
the reality that detention was a CENTCOM mission (not a SOUTHCOM mission).  
SOUTHCOM, whose area of responsibility (AOR) was the Caribbean and Latin 
America, lacked the personnel, money, and experience to deal with the CENTCOM 
mission.  Although General Dunlavey argued these points, he was informed that 
General Franks had ordered the detainees’ transferred, the move was final, and he was 
to do the best job he could.
786
  
Challenging living conditions caused tension between soldiers and detainees.  
General Lehnert insisted his soldiers live in the field with the detainees following the 
standards set forth by the Geneva Conventions for the detention of armed enemy 
soldiers.  However, those guidelines were for the detention of soldiers caught fighting 
for their country from nations who had signed the treaty.
787
 But Al-Qaeda was a non 
state-affiliated terrorist organization and the status of Taliban fighters had not yet been 
determined.  Detainees received medical care, food, shelter, and had been removed to a 
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During his initial assessment, General Dunlavey found US soldiers living in 
general purpose field tents, eating out of mermite cans, using port-o-potties, drinking 
warm milk, standing to eat out of mess trays with flies and rats, and living right next to 
the detainees.  The female soldiers referred to the walk to the showers, which were next 
to a garbage dump below the tents at X-Ray, as the ‘walk of shame’.789 
 General Dunlavey proposed moving soldiers to a fully operational regimental 
barracks, with a mess hall less than three miles away; he argued the soldiers were in 
garrison and not a tactical field environment, but Lehnert refused.  He said his JAG told 
him the soldiers could not live any better than the detainees; if that were the case then 
the JTF soldiers should have lived in cages like the detainees.  In addition, Lehnert said 
that for security reasons, they needed to live close by the detention facility.  However, 
none of them even had their weapons as they were locked up in a base armoury; only 
the guards in the towers had weapons.  Lehnert also said he didn’t have the financial 
resources to move the troops, but General Dunlavey looked at the budget and 
determined they could afford it.
790
 
In addition, detainees began resisting imprisonment by throwing human waste 
from their buckets at the soldiers.
791
 Lehnert ordered soldiers to clean the detainee ‘crap 
boxes’ daily fearing it was too dangerous for the detainees to dump their own 
excrement.  But having the soldiers carry away detainee waste, the soldiers looked like 
subordinates.
792
 Lehnert thwarted any attempt by interrogators to establish a superior 
position over the detainees or to make them dependent on their captors in order to get 
them to cooperate.
793
 Morale was low; Dunlavey believed the soldiers needed a change 
in order to accomplish their mission.  He wrote General Spears at SOUTHCOM and 
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The international media reported, often erroneously, on abuse of detainees at 
GTMO.  These articles failed to mention detainee attacks on the TF personnel.
795
 
Detainees began a hunger strike at the end of February 2002.
796
 Organised by Shaker 
Abdel-Rahman Amer, a Saudi-born British resident who spoke fluent English.  He was 
a charismatic leader who bragged about killing and how he wielded his walking cane to 
maintain discipline in his English neighbourhood.
797
  
General Lehnert was concerned over the hunger strike and pleaded with 
detainees.  He went into their cells.  At one point Lehnert sat down next to a detainee in 
a spot where the detainee had dumped urine, much to the chagrin of on-looking 
detainees; he was completely oblivious.
798
 His demeanor was reminiscent of Brigadier 
General Francis Dodd, commander of the US prison camp on Koje-do Island during the 
Korean War, who got too close to the prisoners and was captured and held hostage for 
several weeks.
799
 The non-Arabs lasted about eight hours without food and most of the 
Arab detainees gave up within 24 to 36 hours.  Several interrogators, who used various 




When General Lehnert left in March 2002, he told the detainees they would 
have lawyers within three weeks and hearings within four.
801
 Even upon departure he 
made the difficult intelligence mission even more problematic.  In sharp contrast, 
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articles in the media and a 2009 book by Karen Greenberg
802
 praised his command and 
blamed Dunlavey and his team for things done wrong at GTMO.
803
 No one did more 
harm to the intelligence mission at GTMO than General Lehnert.
804
 
When Lehnert’s Marines returned to Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, they were 




Infantry Regiment from Fort 
Hood, Texas.  Their mission was to provide all external security at Camp X-Ray and 
eventually Camp Delta.  They acted as a quick reaction force (QRF) supporting MPs 
‘inside the wire’.  When detainees arrived at GTMO, the TF secured the airfield and 
assisted with detainee transport to Camp X-Ray.
805
 
Brigadier General Rick Baccus, Commander of the 43rd MP Brigade, Rhode 
Island National Guard replaced Lehnert and served from 28 March 2002
806
 to 9 October 
2002.
807
 When General Baccus arrived, Dunlavey hoped for a fresh start, but Baccus 
refused to meet with him regularly, and after the first couple of weeks, he stayed in his 
office issuing orders seemingly unaware of what was going on in camp.  He stopped 
coming to the daily 4:00 PM briefing.  He sent his lieutenant aid in his stead; at one 
point, General Baccus stopped signing orders and official paperwork all together and 
had his chief of staff sign for him.
808
 
Baccus had only one year of experience in the MP corps and relied heavily on 
his reserve Lieutenant Colonel JAG officer Tom Berg, who was a civilian public 
defender.  Berg advised Baccus to use the procedures in the Geneva Conventions, 
despite the Bush Administration’s refusal to classify detainees as POWs because 
treatment of enemy combatants (ECs) was yet to be defined.  Berg’s goal was to run 
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Camp X-Ray just like a POW camp and insisted detention soldiers lived next to the 
detainees.  Detainee cells were open wire mesh and much more comfortable than the 
stifling tents where the troops slept.  Berg approved of X-Ray’s open site plan; he felt it 
led to transparency,
809
 but it also made it very difficult to collect intelligence. 
Dunlavey continued to approach Baccus to persuade him of the importance of 
synchronizing the detention and interrogation missions to achieve unity of effort.  
Baccus refused and continued his predecessor’s policy of giving favours to detainees 
and circumventing the interrogators’ ability to control the granting of additional comfort 
items based on cooperation.
810
 
Baccus was finally relieved of duty and sent home.  He was demoted to the rank 
of colonel and quietly retired in December 2002 after an Ohio MP unit mutinied over 
poor living conditions and a review found he openly thwarted interrogation 
operations.
811
 His Rhode Island Commanding Officer, Major General Reginald 
Centracchio, said Baccus’ actions culminated in a complete loss of ‘trust and 
confidence in him as a commander’.812 Despite the loss of rank, removal from his 
position, and forced retirement, he was awarded the Defence Superior Service Medal 
for his service at GTMO, given a good officer evaluation, and his TF was awarded the 




HDC Phase III: Detainee Operations Improve as Corrections Are Made 
True to the HDC, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon quickly realised X-Ray was a 
temporary solution.
814
 In early 2002, SOUTHCOM put forth a plan to construct a long-
term detention facility at GTMO to house 2,000 detainees.  The SECDEF rejected the 
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plan on the grounds it was too large; he feared if the facility was that large, the system 
would find a way to fill it.  He did not want to be the world’s jailer.  Rumsfeld 
envisioned a small facility in hopes it would compel commanders to release those who 
should not be held.  Once the SECDEF approved plans for a scaled back 400-prisoner 
facility, CENTCOM was finally able to hand off the detention burden to 
SOUTHCOM.
815
 In hindsight, this proved to be a grave error, because it removed 
CENTCOM’s detainees from their control and their mission.  
The new Camp Delta was situated on a grassy field overlooking the best beach 
on the island.
816
 Built by KBR-Haliburton, it was modelled after a prison they had built 
in the Persian Gulf.  When General Dunlavey saw the construction plans, he 
immediately sensed it would impede intelligence collection.  The mesh screen cells 
would promote good air circulation, but also allow the detainees to talk to each other, 
which would harm the intelligence collection mission.  The facility was constructed of 
pre-fabricated shipping containers assembled on the island.
817
 On 28 and 29 April, all 
detainees from Camp X-Ray were moved to the four sub-camps
818
 of Camp Delta.
819
 
The infantry TF provided all the security for the detainee movement from X-Ray 
to Camp Delta.  They worked closely with KBR in the building of the facility and 
coordinated the movement plan.  Once detainees were moved to Delta, the QRF mission 
ended for the infantry TF and was assumed by MPs who worked ‘inside the wire’.  
They also turned over security responsibilities to a new unit, the 2
nd 
Battalion of the 
142
nd 
Infantry from the Texas National Guard.
820
 
In hopes of reducing the detainee population, General Dunlavey tried to have 
many of them released, but was unsuccessful for several reasons:  CITF and the FBI 
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hoped to use some as witnesses in future trials,
821
 Under-Secretary of Defence for 
Policy Douglas Feith refused to allow it,
822
 the ICRC demanded assurances they would 
not be tortured if they were sent home,
823
 some homelands refused to accept them,
824
 
and finally, no one wanted to release a detainee who might return to the fight.
825
  
In Afghanistan, some detainees who met the same profile as those who had been 
sent to GTMO were being released.  Rear Admiral John D. Stufflebeem, Joint Staff 
Deputy Director of Operations for Current Readiness and Capabilities said:  ‘We’re not 
collecting every former Taliban, especially mid-level or lower-level people.  We’re 
interested in the leadership’.826 But there was a disconnect between who was sent to 
GTMO and who was released in the field; even the SECDEF conceded some detainees 
had been picked up erroneously.
827
 
As Camp Delta filled up through the summer of 2002,
828
 the detention and 
intelligence collection mission continued to evolve in support of the intelligence 
community and the war fighters on the ground in Afghanistan.  While standard 
interrogation techniques from FM 34-52 were adequate for most of the detainees, others 
resisted relinquishing information. (Appendix I)  
Bin Laden hand-selected Saudi Muhamed Mani[a] Ahmad al-Qahtani (Detainee 
63),
829
 to participate in the 9/11 operation.
830
 On 4 August 2001, Detainee 63 attempted 
to enter the US at the Orlando, Florida airport on a one-way ticket with only US$2,800 
on hand.
831
 He could provide no details on his destination in the US and became hostile 
during a 90-minute interview with US immigration officials.  They put him on a return 
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Virgin Atlantic flight to London.  His parting words were ‘I’ll be back’.832 Video 
surveillance showed Muhamed Atta, the 9/11 ringleader, waited outside the airport for 
him.
833
 Ultimately Detainee 63 was captured fleeing Tora Bora and transferred to 
GTMO.  In July 2002, his fingerprints were matched to his interview in Orlando.  On 8 
August, he was moved to the Navy Brig
834
 on base where the CITF including FBI
835
 
agents had a month to interrogate him using standard law enforcement techniques; it 
went nowhere.
836
 Having determined Detainee 63 was not the twentieth hijacker the 
FBI turned him over to the military for further interrogation.
837
 However, in his 2011 
book, FBI Agent Ali Soufan, Detainee 63’s initial interrogator, indicated he had 
ascertained he was, indeed, the twentieth hijacker.
838
  Not even the FBI was sure who he 
was. 
Detainee 63’s experience instigated a major discussion in the interrogation 
methods debate juxtaposing law enforcement agency (LEA) techniques (as part of the 
CITF for prosecution and trials) and military intelligence collection methods (to support 
the war effort).
839
 After a discussion with CIA agents who described their success with 
additional techniques newly authorised for the CIA that went beyond FM 34-52,
 840
 
General Dunlavey asked the J-2, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phifer, for a list of techniques 
to be legally reviewed by the JTF-170 JAG Lieutenant Colonel Dianne Beaver to be 
further reviewed at DOD.
841
 
Dunlavey was reticent to move in the direction of harsher interrogation methods 
since his philosophy was based on elicitation through rapport building.
842
 He had used 
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this approach successfully in Vietnam and repeatedly stressed to General Baccus that 
rapport building would bring results.
843
 However, in the post 9/11 environment, 
Dunlavey was willing to explore additional methods if they were deemed legal and 
necessary on select, hard-core resistant detainees.
844
 Chris Hogan, who developed non-
FM 34-52 interrogation techniques and authored The Interrogators, served in 
Afghanistan at the time detainees were being sent to GTMO.  He explained: 
The American army intelligence collection and techniques for human sources 
were ineffective . . . They were really designed for a scenario on the central 
German plain to capture prisoners who were going to behave in a manner 
consistent with the Geneva Convention. The kind of incentives, and indeed, 
disincentives that we had at our disposal were wholly inadequate to persuade 
steeled, ideological fighters to give up information that would be detrimental to 
their cause. Those techniques and tactics evolved and evolved to a certain extent, 
in - during my tenure - to try to become more effective. Some of the techniques 
[sleep deprivation] that - bore the most - fruit during the time that we were there, 
involved variations on themes that were part of our training.
845
 
 On 2 October 2002, a strategy meeting was held at GTMO of key players 
involved with interrogation operations to discuss the pros and cons of various 
techniques.  Members of the Behavioural Science Consultative Team (BSCT) also 
participated to provide their clinical observations regarding detainee behaviour.
846
 The 
discussion included the legality and effectiveness of psychological stressors such as 
sleep deprivation, loss of time, loss of food and isolation, dealing with the ICRC, what 
the CIA had been doing, and how effective the tactics were.
847
 Over several days a list 
                                                          
843
 Baccus, ‘Frontline Interview’ 
844
 Dunlavey Interview. 
845
 Chris (Mackey) Hogan,’ Frontline Interview,’ PBS, 28 July 2006 
846
 Article (AR) 15-6 GTMO Investigation, Sworn Statement of redacted Army officer, 11 January 2005, 
Leonard Wood Army Community Hospital, MO 
847
 ‘Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes,’ JTF-170, 2 October 2002 
168 
of requested counter resistance techniques was drawn up in a request memorandum 
dated 11 October 2002 and signed by the J-2 at GTMO.
848
 
Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, the JTF JAG, provided an initial legal review 
of the requested techniques.
849
 Her conclusion was to allow them only after additional 
review from higher authorities and training of military personnel on how to use the 
techniques.
850
 She was given four days to provide a full legal review of the requested 
techniques which would be a monumental shift in the way the US military conducted 
interrogations.  She asked for help from the SOUTHCOM JAG, the DIA, the JCS JAG, 
and the Army JAG School, but was left to herself to provide the advice to her 
commanding officer.
851
 Beaver did not have access to the 1 August 2002 memorandum 
from the DOJ office of Legal Counsel for the CIA, which dealt with the same issues.
852
 
On 11 October, General Dunlavey signed the request letter for the techniques review 
and sent it to SOUTHCOM.
853
 
On 25 October, Commanding Officer General James Hill signed it, citing the 
need to give interrogators all the tools needed.
854
 The new techniques greatly disturbed 
CITF Deputy Commander Mark Fallon, who represented the law enforcement school of 
thought, saw the minutes from the GTMO strategy meeting and was concerned about 
the legality of the techniques.  He was also worried about how the new techniques 
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would affect future military tribunals, and he warned:  ‘someone needs to be 
considering how history will look back at this’.855 
As the anniversary of 9/11 approached, troubling events increased the urgency 
of obtaining information from Al-Qaeda operatives, including:  the December anthrax 
attacks in the US, the December attempt by ‘Shoe Bomber’ Richard Reid to blow up an 
American Airlines Flight, and the deadly spring and summer attacks in Tunisia and 
Pakistan.  In October 2002, Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri released a tape 
promising to attack the US again.  In September and October, the FBI broke up the Al-
Qaeda linked Lackawana Six cell in New York.  On 6 October, Al-Qaeda attacked a 
French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen.  On 8 October, an Al-Qaeda gunman killed a 
US Marine in Kuwait.  On 12 October, Al-Qaeda affiliated Jemayeh Islamiya bombed a 
nightclub in Indonesia killing more than 200 and injuring 300.  On 28 November, Al-
Qaeda fired two anti-aircraft missiles at a plane in Kenya and suicide bombers attacked 
a hotel in Kenya which killed 15 and injured 40.  On 30 December, three US citizens 
were killed in Yemen during an attack on Baptist Missionary Hospital.
856
 Under these 
environmental imperatives, the new interrogation techniques were requested. 
In addition, GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief David Becker 
said the ‘aggressive interrogation techniques were a direct result of the pressure we felt 
from Washington to obtain intelligence and the lack of policy guidance being issued by 
Washington’.857 Paul Rester, who eventually became the ICE Chief, warned that the 
mere perception of doing anything aggressive would prove to be a challenge for the US 
especially once the detainees were released.
858
 
HDC Phase III:  Detainee Operations Improve as Corrections Are Made 
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The first major move to correct much of the organizational dysfunction at GTMO took 
place on 11 October 2002; under orders from SOUTHCOM General Hill, General 
Dunlavey dissolved JTF-160 and 170 and became the first commander of the newly 
established JTF-GTMO.  He had fought hard to unify the commands and get the 
missions on the same track, but on 4 November he would be gone.
859
 His effort to 
consolidate the missions during the tough start-up phase would pay dividends for the 
next commander.  Now it was unified with two major lines of operation, the Joint 
Detainee Operations Group (JDOG) and the Joint Intelligence group (JIG).
860
 Both 
groups, led by colonels, reported to one general officer; now unity of effort was needed. 
On 4 November 2002, the Pentagon brought in a new leader to foster unity of 
effort in the new JTF.  General Geoffrey Miller, an artillery officer and close friend of 
General Hill, was tasked to put the command and control structure together and put 
procedures and policies in place to instil discipline, order, and efficiency.
861
 For Miller, 
the mission was personal.  He had lost several friends at the Pentagon on 9/11.  This 
was his chance to have an impact on the war effort.
862
 One of his first orders was to 




Another immediate benefit of merging the two TFs was money; previously, 
intelligence-focussed JTF-170 had plenty of funding, while detention-centred JTF-160 
had very little money.  Miller immediately addressed problems with TF personnel 
housing, office space, and vehicle allocation; these issues had been a problem since day 
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one of the mission.  Miller’s goal was to decrease the friction between the detention and 
intelligence operations and get everyone working as a team.
864
 
General Dunlavey and his staff prepared a full briefing on the detention 
operations for General Miller as part of the standard handover-takeover (HOTO), relief 
in place-transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) that units normally do as part of a change of 
command, but Miller said it was unnecessary and he knew what he had to do and 
refused to see the brief.
865
 Dunlavey was also supposed to have briefed the SECDEF on 
his time at GTMO as he left command, but was kept away from Rumsfeld and returned 
to the NSA.  In May 2003, Dunlavey was assigned to the newly created Terrorism 
Threat Integration Center (TTIC) as the Associate Director for Homeland Security.  In 
April 2004, he retired and returned to Pennsylvania to resume his job as a judge.
866
 
Years later, General Dunlavey ran into the SECDEF in Washington DC who asked why 
he never outbriefed him after he left GTMO; Dunlavey stated he did not know why they 
never had their meeting.
867
 Somebody did not want him talking to the SECDEF. 
Shortly after General Miller took command, he authorised Detainee 63’s 
interrogation over the objections of the FBI, who felt the DOD plan was too 
aggressive.
868
 This is not surprising since the FBI was squarely in the judicial-Geneva 
Conventions camp.  FBI agents at GTMO received a full legal analysis from FBI legal 
counsel at headquarters stating that most of the techniques the DOD proposed violated 
the Constitution and US laws against torture.
869
 Despite those protests, on 23 November 
2002, Detainee 63 was moved from Camp Delta to Camp X-Ray to await 
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 On 27 November, DOD General Counsel William Haynes sent a 
memorandum to the SECDEF requesting the new techniques be authorised at GTMO.
871
 
On 2 December, Rumsfeld approved the requested techniques allowing interrogators to 
move beyond the standard FM 34-52 interrogation approaches.  In June 2005, a 
government source leaked news of Detainee 63’s interrogation to Time magazine.872  
The inside source was most likely from the CITF or the FBI. 
Detainee 63 initially provided a weak cover story, but finally admitted he had 
been sent to the US by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM).  He told interrogators he had 
met Bin Laden several times, trained at two Al-Qaeda camps, and had contact with 
senior Al-Qaeda leaders.  He provided intelligence regarding the recruitment of Al-
Qaeda operatives and logistics, provided information on the 9/11 attacks, explained 
(Dirty Bomber) Jose Padilla’s and (Shoe Bomber) Richard Reid’s connections to Al-
Qaeda, provided infiltration routes and methods used by Al-Qaeda to cross international 
borders undetected, explained how Bin Laden escaped US forces in Afghanistan, gave 
detailed information about 30 of Bin Laden’s bodyguards in custody, and provided 
other (still classified) information.
873
 
In May, the new ICE Chief, Lieutenant Colonel Ted Moss, sent a memorandum 
to General Miller stating Detainee 63 had been fully exploited and was no longer 
needed at GTMO for questioning.
874
 He continued cooperating until October 2005 when 
he received an attorney; he recanted everything he previously said despite KSM’s 
confirmation of his role in the 9/11 operation.
875
 Thus the greatest fears of the 
intelligence-collection school of thought played out like a textbook. 
                                                          
870
 Saar, p. 146 
871
 William Haynes, General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Action Memo for the Secretary 
of Defense Regarding Counter-Resistance Techniques, (Washington DC:  DOD, 27 November 2002) 
872
 Zagorin and Duffy, pp. 26-33 
 
873
 Author Unknown, ‘Guantanamo Provides Valuable Intelligence Information,’ DOD-Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 12 June 2005 
874
 OIG Report, p. 120 
875
 Cucullu, pp. 37-38 
173 
 In 2009, Susan Crawford, the convening authority for military commissions for 
GTMO, said Detainee 63 was supposed to be a 9/11 hijacker, but the interrogation 
techniques applied to him, despite the SECDEF’s approval, constituted torture in the 
manner and combination they were applied.  He will never be tried in a US criminal 
court and will likely never be released;
876
 indefinite detention without trial is a choice 
the US may have to make with other detainees.
877
 Susan makes the argument for the 
need for the hybrid school of thought to create a special National Security Court to try 
just such an individual. 
Paul Rester, who followed Moss as the ICE Chief, disagreed with Crawford’s 
analysis.  In regard to FBI emails protesting the interrogation of Detainee 63 he told 
Michigan Senator Carl Levin: 
Senator, they’re hysterical hyperbole.  Sir, nobody hurt that boy.  Nobody 
physically or mentally hurt that boy.  But I will tell you this.  If he’d succeeded in 
his mission, if he had not been turned away by an underpaid GS-11 civil servant 
INS [immigration] inspector in Orlando, Florida he would have hooked up with 
Mohammad Atta, he would have strapped an airplane to his ass, he would have 




According to Rester, the anti-GTMO crowd ‘turn[ed] the villains into victims, and the 
victims into villains.  It’s Alice in Wonderland.  It’s all on its head.’879  
 USAF Lieutenant General Randall Schmidt, the senior investigating officer for 
abuse at GTMO made a statement supporting the intelligence collection school-of-
thought when he said, ‘the long interrogations and other techniques used [on 63] were 
not violations of DoD policy in themselves but that the cumulative effect was 
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“degrading and abuse” . . . I do not, however, consider this treatment to have crossed 
the threshold of being inhumane’.880  
 Despite these conflicts, GTMO operations continued to produce valuable 
intelligence for GWOT operations.  In an 8 January 2003 interview with ABC, General 
Miller, maintained the information provided by Detainee 63 was ‘particularly valuable 
when pieced together with information collected elsewhere.’881 Despite these good 
reports from the GTMO JTF, critics from the judicial-Geneva Conventions school of 
thought continued to state claims of good Intel coming from GTMO were false.  To the 
public who did not have access to the actual classified information like General Miller, 
it was hard to see the evidence to support the intelligence-collection school of thought.  
In December 2002, per Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s guidance, Lieutenant 
Colonel Ted Moss assembled the SOP for the new techniques approved by the SECDEF 
based on training at the Navy Survive, Evade, Resist, Escape (SERE) School in 
Brunswick, Maine.
882
 Two SERE instructors came to GTMO to train interrogators from 
31 December to 2 January 2003.
883
 In Washington, a storm of controversy was erupting 
over the SECDEF’s 2 December authorisation; on 15 January 2003, Rumsfeld’s legal 
counsel advised him to rescind his 2 December approval for the techniques.
884
 The 
interrogation of Detainee 63 stopped.  The SECDEF also established a working group to 
discuss the techniques and recommend a way forward.
885
 On 4 April, the working group 
made their report
886
 and on 16 April the SECDEF approved their recommendations for 
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 Deep within the pentagon the two ideological camps were 
deeply divided and all tried their best to sway the SECDEF to their side.   
 This approval allowed the second special interrogation to move forward.  
Mohamedou Ould Slahi (Detainee 760) was a senior Al-Qaeda operative believed to 
have recruited several of the 9/11 hijackers.  After his arrest in Mauritania, he was 
brought to GTMO in August 2002 and interrogated by the FBI through May 2003.  
When they finished, the military created a 90-day special interrogation programme for 
him, which began 1 July.  Prior to the plan’s approval, military interrogators threatened 
Detainee 760 with the arrest of his mother, his family, and implied they could suffer 
beatings, physical pain, be imprisoned in GTMO, or simply disappear.
888
 Had he been 
classified as an enemy prisoner of war (EPW), this would have violated FM 34-52 
guidelines, but the new environment with the EC classification and the SECDEF’s new 
guidance left room for interpretation.
889
 
The programme involved hooding and moving Detainee 760 around the base to 
induce confusion about where he was and potentially resorted to more of the techniques 
approved by the SECDEF.
890
 Rumsfeld approved the plan on 13 August,
891
 but by 8 
September he was so compliant they used only the direct approach.
892
 The Schmidt-
Furlow investigation concluded the elements of the special interrogation plan were 
never employed because of Detainee 760’s cooperation.893 The military interrogation of 
Detainee 760 illustrated the stark differences between military techniques and LEA 
approaches, which were governed by the necessity of collecting admissible evidence to 
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be used in military tribunals.
894
 Since Detainee 760, there are no open source reports 
indicating the military has received authorisation for any special interrogation plans 
using techniques beyond those in the DOD interrogation field manual. 
General Miller instituted a system to reward detainee cooperation and good 
behaviour.
895
 Level one detainees were the most compliant; they wore white jumpsuits 
and received more comfort items.  Level four detainees were the most defiant and wore 
orange jumpsuits and were denied basic comfort items.  Level five detainees were of 
interest to the intelligence mission, and were housed in a separate block.
896
 As part of 
the level system, the new Camp Four was opened 28 February 2003 to house the most 
complaint detainees.  The new camp was designed as a dormitory-style facility with ten 




Camp Iguana was created at the end of March 2003 to house a new class of 
detainees, Juvenile Enemy Combatants (JECs).  Three JECs arrived from Afghanistan 
and were kept separate from the older detainees.  They had more freedom than the other 
detainees and even had a VCR to watch approved movies.  Despite their age, they were 
still considered dangerous because of their involvement in operations against coalition 
forces.
898
 Army Colonel Larry James, a psychologist from Walter Reed Army Medical 
Centre, created a plan to care for and interrogate the JECs.
899
  
By 9 May 2003, GTMO reached its high water mark of 681 detainees in 
custody. (Appendix J)  While many more arrived, others were released.  The large 
build-up of detainees frustrated the SECDEF who was alarmed by the growing number 
in detention.  He wanted some detainees released immediately and tasked his legal 
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counsel and intelligence policy advisor to move quickly on the issue.
900
 As Clausewitz 
taught, in war time friction is everywhere and what should have been an easy directive 
from the SECDEF to send home detainees that no longer needed to be there was 
proving difficult even for him. 
At GTMO, day-to-day operations were busy but synchronised.  The schedule 
kept by the guards and intelligence personnel became routine but was always stressful 
given the stakes.  In addition, some detainees attempted extreme measures including 
hunger strikes and suicide.
901
 
On 22 May 2003, Military Commission Order #1
902
 was issued and the 
Pentagon announced the assignment of two military lawyers to oversee the military 
commissions for detainees at GTMO.  Army Colonel Frederic Borch was named Acting 
Chief Prosecutor; his office prosecuted individuals in violation of the laws of war and 
terrorism.  USAF Colonel Will Gunn was named Acting Chief Defence Counsel, and 
pledged to ensure detainees brought before the military commission had ‘zealous 
representation by defense counsel; either military or civilian’.903 Many detainees were 
encouraged by the announcement and the prospect of review and release. 
John Bellinger, former legal advisor to the Secretary of State, said the 
commissions were the appropriate place to try terrorists captured in the GWOT because 
prior to 9/11, US law did not address the legal status of terror suspects captured in 
Afghanistan.  He also said that GTMO detainees did not have habeas corpus rights and 
thus, could not be denied them.  He stated: ‘No individual in any military conflict in 
American military history has ever had the right to habeas corpus before’ but said they 
would receive an independent court’s review to determine if they are properly held, 
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which is, in essence, like unto a habeas review.
904
 The US Supreme Court later ruled 
against this argument and for the first time in US history granted military combatants 
habeas reviews in US civilian courts. (Appendix K) 
A group of senior Al-Qaeda detainees not likely to ever be released arrived at 
GTMO 24 September 2003 in CIA custody.  Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Nashiri, Ramzi 
Binalshibh, and Mustafa al-Hawsawi had all undergone CIA interrogation and were 
turned over to the military for detention.  GTMO was the optimal choice because the 
facility was preparing for military commissions.  These detainees were housed at a 
separate CIA location at GTMO known as Camp Seven which was also referred to as 
Camp No and Strawberry Fields.  They were only there a brief period when the 
Supreme Court decided to open the US courts to detainees.  On 27 March 2004, the 
HVDs were transferred to other CIA black sites.
905
 In September 2006, they returned to 
GTMO after President Bush announced the transfer of 14 HVDs from the CIA 
detention programme to GTMO to stand trial.
906
 The 15th HVD, Abd al Hadi al Iraqi, 
arrived in April 2007,
907
 and the 16
th




While Miller made the needed structural and procedural changes to the TF, the 
DOD reiterated guidance that ‘low level enemy combatants who represent only a 
tactical force protection threat are not eligible for movement to [GTMO]’.909 The 
Assistant SECDEF for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), 
Thomas O’Connell cautioned: 
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The availability of DOD detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, or elsewhere, 
shall not be a determining factor in whether a Combatant Commander detains or 
obtains control over an individual.  The detainee facilities at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, function as a strategic intelligence gathering centre and should be used for 
detaining those Enemy Combatants who meet the stated criteria, and are of high 
operational or strategic intelligence or law enforcement value, and not those low 
level Enemy Combatants who pose only a tactical force protection threat.
910
 
This was the same guidance that had been put out by the Pentagon in early 2002 yet 
Colonel Flynn’s team on the ground in Kuwait reviewed detainee files for transfer to 
GTMO felt many of the low level detainees should be sent to GTMO despite the 
guidance.   
During Miller’s tenure, the counterintelligence (CI) climate deteriorated in the 
already high pressure-working environment.  Several CI investigations against Muslim 
US servicemen suspected of supporting detainees were driven by JDOG intelligence 
officer, Captain Jason Orlich.  Ultimately, no espionage conspiracy was found, but 
minor charges were filed against a few of the servicemen.  The alleged ringleader, 
Army Chaplain James Yee, was fully exonerated by General Hill at SOUTHCOM at the 
end of the investigation.
911
 
One of the most important actions taken to assist with the HDC phase three and 
corrections to the entire US global detention system was the creation of the Office of 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Detainee Affairs. Detention issues in Iraq 
affected the entire US detention programme.  Revelations of detainee abuse at Abu 
Ghraib first reported to the DOD in January 2004
912
 burgeoned into 12 formal 
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investigations that delved into every faucet of US detention operations.
913
  (Appendix 
L)  
After the media broke the story, the SECDEF tapped Secretary of the Army Pete 
Geren and DIA Director General Michael Maples to lead a TF to update him twice a 
day on anything related to the emerging Iraq detention crisis including Abu Ghraib, 
congress, public relations, policy, or investigations.  Eventually the Geren-Maples TF 
was replaced by the weekly Joint Detainee Coordinating Committee (JDCC) meeting.
914
 
A key recommendation from the major investigations was the creation of a 
single point of focus at the DOD for detainee issues; until that point, different offices 
throughout the DOD owned various aspects of detention operations.  The DASD for 
SOLIC, Paul Butler, became increasingly more involved because of the trust the 
SECDEF had in him.
915
 On 13 February 2004, a Pentagon press article referred to 
Butler as the DASD for Detainee Operations.
916
 He became the spokesman to describe 
evolving detainee policy and he spent more and more of his time on the issue until it 
became clear a permanent solution was needed.
917
 
Mathew Waxman, a young former Supreme Court clerk and NSC staffer 
familiar with the GTMO debate, had spent a few months working on justice reforms 
and detainee issues in Iraq.  He was part of the team investigating options for the future 
of detention policy and determining what apparatus within the DOD should support it.  
One option was the development of a temporary TF rather than a permanent 
organization that would draw detailees from various DOD entities relevant to detention 
policy.  Another option was the creation of a new DASD office.
918
 The DASD was a 
mid-level position and the lowest level of senior management that interacted with 
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Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) and other agencies on a regular basis, whereas the 
Assistant Secretaries of Defence (ASDs) managed other DASDs.
919
  
One factor that made the creation of a new DASD most attractive was the hope 
it could eventually be phased out.  A special TF was a temporary 90-day organisation 
used to manage and implement recommendations that dissolved when the period 
expired.  An office was more permanent but could still be folded at some point in the 
future when it was no longer needed.
920
 Rumsfeld favoured the DASD route and began 
seeking an appointee. 
The first member of the (yet to be officially announced) office was Alan Liotta, 
appointed on 16 February 2004 as the civilian principal deputy; he would be a constant 
in the office as the presidentially appointed DASDs came and went.
921
 The Senior 
Advisor for Detainee and Prisoner Issues to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
in Baghdad, Dobie McArthur, was first offered the position.
922
 An Arabic speaker, 
Oxford and Naval Academy graduate, and former active duty Marine, McArthur had 
been sent to Baghdad by Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz to assist the 
CPA.  He was deeply involved in detainee affairs even before the Abu Ghraib scandal 
broke in the news.  He was offered the position while still in Baghdad in June 2004, but 
he declined because of his lack of legal training.
923
 
On 16 July 2004, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Ryan Henry formally 
announced the creation of the DASD for Detainee Affairs office and stated the head 
would report directly to him.  There would be no ASD intermediary between him and 
the new DASD which was unique in the OSD command and control structure and 
showed the importance the DOD placed on the growing detainee policy issues.  Part of 
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the job was to interface with the ICRC, but in the past, ICRC reports were dealt with in 
the field.  The DASD chaired a joint committee composed of the Undersecretary for 
Intelligence and representatives from the Joint Staff, the Office of General Counsel, the 
Department of the Army, and others involved in detainee affairs.  They would review 
ICRC reports and advise the SECDEF on their findings.
924
 
 After McArthur turned it down, Waxman was offered the job and in August 
2004 he became the First Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Detainee Affairs, 
only the 12th DASD in the DOD, a significant position for a 32 year old;
925
 he accepted.  
This new office would play a critical role in ensuring all of the needed corrections in the 
HDC phase three were actually carried out.  He built his staff borrowing people from 
organizations inside the Pentagon and others.
926
 The office consisted of two deputies 
who covered the ICRC and Capitol Hill, two deputies over Iraq, another over 
Afghanistan, a special projects staffer, and two DASD secretaries.  Most positions were 
funded with temporary money so they could be eliminated quickly.  Staffers were like 
contractors; there was no health care compensation or benefits, only salary.
927
 The new 
office eventually grew to about 20 people even though most DASD offices employed 
only four or five.
928
 The size of the office was a testimony to the relevance of detention 
policy. 
Over the course of his tenure as the DASD, Waxman’s office was overwhelmed 
with two main tasks:  to develop detention policy and to undertake the historical 
reviews and investigations.  In the wake of Abu Ghraib, the first priority was to improve 
care in custody and minimise the likelihood of abuse recurring.  Waxman and his 
military counterpart, Director of the Joint Staff’s Detainee Affairs Division General 
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Robert Caslen, ran the Defence Strategic Leadership Oversight Committee (DSLOC) to 
implement necessary detention reforms from training, facilities, doctrine, to policy 
issues.
929
 Few committee members had any real experience with detention or 
interrogation policy and operations.
930
 
The 12 post-Abu Ghraib investigations by the DOD ultimately provided 492 line 
item recommendations;
931
 more than 1,700 people were interviewed and at least 16,000 
pages of information were reviewed.
932
 Waxman and Caslen created a matrix of the 
recommendations and prioritised them.  On a quarterly basis, representatives from each 
of the services and the Combatant Commands met to discuss implementation of the 
reforms.  Some were implemented immediately, others not at all, others were rolled into 
other recommendations, and the DASD office came up with some of their own.
933
 The 
matrix was colour-coded; red meant ‘recommendation’, yellow meant ‘in progress’, and 
green meant ‘implement’.934 Three people signed off on a recommendation before it 
was marked green; Waxman signed on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defence 
(OSD), General Caslen signed for the Joint Staff, and Major General Donald Ryder, the 
Army Provost Martial General (PMG), signed for the Army as the DOD detention 
executive agent.  Occasionally, the White House objected to one of the 
recommendations because it required a re-examination of the 2001 and 2002 legal 
determinations regarding the Geneva Conventions.
935
 
In August 2005, Waxman, who felt the media rarely portrayed detention in a 
positive light, spoke to the Washington Post about the continued necessity of detention 
and historical precedent the US and coalition followed in holding enemy combatants for 
the duration of the conflict.  He also described the progress made in US detention 
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policy.  He disclosed an agreement with the Afghan government to accept their GTMO 
detainees for repatriation and discussed the institution of detainee review boards that 
had released more than 250 prisoners.  Waxman said calculated releases were worth the 
risk to illustrate that the US did not want to hold anyone unnecessarily because of the 
cost of holding detainees in a long war against Al-Qaeda.   
Waxman did he best to undo many of the mistakes made during the HDC phase 
two and detainee releases, part of HDC phase four, were a crucial component of getting 
it right.  As partner countries shared the security burden with the US, more detainees 
could be released.  Waxman said countries willing to take back detainees needed to 
show they had risk mitigation policies in place to prevent transferred combatants from 
returning to the battlefield; they also had to make assurances to treat detainees 
humanely.  The US indicated it would assist partner countries that requested help to 
develop the legal and physical apparatus to contain terrorist threats.
936
 Partnering with 
other foreign countries was crucial because the detainee problem was a shared problem 
not just a US problem. 
Despite this progress, Waxman clashed repeatedly with Undersecretary of 
Defence for Intelligence Policy Stephen A. Cambone and William Haynes the DOD 
general counsel.  The disagreement that led to his resignation was with the Vice 
President’s counsel, David Addington, over language from the Geneva Conventions 
‘barring cruel, humiliating, and degrading treatment’.937 Waxman felt the standard set in 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions should be applied to all US detainees, 
and Addington disagreed;
938
 Waxman stepped down to take a new position at the State 
Department in December 2005. 
On 24 March 2004, General Jay Hood, an artillery officer with strong leadership 
and operational experience, became the longest serving commander at JTF-GTMO and 
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would see most of the major correctiosn made during HDC phase three implemented.  
He assumed command just before news of the Abu Ghraib scandal broke and led the 




His mantra was to make sure no detainees died on his watch and his goal was to 
run a humane facility that continued to provide actionable intelligence.
940
 Under 
General Hood, the detention mission took precedence over intelligence collection.  His 
JDOG Commander, Colonel Michael Baumgartner, dealt directly with detainee 
representatives and granted privileges that normally only an interrogator could authorise 
as an incentive for cooperation.  Baumgartner wanted peace with the detainees, not 
information
941
 pitting him squarely against the intelligence-collection camp. 
General Hood had a reputation for being a micromanager who wanted things 
done his way.
942
 Despite this, morale among interrogators and analysts was high 
because the mission was still yielding actionable intelligence.  Roughly 30 analysts and 
interrogators (military and civilian contractors) continued working 14-hour days.  As he 
solidified his command, Hood favoured the JDOG (judicial-Geneva Conventions camp) 
over the JIG (intelligence-collection camp) and did little to alleviate friction between 
the two groups.
943
 Delegations continued to visit the camp; Congressional groups toured 
regularly and every Wednesday was media and VIP day.  Members of the media often 
commented on how nice the facilities were for the detainees.
944
 
After the Abu Gharib scandal became public, everyone at GTMO was on edge.  
In an attempt to be proactive, General Hood ordered several changes:  first, an officer of 
the rank of 0-4 or higher and a senior NCO was present in the camp at all times.  This 
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was not the case when the abuse took place at Abu Gharib.
945
 Second, he ordered the 
JIG to rewrite the detention interrogations SOP and incorporated many changes that 




One of the most important HDC phase three corrections was set up during 
General Hoods tenure; detainees began to have their individual cases reviewed and the 
HDC phase four releases picked up rapidly.  Detainees, who often understood the 
process better than their interrogators, hoped for an opportunity to plead their case and 
go home.
947
 On 11 May 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense created the Office for 
the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC) to 
conduct yearly administrative review boards (ARBs) at GTMO.  Although the 
OARDEC was not under Hood’s command, he dealt daily with its impact on both the 
detention and intelligence collection missions.  The Secretary of the Navy was 
designated to determine whether a detainee would be released, be transferred, or 
continue to be held based on recommendations from the OARDEC.
948
 Rear Admiral 
James McGarrah, a Naval Academy graduate and engineering reserve officer,
949
 was 
put in charge of establishing the office and overseeing the ARBs.
950
 While he may have 
been a good general officer, his lack of legal background surely did nothing to bring 
confidence to those who wanted to see a fair process instituted.   
On 28 June 2004, several US Supreme Court rulings were handed down which 
affected the detention review process.  In the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the court ruled 
the US had the right to detain enemy combatants, but if they were US citizens, they 
would be granted access to the US justice system.  Hamdi, who was born in the US 
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while his father was in graduate school, was given access to the US courts.
951
 On the 
same day, the high court ruled in the consolidated cases of Rasul v. Bush and al Odah v. 
Rumsfeld, that the US government had the right to detain US and foreign citizens in the 
GWOT, but determined that the US had enough sovereignty over GTMO to grant that 
the ‘courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of 
foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at 
Guantanamo Bay’.952 
In response to the rulings, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz signed 
Authorisation for the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) on 7 July 2004.  
Within ten days, all detainees were notified of their opportunity to challenge their status 
as an enemy combatant and assigned a personal representative to assist them in 
reviewing all non-classified information provided by the DOD.  Within 30 days, 
personal representatives were to review all the information before a tribunal to 
determine the detainees’ status as an enemy combatant.  Detainees were allowed to 
present evidence and call available witnesses.  If a detainee’s challenge to his enemy 
combatant status was successful, the DOD notified the State Department of the status 
change and arranged repatriation.
953
 The CSRTs were based on the Article 5 principles 
in the Geneva Conventions and Army Regulation 190-8.  They went beyond the ruling 
in Hamdi v. Bush by requiring the assignment of a personal representative.
954
 
 In early August 2004, the first 150 detainees opened cases under the 
CSRT process;
955
 the CSRT was a one time review to ensure each detainee was 
classified correctly as an enemy combatant.  In October, the first ARBs began.
956
 In 
November, before the reviews were even completed, ten former detainees had already 
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re-joined the fighting; it was just as many had feared
957
 In the intelligence-collection 
school of thought. On 29 March 2005, 10 months after starting the CSRTs, the DOD 
announced their completion; 520 detainees were confirmed as enemy combatants while 
38 were cleared for immediate release,
958
 thus enabling the HDC phase four process. 
Also in March, Admiral Church’s detention investigation was released and found ‘the 
extremely low rate of abuse at GTMO is largely due to strong command oversight, 
effective leadership, and adequate training on detainee handling and treatment’.959 
Defence lawyers from the judicial-Geneva Conventions camp were granted 
access to GTMO detainees in 2004.
960
 Some of the foremost attorneys in the US 
became involved; they referred to themselves as members of the ‘Guantanamo Bay Bar 
Association’.961 More than 400 lawyers from at least 50 US firms agreed to do pro bono 
work for the detainees.
962
 Many were driven by their disdain for Bush policies and felt 
the detainees should have access to the US judicial system.
963
 Other lawyers were 
appointed by the US military including Lieutenant Colonel Yvonne Bradley, who 
represented Binyam Al-Mohammad.  Even among members of the military defence 
counsel, there were those with ideological hostilities.  Bradley was accused of 
propagating lies about torture at GTMO in the press.
964
 She complained that her client 
was abused.  Others said detainees were denied basic medical care, interrogated at 
gunpoint, and frequently prevented from praying.
965
  
These accusations by the judicial-Geneva Conventions camp were untruths and 
easily proved by a visit to GTMO but the damage of putting out false information into 
the public domain was already done once printed. On 1 May 2005, Newsweek 
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erroneously reported that US investigators had confirmed that an interrogator 
deliberately flushed a Quran down a toilet at GTMO.  The issue created a violent 
backlash across the Islamic world; at least 16 people died and more than a hundred were 
injured.  Eventually Newsweek retracted the story, but the damage had been done.
966
 
Lies in this game with radical extremists have deadly consequences as the Newsweek 
story showed. 
In addition to their families and counsel, some detainees had other advocates.  In 
England, a play was produced depicting the plight of the British detainees.
967
 The TF 
received tens of thousands of pieces of mail for the detainees including fan mail.  
During the holidays, Americans sent Christmas and Easter greetings.
968
 The detainees’ 
most vocal advocate was Andy Worthington, a British human rights activist, who took 
up their cases.  Worthington despised the Bush Administration for preventing detainees 
from being tried in US criminal courts and objected to the US declaration of war; he felt 
alleged terrorists should have been dealt with through the US legal system.  For years, 
he collected articles about the detainees and derided US detention policy.
969
 
In March 2006, Worthington began writing a book telling the detainees’ stories 
just as thousands of documents were released through the FOIA process requested by 
the Associated Press.  He spent 14 months compiling the data and created a detainee 
website, which at the time was the most comprehensive public resource compiled on the 
detainees.  He was invited to visit GTMO as a blogger, but declined unless he was 
allowed to speak to the detainees;
970
 he has no first hand knowledge only what he has 
heard from others. 
Conversely, American researcher Thomas Joscelyn, clearly in the intelligence-
collection camp, examined the same documents and completed a comprehensive 
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analysis of the data.  His findings indicated that comparatively few detainees were 
innocent.  He criticised US press organisations for ignoring the value of intelligence 
produced by interrogations at GTMO and pointed to the media’s bias in highlighting 
every instance of alleged abuse.  Jocelyn authored numerous articles defending the 
detention of enemy combatants at GTMO and exposed millions of dollars of pro bono 
work being done for detainees by US law firms.
971
 
In addition to CSRTs and ARBs were military commissions.  On 18 August 
2004, the DOD stated that 15 GTMO detainees had been designated for military 
commissions;
972
 Yemenis Salim Ahmed Hamdan and Ali Hamza Ahmad Sulayman Al-
Bahlul, Australian David Hicks, and Sudanese Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud Al-Qosi were 
the first four to be charged.
973 
On 23 August, the first military commissions started,
974
 
but the US federal court halted the process on 8 November.  Judge James Robertson of 
the US District Court in Washington, DC stated the ‘government overstepped its bounds 
and violated the Geneva Conventions in trying Salim Ahmed Hamdan in a military 
commission.  The judge’s ruling said the government should try Hamdan in a military 
court-martial’.975 On 15 July 2005, the US Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court overturned the order to halt the commissions
976
 and in August 
the DOD announced changes to the commission process in response to legal 
criticism.
977
 Again the friction of the two ideological camps in the detention debate is 
evident in every decision.  Rather than create a win-win in a new national security court 
system, there is a constant back and forth both sides looking for a zero-sum win. 
In an attempt to clarify the ambiguous environment for military personnel 
involved in interrogations, Senator John McCain of Arizona authored the Detainee 
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Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005 elucidating rules for those involved in detention 
operations.
978
 The DTA stated that FM 34-52 was the standard for all DOD 
interrogations, even at GTMO, and that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear 
habeas petitions from GTMO detainees.
979
 On 12 June 2008, the US Supreme Court 
ultimately struck down parts of the DTA in Boumediene v Bush.  The ruling gave the 
courts jurisdiction over detainee habeas petitions and challenged the constitutionality of 
the 2006 Military Commissions Act.
980
 
On 22 March 2005, a new lessons-learned unit at GTMO was tasked to codify 
best practices,
981
 and on 3 November, the DOD issued Directive 3115.09, ‘DoD 
Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning’ to 
consolidate and clarify rules for military personnel working in detention operations.  
Specifically, it stated that all detainees were to be treated humanely and ordered medical 
personnel to immediately report any signs of abuse.  It authorised behavioral science 




Admiral Harry Harris, a combat veteran, Naval aviator, and experienced 
commanding officer,
983
 was the first Naval officer to command JTF-GTMO;
984
 he came 
at a time when operations were running smoothly, detainee tensions were high, and a 
new Camp Five for hard-core detainees was created.
985
 His philosophy was that prisons 
were for rehabilitation and punishment but GTMO’s purpose was to keep enemy 
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combatants off the battlefield.
986
 His leadership style was diametrically opposed to his 
predecessor General Hood.  He trusted his subordinates and believed in delegation.
987
 
Under Admiral Harris, top-level medical treatment continued to be provided to 
the detainees further taking the wind out of the sails of critics who said the detainees 
were being mistreated.  Harris extended the policy of force-feeding detainees on hunger 
strikes so they would not die.
988
 The US went to extraordinary measures, beyond the 
standards set in the Geneva Conventions, to ensure excellent health care for the 
detainees.  One detainee needed an electrocardiogram; the procedure showed a blockage 
in his heart.  Pursuant to the Geneva Convention standard of equal treatment for 
detainees and soldiers, the detainee required a cardiac catherization and a stint placed in 
his heart; top DOD cardiologists agreed.
989
 
The DOD located two, state of the art, mobile cardiac catherization labs but they 
were too large to fit on the largest military aircraft.  At great expense to the US 
government, a lab was loaded on a barge at an east coast port and sailed down to 
GTMO at a high rate of speed because GTMO officials were worried about the detainee 
dying.  Then the DOD found one of the top cardiac catherization doctors in the US, one 
qualified to operate on the president if he was at the Bethesda Naval hospital; he was 
taken to GTMO.  The mobile lab remained at GTMO because it was too costly to move 
back to the US.
990
 
On 6 June 2006, the DOD reiterated the responsibility of health care 
professionals to treat detainees in US custody properly according to DoD Instruction 
2310.08, the Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations.
991
 The document 
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consolidated all detainee medical policy guidance into one place.  Dr. William 
Winkenwerder, ASD for Health Affairs said: 
It is a comprehensive, thoughtful policy document that’s reaffirming high ethical 
principles and humane care and treatment for detainees and persons under the 
authority and control of the U.S. armed forces . . . This instruction doesn't change 
any of the current practices at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or other places where the 
U.S. deals with detainees, but is a compilation of various policy memoranda . . . 
The instruction reaffirms principles that will be prevalent for years to come, and it 
gives a single source of reference for military medical personnel who rotate in and 
out of places like Guantanamo.
992
  
Pressure to close GTMO began to mount during Admiral Harris’s tenure.  The 
Associated Press requested the names of detainees under the FOIA.  On 3 March 2006, 
the DOD released the names of 317 detainees,
993
 officially confirming many of the 551 
names illegally disclosed by Navy Lieutenant Commander Matt Diaz in January 2005, 
for which he was convicted, imprisoned,
994
 and ultimately disbarred.
995
  In an attempt to 
improve transparency, the Bush Administration authorised the release of 759 current 
and former GTMO detainee names.
996
 
On 15 February 2006, the UN issued a report claiming GTMO detainees had 
been subject to abuse, excessive violence, insufficient health care, illegal detention, and 
violations of the right to freedom of religion.
997
 Public pressure to close the facility 
mounted.  In May 2006, President Bush told a German television station he would like 
to close the facility, but needed to wait for a Supreme Court ruling to decide what kind 
of trials the detainees would have, a civil or military trial.
998
  A month later the Supreme 
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Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the that  the previous military tribunals  
violated the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and could 
not go forward unless they were revamped with the help of the Congress.
999
 
The Bush Administration did agree with the high court that the Common Article 
3 provisions of the Geneva Conventions should be applied to all US detainees.
1000
 
Deputy Secretary of Defence Gordon England released statements assuring the DOD 
would comply immediately.
1001
 Specifics of the new directives were formalised on 5 




On 19 May 2006, ten detainees attacked the guards in the minimum security 
Camp Four.
1003
 The prisoners claimed fighting broke out after a Quran was torn and 
thrown on the ground during a room search.  An Emergency Reaction Force (ERF) 
moved in and used rubber bullets and tear gas to regain control.  The detainees pulled a 
ceiling fan apart and used the sharpened blades to attack and wires to strangle the 
guards.  No guards or detainees were killed but soldiers were wounded.  Camp Four 
was completely evacuated
1004
 and communal detainee living was suspended.
1005
 In June 
2006, Camp Four was re-opened for the most compliant detainees and operated like a 
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The second major event of Admiral Harris’ tenure was the first detainee deaths.  
On 10 June 2006, three detainees hanged themselves inside their cells.
1007
 Lieutenant 
Commander Abuhena Saifulislam, the first Muslim chaplain under TF-160 in 2002, was 
flown in to perform the burial rites according to Islamic customs.
1008
 While GTMO 
critics called the suicides acts of desperation by despondent detainees, Admiral Harris 
called it an act of asymmetric warfare.
1009
 
The Navy conducted an official investigation, but four former guards from the 
Maryland National Guard claimed they were instructed not to discuss the events leading 
to the detainee deaths.
1010
 In a 2009 report, Seton Hall Law School concluded that there 




The only other detainee deaths reported at GTMO were by Navy Captain Alan 
Yund at a medical meeting in San Diego, California 22 February 2002.
1012
 But the 
former TF-160 Chief Medical Officer, Captain Albert Shimkus, denied any detainees 
died on his watch.  Captain Yund stood by his comments, and said Shimkus himself 
told him about the deaths.
1013
 
Gordon England, the former Navy Secretary who originally implemented the 
ARBs and CSRTs in 2004 under the OARDEC became the Deputy SECDEF and 
responded to critics of the process by publishing revised guidelines.  A 14 July 2006 
ARB memorandum delineated a detailed flow for the ARB process.  It discussed the 
purpose of the boards, its members, rules of procedure, recording boards, threat 
assessment criteria, how to handle classified material, a board nomination 
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questionnaire, a board designation letter, sample summary letters, sample designation of 
threat letter, oaths, implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and 
description of roles, responsibilities, and qualifications of board members.
1014
 
England also released a CSRT memo the same day.  Specifically, the 
memorandum covered the tribunal structure, procedures, how to handle classified 
information, what specifically a tribunal could do, what the detainee was allowed to do, 
admissibility of evidence, witnesses, burden of proof, determinations of availability of 
evidence, voting, post hearing procedures, notice to detainees, appointment letter 




After DASD for Detainee Affairs Waxman resigned in December 2005, his 
replacement, Cully Stimson, was interviewed nine times, which culminated in a final 
decision by the SECDEF to hire him.  Stimson brought a wealth of experience to the 
post; he previously served on active duty as a top Navy JAG litigator, worked in 
mergers and acquisitions in the private sector, and worked as an Assistant US Attorney 
in Washington, DC at the time of his appointment.  He understood how to deal with 
general officers, which was difficult for the younger Waxman who had a hard time 
earning the respect of senior military officers.  Ironically, Stimson had been 
involuntarily recalled to active duty just after 9/11 and assigned to Florida to potentially 
defend detainees at GTMO.  The SECDEF told him his task as DASD for Detainee 
Affairs was to do a better job telling the world what the US was doing at GTMO.
1016
 
On 22 January 2006, Stimson started; the next day he flew to GTMO for a tour 
of operations.  He quickly realised the GTMO story had not been told properly.  The 
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media was fixated on non-existent torture and their perceived illegality of the facility.  
Back at the Pentagon, he earned the trust of his senior officers.  Word quickly went out 
among Pentagon staff that he was ‘one of them’.1017 When Hood’s tour of duty ended, 
Stimson continued to work well with Admiral Harris, a fellow Naval officer.
1018
 
 Stimson’s goal was to show that high quality care and custody was already in 
place and inform the media on the legal framework for non-state actors engaged in the 
GWOT.  He flooded GITMO with international press, accompanying many delegations 
personally.  He gave as many interviews as possible.  By June 2006, the press was no 
longer talking about conditions at GTMO; they moved onto the legal framework for the 
detainees.  Stimson, to further increase transparency, convinced the DOD to allow an 
award winning, University of California, Berkeley journalism professor to make a 




 Another goal was to improve relations with the ICRC.  Although heavily funded 
by the US, the Geneva-based entity had a negative history with the US military that 
went back to the Vietnam War.  Rumsfeld and England were antagonistic to the ICRC 
and the US government did not give enough attention to early ICRC reports of detainee 
abuse in Iraq.  Despite this bad blood, Stimson realised ‘the key to success in detainee 
matters and detainee policy development was to establish a close personal working 
relationship with not only the ICRC but some of the human rights groups who ‘weren’t 
out of their mind’.1020 Stimson approached Geoff Loane, the head of the ICRC 
delegation in Washington, DC and established a relationship based on mutual trust.  














Originally, the DASD for Detainee Affairs office was not to be involved in 
military commissions, but Stimson was dragged into the policy debate on 29 June 2006, 
when the US Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.  The high court said military 
commissions violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva 
Conventions.  Stimson recommended modifying the commissions, labeling them courts 
martial for terrorists, and providing them with experienced prosecutors.  Stimson did 
not believe military JAG officers were experienced enough to prosecute the cases, nor 
did they have national security trial experience.  He argued that only prosecutors with a 
minimum 100 cases should be used.  He suggested recalling JAG reservists who were 
civilian prosecutors and had the experience to oppose the high priced, well-funded, pro 
bono detainee lawyers.  He suggested restructuring the commission rules to the rules for 
courts martial and using the Military Rules of Evidence outlined in the UCMJ, which is 
consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  The SECDEF did not 
take his advice.
1022
 Instead, on 17 October, Congress passed the Military Commissions 
Act, authorising military commissions for ‘alien unlawful enemy combatants’ and 
suspending habeas rights for the detainees in US federal courts.
1023
 
 Stimson reinvigorated the weekly JDCC meeting that Waxman had pushed off 
to his deputy, Alan Liotta.  It had become more of a deliberative body rather than a 
decision making body.  To ensure its significance, he had the Secretary of the Navy, 
Gordon England, send out a memorandum that attendance would be taken, it would be 
chaired by the new DASD, and that he, himself would periodically attend.  Stimson also 
continued the DSLOC meetings; when he became DASD, only 190 to 200 of the 492 
recommendations had been implemented, but by the time he left, only six were yet to be 






 Military Commissions Act of 2006, (Washington, DC:  US Congress, 2006) 
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actualised.  To foster transparency, Stimson pushed the DOD to release the 
recommendation results, but due to classification, they did not.
1024
 
 Stimson’s two major accomplishments as the DASD were the publication of the 
new detention directive
1025
 and the update of the Army interrogation manual FM 2-
22.3.
1026
  The directive provided a minimum standard of treatment for all DOD 
detainees regardless of their status including ‘Geneva Conventions protections to 
unconventional forces that don’t qualify as enemy prisoners of war as defined by the 
Geneva Conventions’.1027 These documents linked and clarified interrogation and 
detention policies, which had historically been at odds operationally.
1028
 The new 
manual laid out 19 approved approaches authorized for use on detainees and the 
directive provided clear guidelines for US military detention and interrogation practices 
and delineated Common Article 3 as the DODs standard for detainee treatment. 
In an 11 January 2007 interview with Federal News Radio, Stimson questioned 
the motives of law firms doing pro bono work for detainees at GTMO.
1029
  The judicial-
Geneva Conventions camp pounced on him right away.  Deans of 130 law schools 
criticised him for his remarks and called for the administration to disavow his 
remarks.
1030
 Amid a hailstorm of condemnation, Stimson apologised,
1031
 and fearing his 
comments had become a distraction he resigned 2 February.
1032
 Deputy Assistant 
SECDEF for Public Affairs Bryan Whitman, praised Stimson’s efforts to ‘increase 
transparency and strengthen relationships with other non-governmental organisations 
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and other groups, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross’.1033 
Stimson received no pressure from his superior at the DOD or the White House to 
resign, and in hindsight he believes he should have stayed on.
1034
 
As GTMO approached the end of its fifth year of operations in September 2006, 
the CIA transferred 14 HVDs to GTMO to await trial.
1035
 They were housed at Camp 
Seven away from the other detainees.
1036
 They appeared at CSRTs starting in March 
2007 where their status as ECs was confirmed.
1037
 
In December, the Military Commissions Act was upheld in court, which paved 
the way for commissions to start.
1038
 On 18 January 2007, the manual for military 
commissions was published to implement the new act.
1039
 On 30 March, Australian 
David Hicks, after more than five years in detention, pleaded guilty to one charge of 
providing material support for terrorism and was sentenced to nine months in prison.  
After the trial, chief prosecutor for the Office of Military Commissions, USAF Colonel 
Morris Davis said, ‘What I hope is going to be reported is that we gave an [Al-Qaeda] 
terrorist a full and fair trial’.1040 
On 22 May 2007, Admiral Mark Buzby replaced Harris.
1041
  Buzby, a Merchant 
Marine Academy graduate and experienced surface warfare officer,
1042
 assumed 
command of a mature TF, focussed on holding existing detainees under the HDC phase 
three, and working with OARDEC to expedite the release of those eligible under the 
HDC phase four.  One of Buzby’s priorities was strategic communications in relation to 
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the mission of GTMO.  He travelled the country lecturing on what GTMO was doing 
and why it existed.
1043
 
During Buzby’s tenure, the ICE OIC had 78 analysts and civilian and military 
interrogators.  The ICE OIC’s job was to ensure compliance with Army field manuals 
and DOD regulations pertaining to detainee interrogation operations.  There were more 
contractors than there were military personnel in the ICE:  only about a third were 
military and of those, none had target language capabilities.  Many of the contractors 
were experienced and recently released Army and Marine personnel.  The only 
approved interrogation approach during Buzby’s tenure was the direct approach despite 
the Army interrogation field manual authorising many others.  The detainee to 
interrogator ratio was roughly 10 to 1 with 275 detainees to about 30 interrogators.  
Although still a challenge, the odds were better than the ratios of the past when the 
detainee population was double with the same amount of interrogators.  The TF had 
roughly 90 interpreters to assist with all duties inside the camp.
1044
 
During Admiral Buzby’s tenure the historical tensions between the JIG and the 
JDOG continued but his staff was able to make significant inroads to alleviate tensions.  
The JDOG was experienced at running a detention facility but did not have expertise in 
moving detainees around outside of the detention facility.  With the start of the 
commissions, detainees needed to be moved outside the camp to appear at their 
hearings.  The JIG had a mobilised reservist who worked in federal law enforcement 
and had contacts at the US Marshals Service; moving detainees is core to the marshals’ 
mission.  The ICE OIC developed the trust of the JDOG commander and utilised his 
contacts at the marshals’ office to help the JDOG create an SOP for detainee movement.  
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Media relations and delegations visiting the facility continued to be an important 
part of the TF.  Members of the American and international media visited each week.  
Congressional delegations also came to GTMO.  Some visits informed opinions, others 
did not, but the visits were important for the mission of the camp.  Media portrayal of 
GTMO affected the morale of interrogators and support staff alike.  It was important to 
the TF that news of their successes in producing actionable intelligence which saved 
military, civilian, and allied lives, be told to the visitors who came to GTMO.
1046
 
While Admiral Buzby toured the country defending operations at GTMO, 
political opponents from both major political parties pushed for its closure.
1047
 
Additionally, the new SECDEF, Robert Gates, lobbied the administration to close the 
facility and find another solution for the detainees.  Gates acknowledged that one of the 
major dilemmas was what to do with the 70 detainees cleared to go home whose home 
governments would not, could not (due to inadequate facilities), or should not (because 
of the threat of immediate release) accept them back.
1048
 
The Uyghur detainees presented a peculiar problem; they had been cleared for 
release since April 2003, but even after approaching more than 100 countries, the State 
Department could not find any country willing to risk angering China by taking them 
in.
1049
 In the 2005 CSRT process, 17 were declared no longer enemy combatants.
1050
 
They were ordered released on 7 October 2008,
1051
 and eventually 17 of the 22 were 
sent to third party countries. 
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President Bush described the steps the US would have to take to close GTMO: 
first, the US had to help the Afghans build a new prison to properly house their 
returning detainees.  Second, he directed Secretary of State Condaleeza Rice to work 
out details with her counterparts to try to repatriate detainees to their home countries 
and to make sure they would be treated humanely and not be allowed to engage in 
terrorism again.
1052
 On 29 June 2007, Virginia Congressman Jim Moran tried to cut 
funding for the US$125 million per year facility in hopes of expediting the process.  
Moran cited the use of the rule of law to charge detainees and wanted to deny enemies 
in the GWOT the use of GTMO as a propaganda tool against the US.
1053
 
The case to close GTMO was also hampered by mixed HDC phase four 
repatriation successes in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  While some detainees returned 
home and shunned war, others returned to the fight.  Senior Taliban fighter, Abdullah 
Ghulam Rasul, also known as Mulah Abdullah Zakir, was captured in December 2001.  
He spent six years at GTMO and was released and quickly appointed the Taliban 
commander in Southern Afghanistan.
1054
 There is no guarantee with a ‘catch and 
release’ COA that former detainees will not fight again.  Alan Liotta cautioned there 
was no easy answer; closing GTMO and moving detainees to a US facility would not 
make problems go away and could even exacerbate the situation based on new legal 
considerations for detainees on US soil who could potentially be released under the 
current legal framework.
1055
 The judicial-Geneva Conventions camp never brought this 
point up.  To them simply closing GTMO and putting them in a US prison is a panacea 
to cure the wrong that is GTMO. 
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Ultimately President Bush decided against closing GTMO.  He did not have the 
time left in his presidency to resolve many of the core challenges associated with the 
prison before his term was over.
1056
 By the time he left, his administration had reduced 
the GTMO population by over 50% having released 537 detainees.  A large number of 
detainees that flys against the critics who say GTMO is a black hole with no way out. 
Most detainees were sent home, but eight detainees were sent to Albania because there 
were concerns over the detainee’s safety if sent home.  Albania was the only country 
willing to help.
1057
 While many wanted the prison closed, others called for it to be 
explained better, expanded
1058
 and turned into a permanent intelligence centre of 
excellence for interrogation and debriefing.
1059
 
Sandy Hodgkinson, a lawyer who worked detention issues at the National 
Security Council,
1060
 had been trying to get the job since its creation.  She applied after 
Waxman left, but Under Secretary of Defence Henry did not want to work with her.  
After Stimson left, the slot was open for several months before Secretary of State 
Condaleeza Rice called the new SECDEF, Robert Gates, to recommend Hodgkinson for 
the job.  She was also endorsed by Waxman and John Bellinger at the Special War 
Crimes Issues Office at the Department of State, the office tasked with the transfer and 
release of detainees from GTMO.  Even after these endorsements, the DOD was still not 
going to hire her.  When Stimson heard people were upset over the vacancy his 
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Hodgkinson came into the office on the heels of Lieutenant Colonel Stephen 
Abraham’s testimony about problems with the CSRTs at GTMO.  Abraham thought the 
tribunals were deeply flawed.  The OARDEC lacked the resources to conduct the 
tribunals and the lawyers assigned to defend the detainees did not have access to the 
information required to support their assigned detainees.
1062
 Hodgkinson dealt with the 
ICRC and other NGOs interested in US detention policy.  After President Obama was 
elected, one of Hodgkinson’s main jobs was to advise the new administration on the 
difficult issues faced in detainee policy and help them see beyond the political rhetoric 
about closing GTMO and the operational challenges of moving detainees to a US 
facility.
1063
 Bradford Berenson, a Washington state lawyer who worked on military 
commission policy for the Bush Administration said: 
I think the policies that have led to preventive detention for suspected terrorists at 
Guantanamo will probably change far less in the new administration than many 
people on the left hope and expect . . . And that’s because those policies were not 
adopted out of some excessive ideological zeal, they were adopted out of a 
sincere and genuine concern for protecting the public, and they’re based on reality 
and facts that can’t be wished away.1064  
The most important policy event during Hodgkinson’s tenure was the 9 October 2008 
detainee interrogation directive that superseded the previous 2005 directive.  The 
directive delineated that the USD for Policy, who the DASD for detainee affairs directly 
supported, retained oversight of interrogations but coordinated with the USD for 
intelligence in crafting policy.  The directive consolidated and codified all existing 
DOD policies into one document encompassing treatment during intelligence 
interrogations, debriefings, and tactical questioning of detainees.  It defined the role of 
contract interrogators, banned all SERE techniques, banned MPs and dogs from all 
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interrogations, clarified the requirement that only properly trained DOD personal could 
conduct interrogations, defined the policy of interrogating segregated detainees, and 
underlined the role of medical/behavioural science in support of interrogations.  The 




One of Hodgkinson’s tasks was to facilitate HDC phase four repatriation of 
detainees.  As part of the agreement to return Saudi detainees to their country, the Saudi 
government, under the direction of Deputy Interior Minister Prince Muhammad bin 
Nayef, established an extensive re-education and rehabilitation programme.  Led by 
Abdulrahman Al-Hadlaq, Director of the Interior Ministry’s Ideological Security 
Directorate, 300 detainees, including 106 from GTMO had graduated as of July 2010.  
From the GTMO graduates, eleven rejoined Al-Qaeda in Yemen after release.
1066
 The 
rehabilitation programme was part of a re-education effort in Saudi prisons to provide 
psychological and religious counseling to enable prisoners to abandon the beliefs that 
led them to violent organisations.  Completion of the programme was required before 
release from prison.  Additional care was afforded to the GTMO detainees who began 
arriving in 2007.  The rehabilitation programme was rooted in Saudi culture and 
stressed the importance of family and personal relationships; the stronger the family the 
better the rehabilitation went.  Families were accountable to watch over detainees after 
their release.
1067
 Other countries including Indonesia,
1068
 the UK, Egypt, Singapore, 
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General Douglas Stone, former TF-134 Iraq detention commander, visited many 
detainee rehabilitation programmes and interviewed every GTMO detainee in the Saudi 
programme.  He felt the Saudi programme was the most well-rounded but sensed many 
of the former GTMO detainees would revert to their ideological and religious 
dogmas.
1070
 Former CIA case officer and terrorist profiler, Dr. Marc Sageman, was 
convinced the Saudi programme rehabilitated many young people, not because they 
disavowed their beliefs, but because they were convinced not to act upon them.
1071
 
Rear Admiral Thomas, a Naval Academy graduate and career surface warfare 
officer
1072
 served at the Pentagon during the attacks on 9/11.  He was one of the few 
who ran into the building to help as others ran out.  When he took command of JTF-
GTMO on 27 May 2008, it held 270 detainees and was preparing to support the military 
commissions of five of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.
1073
 His tenure began during 
a presidential campaign in which his TF’s mission was hotly contested; then-Senator 
Obama vowed to close the facility if elected.  
Barack Obama was elected President on 4 November 2008
1074
 and was sworn in 
on 20 January 2009.
1075
  On the campaign trail he clearly articulated he was in the 
judicial-Geneva Conventions camp and on his second day in office, President Obama 
signed three executive orders.  Executive Order 13491:  Ensuring Lawful Interrogation 
reaffirmed Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as the baseline for treatment 
of detainees and prohibited the use of any technique not included in the updated FM 2-
22.3.  The order revoked all Bush era legal interpretations of interrogation policy issued 
between 11 September 2001 and 20 January 2009.  It ordered the CIA to immediately 
close all detention facilities and ordered all agencies to notify the ICRC of all detainees 
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 Previously, the CIA’s prisoners were classified and had been referred to 
as ‘ghost detainees’ because they were not registered in the military system.1077 By the 
time the CIA programme ended, more than 50 prison locations in 28 countries had been 
utilised.
1078
 Lastly, the order established an interagency TF on interrogation and 
detainee transfer policy.
1079
 While this appeared to be a step towards transparency, in 
reality, other than the ‘enhanced interrogation’, President Obama realised the necessity 
of quietly maintaining the policies and processes of the previous administration 




Executive Order 13492:  Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Close of Detention Facilities, called for the closure of 
the detention facility at GTMO within a year and an immediate review of all individuals 
detained there whom the DOD had ever labelled ECs.  Detainees were specifically 
granted the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
1081
 despite the fact the 
DOD had already done this under the CSRTs. 
Executive Order 13493:  Review of Detention Policy Options called for the 
creation of an interagency TF on detainee disposition to conduct a comprehensive 
review of options available to the government in regards to apprehension, detention, 
trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in 
connection with armed conflicts and CT operations.
1082
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As part of his reviews to implement the new executive orders, the White House 
tasked the DOD to conduct a current assessment of GTMO operations.  The Navy 
appointed Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Patrick Walsh to lead the 
assessment team.
1083
 On 22 February 2009, Admiral Walsh reported the detention 
facility at GTMO complied with the standards of humane treatment and Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.   
The team conducted more than 100 interviews with TF members, made several 
announced and un-announced camp visits, and observed daily life.  ‘The team looked at 
shelter, clothing, food and water, practice of religion, recreation, the detainee discipline 
system, protections against violence, sensory deprivation and humiliation, human-to-
human contact, health care, interrogation and access to attorneys and outside 
entities’.1084 Walsh concluded the GTMO prison leadership ‘seeks to go beyond the 
minimum standard in complying with Common Article 3’.1085 Newly appointed 
Attorney General Eric Holder visited the camp on 23 February and agreed GTMO was a 
well-run camp with no signs of abuse.
1086
  
In January 2009, Admiral Copeman, who graduated Punahou High School two 
years after President Obama in Hawaii, was announced as the new GTMO detention 
commander.
1087
 He assumed command on 19 June
1088
 and was supposed to close the 
facility down.
1089
 Copeman, an Officer Candidate School graduate and surface warfare 
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He drew up plans that were never implemented.  After a year’s tenure, he left 
and GTMO still held 181 detainees in multiple camps.  Copeman worked with the 
detainee review TF, to release approximately 50 detainees as per the HDC phase four.  
Many others lived in communal camps where they ate, prayed, and played in small 
groups.  This helped decrease tension between the guards and detainees 
considerably.
1091
 Despite the closure plan, Copeman continued to host media visits to 
GTMO.  In 2009 alone, 221 news representatives from 140 media outlets visited the 




Phil Carter, an Army reserve civil affairs officer, Operation Iraqi Freedom 
veteran, a detainee policy advocate, and a lawyer who wrote amicus briefs for two cases 
against SECDEF Rumsfeld dealing with detainee issues,
1093
 was appointed as the new 
DASD for detainee affairs on 6 May 2009;
1094
 his job was to enforce the judicial-
Geneva Conventions camps main ideas. When the Pentagon announced in October 2004 
that former detainees were returning to the battlefield, Carter blamed Bush policy 
blowback and asserted that had the US applied the Geneva Conventions, detainees 
would not have returned to the fight.
1095
 Carter worked on the Obama presidential 
campaign reaching out to veterans.
1096
 Although he made it known to the campaign in 
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late 2008 that he hoped to work for the administration, after he was tapped to be DASD 
for detainee affairs, it took more than four months to get him cleared for the job.
1097
 
 Carter came into a well-run DASD office managed by Alan Liotta, the career 
DOD deputy.  Liotta had established an efficient office and staff morale was high.  The 
15 full time staffers were knowledgeable on detainee affairs, as many of them had 
worked the issue for more than six years.  They had a wealth of historical knowledge 
and also tapped into a network of civilians who had worked at GTMO for the past seven 
years.  Carter leveraged the advice of two former DASDs; he consulted with Waxman 




The Detainee Affairs office along with the SOLIC and AFPAK offices had the 
highest operational tempos in the Pentagon.  They touched the war on a daily basis 
while the rest of the Pentagon was on peacetime footing.  Initially, Carter focussed on 
emptying the prisons in Iraq, building detainee capacity to support the broader 
campaign in Afghanistan, and continued safe, humane, and lawful detention at GTMO 
while trying to find a way to close it, according to the President’s executive order.  
Carter spent a great deal of time at interagency leadership and planning meetings, a 
deputies weekly meeting, and a monthly principles meeting.  Much of his office staff 
time was spent in meetings to prepare the SECDEF and the DEPSECDEF on detainee 
affairs.   
Carter also met with the ICRC regularly, both in Washington, DC and in 
Geneva.  He developed a trusted relationship with the ICRC; they provided valuable 
feedback and kept confidentiality.  Carter’s office improved and monitored the 492 
recommendations that had previously been implemented; he felt constant improvement 
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 In 2009, ICRC delegation chief in Washington, DC Geoff Loane, who 
had been very helpful to previous DASDs, left and was replaced in September by Mary 
Werntz.
1100
 Werntz, stated she wanted to continue the good work Loane had done and 
maintain the ICRC’s ‘outstanding reputation’.1101  
Carter’s office focused on three main issues during his time as the DASD:  first, 
the Detainee Review Task Force.  Carter detailed two people from his staff to support 
this DOJ lead effort.  His staff had a vote regarding the disposition of the detainee 
dossiers that were reviewed.  Second, he informed the DOD response to habeas 
litigation on behalf of the detainees.  He advised the Senior DOD legal counsel who 
managed the detainee habeas litigation process and the DOJ on the same matter.  Third, 
Carter led the effort to implement President Obama’s order to close GTMO; this 
eventually became his top priority.  Carter’s office led survey teams to potential new 
sites for a detention facility.  Carter often led the teams personally, especially to civilian 
sites where he engaged publicly with the local city officials and media.  When the 
survey teams went to potential military installations he did not attend since there was no 
public engagement element; his staff handled the rest.  At times he brought Harley 
Lappin with him, head of the bureau of prisons, to provide insight to the field survey 
teams looking at new sites.  The survey teams required more personnel than the office 




Within the Office of the SECDEF, all the departments examined the lines of 
effort that would be affected by the closure of the GTMO detention facility. The process 
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raised a lot of issues that exposed second, third, and fourth order effects and manifested 
the real challenges of implementing the president’s order.1103 
Carter travelled frequently to Cuba, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Thompson, Illinois, 
the site of a facility where the Obama Administration wanted to ship the GTMO 
detainees.
1104
 The Illinois prison became a lightning rod in the debate; Congress 
eventually blocked funding to close GTMO and upgrade the Thompson prison.
1105
 
Opinion polls indicated the American public was strongly opposed to closing GTMO 
and setting the detainees free.
1106
 In November 2009 when Obama announced he would 
not meet the deadline to close GTMO, Carter abruptly quit without giving any warning 
to the DOD.
 1107
 Carter stated:  ‘I was happy to have served in the position; I had a good 
experience but was ready to move on’.1108 
 During his seven-month tenure, Carter also enforced policy change by amending 
the terminology used to describe detainees.  In March 2009, the administration had 
decided to stop using the term ‘enemy combatant’ and preferred ‘detainee’.1109 In a July 
2009 detention guidance document for Afghanistan, Carter referred to detainees as 
‘aliens’ and ‘unprivileged enemy belligerents’.1110 The new terminology was Carter’s 
attempt to move away from what he felt was an inflammatory label in favour of terms 
that were more in compliance with international law.
1111
 When the revised Obama 
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military commissions restarted at GTMO in February 2011, detainees were referred to 
as ‘alien enemy unprivileged belligerents’.1112 
To implement Executive Order 13491:  Ensuring Lawful Interrogation, the 
Obama DOJ created the Special TF on Interrogation and Transfer Policies headed by 
Douglas Wilson, the Chief of the National Security Unit in the US Attorney’s Office for 
the Northern District of California.  This interagency TF was supposed to determine if 
the Army interrogation manual guidelines were appropriate for non-DOD organisations 
to use to collect intelligence or if other methods were needed.  The TF also examined 
the process the US used in transferring detainees to other nations and determine how to 
best to ensure their safety under international law.
1113
 
On 24 August, the TF released their findings that the Army interrogation manual 
FM 2-22.3 and current LEA practices were sufficient for conducting interrogations.  
They also recommended the creation of a scientific research programme to study and 
compare the most effective techniques and develop new ones to improve intelligence 
interrogations.  The TF made several suggestions aimed at improving the US’s 
capability to monitor detainees transferred to other countries to ensure proper treatment.  
Lastly, the TF recommended the creation of a High-Value [Detainee] Interrogation 
Group (HIG) led by the FBI (instead of the CIA), and comprised of the most 




President Obama, true to his camps viewpoints of focussing on the judicial route 
as opposed to the intelligence-collection camp, immediately signed off on the FBI-led 
group; a clear break from the Bush Administration that gave the CIA primacy over CT 
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interrogations and HVD interviews.
1115
 Andrew McCabe, a seasoned FBI CT 
investigator, was tapped to head the HIG.  He explained the HIG consisted of three to 
five teams of interrogators based in Washington, DC mostly from the FBI with a few 
from the CIA and the DIA.  A clandestine service CIA officer filled a deputy HIG 
position in order to provide knowledge of Al-Qaeda.
1116
 On 6 February 2010, the HIG 




To implement Executive Order 13492:  Review and Disposition of Individuals 
Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Close of Detention Facilities, the 
Guantanamo Detainee Review Task Force was created.  Headed by Matthew Olsen, 
former DOJ Acting Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division, the 
TF was charged with reviewing the case files of every detainee at GTMO and making a 
recommendation.
1118
 Olsen’s TF was comprised of approximately 65 people on two 
teams:  one identified detainees who were no longer considered a threat and could be 
transferred to other countries, the other determined if the remaining detainees could be 
prosecuted in federal court or by military commissions.  Detainees who could not be 
released or stand trial in a commission or federal court were slotted for indefinite 
detention; an alternative Obama said he was averse to when running for president.
1119
 
The first challenge for the TF was the copious amount of detainee data 
distributed among various agencies.  By late April, the TF had logged 1.8 million pages 
of information on the 240 GTMO detainees into their database.
1120
 Once all the data 
was collected and entered into a secure network, the TF met weekly.  In determining a 
detainee’s status, the review panel had to vote unanimously, or the case was sent to the 
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cabinet level for final decision.  Yemeni detainees posed the greatest challenge, because 
of their government’s inability to prevent them from escaping.  Although the one-year 
deadline to close GTMO seemed daunting, Olsen argued the deadline was critical to 
moving the process along.
1121
 
In June 2009, the TFs’ results were delayed and each was given more time to 
work through their challenges.
1122
 After missing the original deadlines and the deadline 
to close GTMO, Olsen’s TF findings were published 22 January 2010.  Of the 240 
detainees reviewed, 126 were approved for transfer; of these, 44 had already left due to 
the efforts of Ambassador Daniel Fried, who was appointed as the Special Envoy for 
the Closure of the Guantanamo Detainee Facility on 13 March 2009.
1123
 Fried led the 
State Department effort to find other countries willing to accept detainees from GTMO 




Another 44 detainees were referred for prosecution either in federal court or a 
military commission and 36 of these detainees remained the subject of active cases or 
investigations.  The US announced it would pursue prosecutions against six detainees in 
federal court and six detainees in military commissions.  The 30 Yemeni detainees were 
designated for conditional detention due to the inability of the Yemeni government to 
secure them at home.  Finally, 48 detainees were deemed too dangerous to transfer and 
not feasible to prosecute.
1125
 
In 2011, the Obama Administration selected Olsen as director of the new 
National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC).
1126
 At his confirmation hearing, Virginia 
Congressman Frank Wolf accused him of lying about the status of two Uyghur 
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detainees when he was in charge of the Detainee Review Task Force.  Although Olsen 
told Wolf in a 22 April 2009 meeting that no decision had been made, Wolf later 
discovered the decision to move the Uyghurs to the US was approved 14 April.
1127
 
At his July 2011 senate confirmation hearing, Olsen said he made decisions with 
unanimous support from all agencies in the TF and stated Congressman Wolf ‘suffered 
from a mis-recollection’ about the Uyghur briefing.1128 Georgia Senator Saxby 
Chambliss asked Olsen if he had seen any evidence the country was safer or if Al-
Qaeda recruits had decreased as a result of the president’s announcement to close 
GTMO.  Olsen said he had seen nothing to indicate a change in Al-Qaeda recruiting 
based on the announcement.
1129
 
On 5 January 2010, President Obama said closing GTMO was important 
because of its recruiting value to Al-Qaeda.
1130
 When the detainee review TF report was 
released 25 January and he announced GTMO was not closing, Obama reiterated that 
GTMO was a major recruiting tool for Al-Qaeda.  However, mujahid recruitment 
videos rarely mentioned GTMO, but used Bagram as a rallying point.  In the previous 
seven years, Al-Qaeda referred to GTMO in videos 32 times and affiliate groups 26 
times.  In 2009, they only mentioned GTMO four times in discussing other prisons 
holding Muslims.
1131
 According to American Al-Qaeda member Adam Ghadan: 
Americans have to understand that the important thing isn’t whether our brothers 
are being held in Cuba, or in Afghanistan, in Diego Garcia, or in Belmarsh, in 
Michigan, or Montana or in Fort Leavenworth . . . They are being held without 
right by unbelievers in God’s divine law.1132 
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Ghadan underlined the administration’s fallacy that closing GTMO would reduce 
extremist recruiting.  Ultimately, President Obama lost the battle; on 16 February 2011, 
when asked where Bin Laden would go if captured, CIA Director Leon Panetta said:  
‘The process would obviously involve - especially with the two targets [Bin Laden and 
Zawahiri] that you just described - we would probably move them quickly into military 
jurisdiction at Bagram for questioning and then eventually move them, probably to 
Guantanamo’.1133 Despite the political rhetoric, GTMO was clearly central to the 
administration’s CT detention programme. 
 To implement Executive Order 13493:  Review of Detention Policy Options, the 
Special Task Force on Detention Policy was created.  Co-chaired by Brad Wiegmann, 
the Principal Deputy and Chief of Staff in the DOJ National Security Division
1134
 and 
Colonel Mark Martins, an Army JAG officer,
1135
 the TF was charged with the review of 
all options available to the US government for the apprehension, detention, trial, 
transfer, release or other disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in 
connection with armed conflicts and CT operations.
1136
 
On 20 June 2009, the TF issued a preliminary report stating it needed more time 
to explore all options for the detainees as well as the long-term consequences.  It 
discussed military commissions and civilian courts and argued that while some 
terrorists had successfully been tried in US courts, historically, violations of the laws of 
war were tried in military commissions.  The report also said no ECs would be 
Mirandized, as that was meant for law enforcement.  It also called for the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 to be revised; eight key changes were suggested to make it 
viable and legal: 
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1. Codify in law prohibition on using statements obtained through cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment. 
2. Regulate the use of hearsay to bring rules in line with the federal courts or 
military courts-martial. 
3. Adopt a voluntariness standard for the admission of statements of the 
accused based on battlefield realities. 
4. Incorporate classified information procedures that are similar to those in 
federal courts but modified for the commissions. 
5. Reform appellate process to give reviewing courts more authority. 
6. Develop clear rules requiring the government to disclose evidence 
favourable to the detainees. 
7. Ensure offenses charged in the commissions are law of war offenses. 
8. Include a sunset clause that has congress revisit the law after some years.1137  
Many of these changes were incorporated into the 28 October Military 
Commissions Act of 2009 and the 27 April 2010 manual for military commissions 
which resumed under President Obama.
1138
 
 Some defence lawyers and human rights groups complained that the changes in 
procedures and rules favoured the prosecution.  Retired USAF Colonel Morris Davis, 
who resigned as chief prosecutor for the trials in October 2007, said the trials should be 
moved to a US federal court to avoid the perception of illegitimacy.
1139
 
After months without a DASD for detainee affairs, the Obama Administration 
appointed in February 2010, USMC Colonel William Lietzau, deputy legal counsel to 
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the National Security Council, to the position.
1140
  Lietzau had been a key player behind 
the scenes early on in the Bush Pentagon.  He helped create the first version of the 
military commissions struck down by the US Supreme Court and voted against by then-
Senator Obama.  Despite his early Bush detainee policy involvement, his pragmatic, 
non-ideological, and energetic reputation won him the position.
1141
 Lietzou had myriad 
experience in international criminal law, counternarcotics, interdictions, piracy, CT, 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), non-proliferation, missile defence, foreign 
assistance, and treaty implementation.
1142
   
 As DASD for detainee affairs, Lietzou dealt with a new political environment 
marked by efforts to close GTMO over the previous year.  The Yemeni government was 
unable to properly incarcerate their repatriated detainees.  In addition, the Christmas 
2009 ‘Underwear Bomber’ and 2010 Times Square car bombing attempts depleted the 
last shreds of political will to close GTMO.  Lietzou focused on continuous 
improvement of detention operations, finalised the closeout of all remaining detention 
operations in Iraq, and supported policy to enhance operations in Afghanistan.
1143
 
A major policy change was announced 17 May 2010; the Pentagon ordered all 
military personnel to record all strategic level interrogations on US bases including 
GTMO and the DFIP.  This did not apply to tactical interrogations conducted in the 
field.
1144
 In November, as part of a provision in the 2010 National Defence 
Authorisation Act, contracted interrogators were banned from conducting 
interrogations.  This was problematic; the US military relied heavily on contract 
interrogators to accomplish the work due to not enough trained military interrogators.  
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The law did permit the SECDEF to waive the prohibition for a period of time if it is 
‘vital to the national security interests of the United States’.1145 
Lietzou also worked closely with Rosa Brooks, the DASD for the first ever 
DOD office to look at ‘emerging non-traditional military activities like compliance with 
the rule of law, humanitarian emergencies and human rights’.1146  The office was 
created in June of 2010 to ensure the Obama administrations strategic goals of adhering 
to the international rule-of-law in on-going wars was at the forefront and not lost in 
contingency planning.   Brooks stated that COIN and CT doctrine had moved towards a 
rule-of-law approach in order for operations to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population being protected.  Former DASD for detainee affairs, Mathew Waxman said 
the creation of the new office was ‘a step toward integrating law and strategy’, 
something that was often lost in war planning.
1147
 
The biggest change wrought under his tenure took place on Friday, 17 June 2011 
when the office for detainee affairs was merged with Rosa’s office, the office for rule- 
of-law and international humanitarian policy, to become the office for the rule-of-law 
and detainee policy.  The Obama administration, unable to close GTMO, grappling with 
a myriad of detainee, rule of law and humanitarian issues, and a tightening defense 
budget, merged the two offices.  The merger made the detainee affairs office, once 
thought to be temporary and would end with the end of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, permanent.
1148
  Former DASD for detainee affairs, Phil Carter said:  
‘There’s a natural synergy between the detainee portfolio, and the broader rule-of-law 
and human rights portfolio’.1149   
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Admiral Harberson, a University of Maryland and Naval War College graduate, 
assumed command of JTF-GTMO on 25 June 2010
1150
  after several successful tours as 
a surface warfare officer.
1151
 When he took command, about 160 of the 181 prisoners 
were living in the minimum security communal living Camps Four and Six.  Detainees 
ate together and had up to 20 hours of recreation time per day.  In the first seven months 
of 2010, only 60 assaults on guards were reported compared to 1,000 in 2009.  There 
had not been a confirmed case of a guard assaulting a detainee since 2004.
1152
 
Detainees in Camps Four and Six wore white jumpsuits and had access to a 
17,000-book library and flat screen TVs with 18 channels including Al-Jazeera English, 
a sports channel, broadcasts focusing on Tunisia, Libya, and Kuwait, movies, and 
Skype.  They attended English classes and ‘life skills’ classes, which taught personal 
finance, business finance, and other vocations.
1153
 Their ice cream rations were, 
however, reduced to one per detainee.
1154
 
Camps One, Two, and Three held the non-compliant detainees who wore orange 
jumpsuits.  Camp Five was equivalent to a supermax prison and held the four alleged 
war criminals destined for commissions.  These detainees lived in 8 by 12 foot cells 
with a steel door with an opening to pass meals and books through.
1155
 Camp Seven was 
for the HVDs.
1156
 In the event of a final closure order, Harberson would need six 
months to empty all the camps.
1157
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On 17 November 2010, President Obama’s experimentation with civilian trials for 
detainees was pushed to the limit.  Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, charged for his role in the 
1998 Tanzania Embassy bombing, was acquitted on 284 charges and found guilty on 
only one.  While some praised the conviction, others feared putting terrorism trials in 
US courts would be disastrous.  Public opposition to civilian trials pressured the 
administration to bring them back to GTMO.
1158
 The difficulty in trying ECs in US 
civilian courts was that they could be released on procedural grounds, a fear the 
intelligence-collection school of thought has always feared.  The detainees had not been 
Mirandized when taken into custody, and could potentially sue for unlawful 
imprisonment.
1159
 Former US Attorney General Mulkasey stated: 
The battlefield, where [KSM] and others were captured, does not provide the 
setting in which evidence can be gathered the way it is when a defendant is 
apprehended by civilian authorities. In civilian trials, federal rules restrict 
admissibility of evidence; in military commissions, the touchstone for 
admissibility is simply relevance and apparent reliability.
1160
 
On 7 March 2011, President Obama stated the detainee reviews were complete 
and the military commissions would resume at GTMO.  He signed an executive order 
placing the 48 GTMO
1161
 detainees deemed too dangerous to release and not eligible for 
trial in indefinite detention and subject to an annual Periodic Review Board (PRB),
1162
 
which functioned much like a parole board.
1163
 Coming from one of the most vociferous 
critics of the Bush era detainee policies, this indefinite detention order is shocking.  A 
spokesperson for the Centre for Constitutional Rights said: 
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The creation of a review process that will take up to a year designed to be 
repeated every four years is a tacit acknowledgment that the Obama 
Administration intends to leave Guantanamo as a scheme for unlawful detention 
without charge and trial for future presidents to clean up, despite the fact that 
senior officials acknowledged today that keeping the prison open continues to 
hinder our national security in the long run.
1164
 
On 4 April 2012, US Attorney General Eric Holder announced Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, the operational planner of the 9/11 attacks, would stand trial at GTMO for 
war crimes before a military commission along with four additional co-conspirators.
1165
 
Legislation passed in December 2011 blocked the DOD from spending monies during 
fiscal year 2011 to move GTMO detainees to the US for any reason.  The bill also stated 
that no monies could be used to purchase facilities for GTMO detainees in the US,
1166
 
effectively rejecting the Obama Administration request for US$237 million to purchase 
the prison in Thompson, Illinois.
1167
 New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg praised the 
legislation reiterating his opinion that holding terrorism trials in NYC was a mistake.
1168
 
New York Senator Chuck Schumer called it ‘the final nail in the coffin of that wrong-
headed idea’.1169 
The US population mostly agreed; a March 2011 Rasmussen Report indicated 
58 per cent of likely voters said GTMO should not be closed; 60 per cent said terrorists 
should be tried before military tribunals and not in US courts.  In a December 2010 poll, 
84 percent of likely voters were concerned terrorists would be set free if GTMO was 
closed and some prisoners were transferred to other countries.
1170
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On 18 May 2011, an Afghan detainee hung himself at GTMO, bringing the total 
detainee population to 171.  This was the eighth detainee to die at the camp since it 
opened; six took their own lives and two died of natural causes.
1171
  
On 10 August, the Navy announced Admiral David Woods would lead the 
detention TF into a second decade of operations.
1172
 Woods, who lost two Naval 
Academy classmates on 9/11, was a highly decorated naval flight officer with more than 
1000 carrier landings and a command tour in Iraq.
1173
 On 27 August, with very little 




Under Woods, the base expanded operations; a new detention hospital was built 
closer to the camp, and the media centre was expanded to accommodate journalists 
attending the imminent trials at Camp Justice for the five alleged 9/11 conspirators and 
the USS Cole bomber.  Woods also requested more forces to secure the court, conduct 
image screening for operational security, and provide reporter and lawyer escorts.
1175
 
During Wood’s first few weeks, on 13 September 2011, the Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper testified the recidivism rate for former GTMO detainees had 
risen to an estimated 27 percent; the total number of ‘confirmed’ and ‘suspected’ 
recidivists was now 161.
1176
 This was a significant increase from the 14 percent rate 
reported by the Pentagon on 6 January 2010.
1177
 
On 3 October 2011, General Mark Martins, newly returned from a two year tour 
working CJITAF-435 detainee and rule of law operations in Afghanistan, was appointed 
to lead the prosecution of the detainees at Camp Justice under the Obama 
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Administration’s revised rules.  The trials were to be broadcast to the US with a 40 
second transmission delay.
1178
 Former Chief Prosecutor Colonel Morris Davis, who 
resigned in 2007, said the trials should be moved to the US to avoid the perception of 
illegitimacy as a ‘kangaroo court’.1179 
On 9 November, the Saudi-born planner of the 2000 Cole bombing, Abd-al-
Rahim Al-Nashiri, appeared before an Army judge at Camp Justice nine years after 
being captured.  The Obama Administration sought the death penalty against Al-
Nashiri, who is accused of killing 17 US sailors.  Critics of the trial say he was tortured 
by the CIA.  General Mark Martins, said, ‘no evidence gleaned through torture would 
be used at a trial’.1180 
In October, Woods ordered guards to search detainees’ cells and personal effects 
to ensure that mail from their lawyers and families was not mixed together and kept in 
separate bins; they also searched for hidden incendiary materials.
1181
 He changed 
detainee mail policy; previously guards opened mail in front of the detainee to search 
for banned items, but did not read correspondence, now guards read the letters.
1182
 On 
28 December, Woods adjusted the policy requiring a security review of all legal 
correspondence for only prisoners facing war crimes charges.  His order created a 
combined military and law enforcement team to check detainee mail for unauthorised 
information.  Detainee lawyers protested it violated the attorney-client privilege.
1183
 
The cost to run GTMO reached US$150,000,000 annually, roughly US$800,000 
per detainee a year; approximately 30 times the cost of a civilian facility.  The island 
location, temporary nature, and multiple commands with separate budgets drove up 
costs.  It was manned by 1,850 personnel including, linguists, intelligence analysts, 
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federal agents, and contract labourers.  Satellite television with sports, news, religious 
programming, and Arabic soap operas were made available to cooperative detainees.  
The library expanded to 24,000 books, videos, and magazines, and plans for another 





The GTMO detention facility was hastily constructed to hold detainees captured in 
Afghanistan during phase one of the HDC.  As OEF continued, a long-term detention 
centre was established according to phase two of the HDC to correct mistakes made 
early in detention operations.  As old and new doctrine collided, the situation became a 
perfect storm of confusion.  The FBI, the military, the intelligence community, and 
others involved were tasked with competing missions (based on the two ideological 
camps) with unclear legal and operational guidance that changed and evolved as the 
mission progressed.  While there were many successes, overall human resources with 
the appropriate skill sets were inadequate to accomplish all the assigned missions.  
Unskilled, well-meaning, personnel attempted to help, but often fell short.  CENTCOM 
focussed only on the tactical and operational detention mission in Afghanistan and 
ignored the strategic interrogation mission they had pushed off to SOUTHCOM. 
 Under General Hood, corrections were made to detainee handling at GTMO, 
corresponding to the third phase of the HDC, and operations began to run more 
efficiently.  Lessons learned from mistakes made at Abu Ghraib were applied to GTMO 
including suggestions from 12 major detention operations investigations.  Despite 
President Obama’s 2008 campaign vow to close the facility, Congress and the 
American public supported keeping it open to serve as the strategic detention facility for 
GWOT detainees. 
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Iraq Case Study 
Whenever we have, perhaps, taken expedient measures, they have turned around and 
bitten us in the backside . . . Abu Gharaib and other situations like that are non-
biodegradable.  They don’t go away.  The enemy continues to beat you with them like a 
stick . . .  
- Former CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus1185 
The war will be won through HUMINT.  Detention and Intel are key to HUMINT.  
They must work together; be merged. 
- MG Douglas Stone Commander TF-134 Detention Operations1186  
Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and subsequent detention 
operations.  It will cover the tenure of each detention operations commander throughout 
the stages of the Historic Detention Cycle (HDC) as they unfolded during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF).   
Detention operations in Iraq mostly followed phase one from the conventional 
military perspective.  Most the detainees were classified as prisoners of war with a 
smattering of foreign fighter’s mixed in who were classified as enemy combatants.  
After the defeat of the Saddam government and his conventional military and security 
forces, the insurgency set in and gravely affected detention operations in HDC phase 
two where US forces struggled to move from a convention mindest to an irregular-
counterinsurgency, counterterrorism mindset.  The learning curve was steep.  Phase two 
was a watershed for detention operations not only in Iraq but for the entire DOD as the 
events at Abu Ghraib prison impacted the GWOT effort at all levels of war; strategic, 
operational, and tactical, and greatly influenced the local Iraqi population, the US 
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population, and international opinion.  In phase three and four of the HDC, the US made 
dramatic changes to detention policy as insurgency swept the country.  USMC General 
Douglas Stone catalysed the most arduous changes in detention operations; the policy of 
detain/hold/release was changed to detain/segregate/hold/rehabilitate/release.  Stone’s 
strategy likely saved the entire surge campaign from collapsing as detention operations 
reached a violent climax in spring 2007.  In the fifth phase of the HDC, US operations 
transitioned to Operation New Dawn, the process of collecting end of conflict lessons 
learned were recorded and US forces prepared for complete withdrawal in December 
2011 according to the status of forces agreement (SOFA) signed in December 2008 by 
President Bush.   
Historical Context 
On 27 November 2001, before the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the SECDEF 
directed CENTCOM to create a plan for regime change in Iraq.
1187
 This directive was in 
line with the spirit of US policy, Public law 105-338,
1188
 signed by President Clinton in 
1998 that codified the elements of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998:
1189
 
It should be the policy of the [US] to support efforts to remove the regime headed 
by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a 
democratic government to replace that regime.
1190
 
While this law did not directly call for invasion, it clarified US policy and authorised a 




As initial combat operations against the Taliban wound down, the Pentagon 
reviewed options for an invasion of Iraq.  The OPLAN 1003V for the invasion of Iraq 
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and defence of the Arabian Peninsula
1192
 had been updated for Operation Desert Fox in 
1998
1193
 and called for an invasion force of 500,000.
1194
 In 1999, then-CENTCOM 
Commander, General Anthony Zinni, conducted Desert Crossing, a war game for the 
invasion of Iraq and post Saddam conditions.
1195
 The result showed regime change did 
not guarantee stability, Iran would prove to be a challenge, ethnic tensions would ensue, 
and up to 300,000 US troops would be needed for the operation.
1196
 A month before the 
invasion, Congress asked US Army Chief of Staff General Erik Shinseki how many 
troops would be needed.  He answered: 
. . . [S]everal hundred thousand soldiers . . . would be required to stabilize Iraq 
after an invasion.  We’re talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of 
geography that’s fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could 
lead to other problems . . . And so it takes a significant ground force presence to 
maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water 




An experienced combat veteran wounded in Vietnam, Shinseki understood what would 




 On 16 October 2002, congress issued the Authorisation for Use of Military 
Force against Iraq.
1199
 Four days later, Saddam Hussein granted amnesty to 60,000
1200
 
criminals, virtually emptying the prisons and hoping to build support in case of a US 
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The original invasion was tentatively scheduled for October 2002.  CENTCOM 
war planners felt the mission in Afghanistan was over and they could focus on Iraq.
1203
 
Bush made it clear he wanted no stretching of the intelligence to launch the invasion,
1204
 
but CIA director George Tenet assured him the case for WMDs was a ‘slam dunk’, 
although he denied saying this in his 2007 memoirs.
1205
 The July 2004 Senate report on 
pre-war Iraq intelligence clearly showed the intelligence analysis was ‘stretched’ to 
support the assessment.
1206
 As the drums of war continued to beat towards an Iraq 
invasion, President Karzai asked that Afghanistan not be forgotten and said the US must 
maintain a military force in his country until the terrorists were defeated.  He reached 




The CENTCOM and Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) 
OIF planners designed detention requirements for holding EPWs based on Iraqi units 
surrendering in place as they had done in the first Gulf War.
1208
 The updated OPLAN 
1003 V gave no additional interrogation and detainee guidance beyond what was found 
in the nine page Appendix 1 to Annex E titled ‘Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW), 
Retained Persons, Civilian Internees and other detainees’ dated 25 September 2002.  It 
did not mention Iraq and looked exactly like the same annex from the Afghan-OEF war 
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 Planners estimated the US would hold between 16,000 and 57,000 EPWs 
during the invasion in 12 detention facilities.
1210
 The coalition never saw these numbers. 
HDC Phase I:  The Conflict Starts and Detainees Are Captured  
General Paul Hill was the commander of the 800 MP brigade, a reserve unit that had 
performed well during detention operations in the 1990 Gulf War.
1211
 From 2001, he led 
the unit through extensive training for their core EPW handling mission.  Hill 
understood how to care for prisoners and support intelligence collection operations; he 
commanded the unit during the first two phases of the HDC.
 1212
 
On 19 March 2003, a coalition of 290,000 troops launched OIF Phase I with a 
CFLCC-directed attack on Baghdad.
1213
 Coalition forces poured into the country and 
seized key terrain quickly and entered Baghdad on 9 April.
1214
 Three MP brigades 
supported detention operations during the invasion:  the 18 MP brigade attached to the 
First Armoured Division (1 AD) in Baghdad, the 220 MP brigade supported units all 
over the country, and the 800 MP brigade ran theatre detention operations.
1215
 
Aboard the USS Lincoln on 1 May, President Bush announced the invasion was 
over, but the hard work of transitioning from Saddam to democracy would take time; 
the US would be there as long as necessary.  The infamous sign hung aboard the ship 
titled ‘Mission Accomplished’ was meant as a tribute to the crew for the longest 
deployment ever for a ship of her class; it did not mean the effort in Iraq was over.
1216
 It 
became a strategic public relations messaging failure for the Bush administration and a 
hammer for the judicial-Geneva Conventions school-of-thought once the anti-Bush 
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camp got a hold of it and used it against the administration especially as the insurgency 
picked up steam and US casualties began to increase.   
 As the war progressed, manoeuvre units initially handled their own detainees in 
the field until they handed them off to corps or theatre level detention facilities.  On 22 
March 2003, the Third Infantry Division (3 ID) TF-EPW established a division 
detention collection point at Talil Airbase in Southern Iraq.  This facility, named Camp 
Whitford, was the first semi-permanent US detention facility in Iraq and used by the 
800 MP brigade to stage detainees for movement south.
1217
  
The 513 MI Brigade sent two US interrogators from the 202 MI at Camp Udairi, 
Kuwait to the British detention facility Camp Freddy near Um Qasar in Southern Iraq in 
late March
1218
 to work with the British Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT), part of 
the F Branch training wing of the Joint Services Intelligence Organization based out of 
Chicksands, Bedfordshire, United Kingdom.
1219
 They were the first US interrogators to 
work at the camp.  The facility, mostly run by British reservists, was initially 
commanded by a Royal British Navy Lieutenant Commander.
1220
   On 7 April, US 
forces assumed command of Camp Freddy from the British and turned it into the theatre 
internment facility (TIF) for the south.
1221
 Camp Freddy, which was a former Ba’athist 
propaganda radio station, was renamed Camp Bucca in honour of NYC fire marshal and 
Army Reserve Intel Warrant Officer Ronald Bucca, who died on 9/11 inside the 
WTC.
1222
  The British moved their interrogation operations to a British logistics base 
close to Basra called Shaiba and eventually operations were moved to the airport at 
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Basra until the JFIT was close down at the end of 2008.
1223
  Accusations of prisoner 
abuse by British Colonel Tim Collins were sensationalized in the press and ultimately 
proved incorrect
1224
 but prisoner abuse at the JFIT and by other British forces would 
hamper their mission just as it would the US in the coming years.
1225
  
When the 513 went home, the 323 MI from the Maryland National Guard and the 
300MI from the Utah National Guard took over operations at Camp Bucca.
1226
 
North of Basra, TF-EPW established several temporary sites, one at Life 
Support Area Bushmaster near Najaf and another at Camp Dogwood near Iskandaria.  
On 1 May, the detention and interrogations operations settled at Baghdad International 
Airport (BIAP) and opened Camp Cropper.
1227
 Smaller detention centres fed into either 
Bucca in the south or Cropper in the north during the first part of the war.
1228
 
Out west, thousands of US SOF and Special Mission Unit (SMU)
1229
 soldiers 
along with British and Australian Special Air Service (SAS) entered Iraq via Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan.
1230
 Some under SOF General Dell Dailey in Saudi Arabia
1231
 and 
some under Qatar-based General Gary Harrell
1232
 staged in various bases in Jordan as 
part of JTF-West under General Jonathan Gration.
1233
 Australian and British SAS were 
under the 23 March 2003 Trilateral [detention] Arrangement signed at Camp Al-
Sayliyah, Doha that allowed Australian and British forces to turn over their prisoners to 
US custody if necessary.
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Units from the Florida National Guard staged at the Prince Hassan Air Base, the 
former H-5 pumping station,
1235
 quietly breached the border between Jordan and Iraq on 
19 March 2003 allowing SOF soldiers to move covertly into Iraq.
1236
 Once the invasion 
started, they moved into the H-2 airfield inside Iraq east of Al-Rutbah to support a hasty 
field detention site as units which operated in Western Iraq, brought in their detainees.  
When they finished with them, they either released them or flew them down south to a 
larger facility.  In May and June, Captain Shawn Martin of the 3 ACR based in Al-
Rutbah, staged several mock shootings of detainees during interrogations.  He and one 
other soldier were court-martialled in 2005 for their actions.
1237
 In August 2003, then 
Lieutenant Colonel Allen West, and now a former Florida congressman, conducted a 
mock execution of a detainee in his battalion’s custody.  West was not court martialled, 
but fined US$5,000 and immediately retired.
1238
 
 During OIF Phase I, the 800
th
 MP Brigade ran theatre level detention operations 
with eight MP battalions.  One battalion managed the Baghdad Central Confinement 
Facility (BCCF) at the old Abu Ghraib prison, one battalion managed the Mujahedeen-
e-Khalq (MEK) Camp Ashraf facility, two battalions ran Camp Bucca, one battalion ran 
Camp Whitford, one battalion ran the HVD centre at Camp Cropper, one battalion ran 
the Al-Diwaniya prison, and one battalion helped managed prisons and jails alongside 
Iraqi guards.
1239
 Because the invasion ended so quickly and nobody realised an 




During OIF Phase I, detention operations mostly dealt with the Iraqi military but 
hundreds of foreign fighters who streamed in across the Syrian border were also 
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captured.  More than 7,000 prisoners, including 3,781 EPWs (and the remainder 
civilians) were released from Camp Bucca by 9 May.
1241
 EPWs were paroled after 
signing a pledge not to fight against the coalition.  They had to agree to only perform 
administrative or medical duties at their military units.  They were also required to carry 
their parole documents with them.  With the regime gone, these soldiers, including 
many Shiite conscripts, just went home.
1242
  
The coalition forces were so overwhelming, most of the Iraqi Army chose to go 
home rather than become EPWs.
1243
 In April, eight MI battalions of interrogators and 
analysts sat in Kuwait and waited for a mission inside Iraq.  Only one battalion had 
been assigned a mission; the other battalions’ officers scrambled to find missions for 
their units.
1244
 Ten of the 17 MI battalions in theatre eventually went home.
1245
  
The most critical battalion to leave was the Middle East-focussed 513MI.
1246
 
When it headed stateside in June, the relief for their MP Company that also left with the 
513 MI, did not arrive until a few days after they left.  Detainees were locked in their 
cells alone for three days with bottled water and a nearby unit was given the keys to 
deliver to the new MP Company when they arrived.
1247
 Bucca, Cropper, and the other 
facilities needed these important intelligence assets as they sorted through thousands of 
detainees that entered the US detention system; they should not have been sent home. 
HDC Phase II:  Mistakes are made in Detainee Handling and Incarceration 
With the declaration of the cessation of hostilities on 1 May, CENTCOM created CJTF-
7.  The US Army V Corp headquarters provided leadership for the new TF under 
General Ricardo Sanchez to control all coalition military operations in Iraq starting on 
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 This coincided with the 9 May appointment of the head of the 
Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA), the new Iraqi government in embryo, of 
Ambassador Paul Bremer.
1249
 Established 16 April by General Tommy Franks, the CPA 
provided a ‘whole of government’ approach for the post-Saddam era and replaced the 
short-lived Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). With the 




Former Ba’ath party employees, with the exception of the Ministry of Oil 
protected by the US, had methodically destroyed all files, records, documents, 
databases, and organisational charts, and even burned down some of the ministries to 
make the process of creating a new government more difficult.  There were no paper 
trails to follow.
1251
 The US military had no government to turn EPWs over to and was 
not prepared to detain criminals and other detainees.
1252
  
Units such as the 204 MP Company, 519 MP Battalion out of Fort Polk, 
Louisiana, entered Baghdad on 20 April and were given extensive responsibilities to 
restore order and care for detainees who were mostly criminals.  They trained many US 
units in how to conduct detainee operations.  The 519 MPs, stationed at Camp Victory, 
was also responsible for a jail next to their base that contained approximately 300 men 
crammed into a space for 75.  US units would drop off their detainees at the jail rather 
than take them out to the detention facility at the Baghdad airport.  Most were criminals 
caught looting, but no evidence or weapons were dropped off with them.
1253
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By the time General Hill transferred command of the 800
 
MP Brigade to 
General Janice Karpinski on 30 June 2003, his unit was undermanned and under 
resourced to accomplish the growing detention mission.  Karpinski, also a reservist and 
recently frocked one star general officer was the first female general officer to lead 
troops in a combat zone.  She commanded during phase two of the HDC, the most 
critical phase of detention operations in the Iraq campaign.  She was put in charge of 15 
detention facilities and only had 83 prison experts in her command.
1254
 Karpinski 
allocated her scarce resources poorly; she put one battalion in charge of 7,000 detainees 
at Abu Ghraib and one battalion in charge of 100 HVDs at Camp Cropper.  One 
battalion, by doctrine, should manage 4,000 detainees.
1255
 Additionally, only a portion 
of her brigade was trained to deal with detainees; the rest did other MP missions.
1256
 
Detention operations became a critical mission for all tactical units as they 
gathered intelligence about the growing insurgency.  Units at every company, battalion, 
and brigade that did not have organic (their own) MPs and MI personnel created their 




Shortly after taking over the CPA, Ambassador Bremer issued several directives 
that had a profound effect on overall detention operations.  His first directives on 16 
May stated the CPA was the new Iraqi government
1258
 and officially dissolved the 
Ba’ath party.1259 In effect, this made the US an occupier and upset many Iraqis who had 
hoped for a quicker turnover; they did not understand that under international law, 
securing the country was a necessary first step before handover to a new Iraqi 
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 His next directive, on 23 May, officially dissolved the 
military and intelligence services of the former Iraqi government.
1261
 The orders 
effectively created 60 per cent unemployment by preventing one million people who 
previously worked in the government, universities, justice, hospitals, and 
communications from returning to work.
1262
 
Iraq scholar William Polk chided Bremer for failing to follow the plan created 
by his ORHA predecessor Jay Garner to use the Iraqi military as a labour corps.
1263
 
Bremer argued that the military had dissolved itself, and the old Iraqi Army with a 
minority Sunni officer corps and majority Shiite enlisted conscripts were not going to 
reassemble and report for duty.
1264
 
In addition to the criminals Saddam released in autumn 2002, many disgruntled 
citizens had a lot of time to fight the coalition in Iraq.  Ironically, after the dissolution, 
the CPA paid the salaries of former military personnel, who used those monies to fund 
insurgent activities against the coalition.
1265
 
As the detention mission grew, the CJTF-7 commander and staff realised they 
needed to assert greater control over a system that was developing in an uncoordinated 
fashion.  On 28 June, Sanchez issued an order explaining the legal status of civilian and 
criminal detainees and mandated that all detention facilities adhere to the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions that defined protections for EPWs and civilians.  Sanchez 
assigned overall responsibility for the detainee mission to the 800 MP Brigade and gave 
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In July, the first four soldiers accused of abusing prisoners in Iraq were charged.  
On 12 May at Camp Bucca, the MPs punched, kicked and broke detainees’ bones as 
they got off a bus.
1267
 CJTF-7 staff formed the Detention Working Group chaired by 
Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) Colonel Marc Warren to get a handle on the situation; no 
provost martial general (PMG) was yet in country.  The group met weekly to deal with 




 During the 19 August detention summit, participants from the 800 MP Brigade, 
the CJTF-7 J-2, and SJA presented information on detainee record databases, facilities, 
and a new review process that standardised the system of evaluating detainee legal 
status and provided for appeal and release.  By the end of the summer, CJTF-7 had 
assigned 10 soldiers from its legal staff to Abu Ghraib in an attempt to ensure all 
detainees had a review of their legal status within 72 hours of arrival at the facility.
1269
 
On 24 August 2003, CJTF-7 issued the first major detention guidance beyond 
the individual and unit training of MPs and MI units.  The guidance, based on the 
summer’s detainee summits, gave the first SOPs on how to deal with detainees 
potentially guilty of war crimes, preservation of evidence for crimes, release guidance, 
support to the Baghdad criminal court, processing civilian internees, who could be 
detained, and under what international authorities the military conducted detention 
operations.  The order was written in a way that units could apprehend whomever they 
wanted.  It stated: 
Capturing units will not detain persons unless there is a reasonable belief that the 
person is or has engaged in criminal activity; Possess information important to, or 
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interferes with, coalition mission accomplishment; is on a list of persons wanted 
for questioning, arrest or detention by coalition forces; or is an enemy combat.
1270
 
To assist CJTF-7 with their detention crisis, Undersecretary of Defence for 
Intelligence Stephen Cambone sent General Geoffrey Miller from JTF-GTMO to 
conduct an assessment of detention operations.
1271
 From 31 August to 9 September, 
Miller and 17 current and former GTMO-assigned personnel toured detention facilities 
in Iraq and made recommendations to synchronise and improve operations.  They 
recommended the acquisition of more detention and intelligence resources, the creation 
of analyst-interrogator-linguist ‘Tiger Teams’, and the implementation of a plan to get 
MPs and interrogators working more closely.
1272
 
Miller visited every US facility and saw no signs of abuse.  He understood his 
environment at GTMO was different than in Iraq, but made recommendations in hopes 
of helping the Iraq mission.
1273
 Differing conditions and resources relative to the MP 
and MI resources in GTMO and Iraq was made clear in the Taguba report; personnel in 
Iraq generally considered Miller’s advice unrealistic.1274 
In November, the PMG of the Army, Major General Donald Ryder, led a team 
of MP and detention experts to Iraq at the request of CJTF-7 to identify problems, 
recommend solutions, and identify the resources needed to correct deficiencies.  The 
team conducted 32 site visits and offered observations and recommendations on 
detention systems management, detainee movement, segregation and accountability, 
command and control, integration of military detention with CPA detention, transition 
to an Iraqi run system, detainee health care, court integration and docket management 
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for criminal detainees, and detainee legal services, databases and records.
1275
 A growing 
rift between General Sanchez, Ambassador Bremer, and a host of other Ambassadors 
working in Iraq did not help the situation.
1276
 Many of these issues were cited as 
problems in subsequent detention investigations. 
On 1 October 2003, CJTF-7 consolidated the majority of detention operations at 
the Abu Ghraib prison.
1277
 The prison, renamed the Baghdad Central Correctional 
Facility (BCCF), had been built by the British in the 1960s and was used by Saddam’s 
Ba’ath party as a prison, torture, and execution centre,1278 complete with wood chippers 
in which to place detainees in feet-first.
1279
 In June, as the prisoner population began to 
swell, CPA Justice Ministry Senior Advisor Judge Donald Campbell scoured the 
country for other suitable Iraqi prisons, but none were useable.
1280
 
Bremer had transferred the Iraqi prison system to the Ministry of Justice away 
from the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Interior, which had been 
notoriously brutal.
1281
 He laid out new rules for the prison system; among the most 
important were humane treatment for all, official registration, segregation based on 
crimes, and no ethnic and religious discrimination.
1282
 Campbell, who said there was no 
other facility available in the country, advised Bremer to reopen Abu Ghraib as a main 
prison in their judicial detention system.
1283
 The other large Baghdad prison, Khan Bani 
Sadh, had been completely destroyed by looters and was not useable.
1284
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In the summer, as the 800MP expanded the facility, General Karpinksi was 
warned not to use Abu Ghraib.  She was expressly educated on its bloody history and 
advised to build a new prison in the desert away from the Sunni neighbourhood where 
the prison was located.  Karpinski argued that it had hardened doors and was the best 
available place.
1285
 She agreed with CJTF-7’s head intelligence officer, General Barbara 
Fast, that Abu Ghraib’s central location was convenient for all the divisions to drop off 
their prisoners.
1286
 Another factor that kept Abu Ghraib open was the Kuwait 




In October 2003, only 90 MPs were in charge of 7,000 detainees.
1288
 Abu 
Ghraib was a complete resource failure with too few MPs, too few MI, and not enough 
money to build the correct facility in the correct location.
1289
 Bremer was reluctant to 
reopen Abu Ghraib but said if it could be brought up to international penal standards 
and the execution rooms were to be set-aside as a museum to remind people of 
Saddam’s brutality, it could be used.1290 
In August, Captain Carolyn Wood of the 513 MI Brigade rotated to Iraq to run 
the ICE at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Centre (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib, a role 
similar to the one she served in Afghanistan.  She recommended the creation of a hard 
site to house only the detainees deemed to have intelligence value.  Wood researched 
approved interrogations methods and came up with a SOP, which was approved by her 
commanding officers, Colonel Thomas Pappas, the 205 MI Brigade commanding 
officer and Lieutenant Colonel Steve Jordan, the head of the JIDC.
1291
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By December 2003, four MP battalions had rotated home, leaving 11,699 
detainees in the custody of the remaining four MP battalions.
1292
 Resources to care, 
feed, house, interrogate, and segregate detainees did not exist in country.  Tactical 
commanders in the field were hungry for intelligence on the growing insurgency and 
hoping to reduce violence, actually exacerbated the situation by rounding up everyone 
in cordon-and-search sweeps across Iraq.  The biggest offender was General Ray 
Odierno, commander of the 4 ID, who captured some ten thousand military aged males 
in his one-year tour.
1293
 When General Barbara Fast complained about Odierno’s tactics 
he told her he did not care; he did not want detainees released.
1294
 The detention system 
simply could not hold all of the detainees that were coming into and it was only a matter 
of time before it broke. 
Retired Army Colonel Stu Herrington, who conducted detention operations in 
Vietnam, was brought in to assess the detention and intelligence collection mission, as 
he had for General Dunlavey at GTMO in 2002.  His report stated that Odierno’s tactics 
had a negative effect on operations.
1295
 It was estimated that more than 70 per cent of 
detainees were arrested by mistake or had no intelligence value.
1296
 Something the 
judicial-Geneva Conventions camp accused the Bush administration of with the 
detainees taken initially in Afghanistan.  In 2010, Odierno, then-head of US forces in 
Iraq, admitted the US was unprepared to handle large numbers of detainees in 2003,
1297
 
but he did not concede his tactics of detaining all military aged males were part of the 
problem. 
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As the insurgency raged and MP and MI resources waned, more contractors 
came into the country.  Blackwater USA provided security for the CPA,
1298
 companies 
like CACI provided interrogation support,
1299
 and Titan and World Wide Language 
Resources provided linguistic support.
1300
 The mission required not only Arabic, but 
Kurdish and Farsi linguists as well; contractors were stationed throughout the country 
and even on the Iranian border in places like Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rough 
Rider near Mandali.  These linguists supported the field detention sites, handling 
detainees before they were sent to the larger TIFs.
1301
 
 Reservist Torin Nelson, an experienced military interrogator, was hired by 
CACI and arrived at Abu Ghraib in mid-November.  He was shocked by the security 
situation:  the prison was in the heart of a Sunni-Ba’athist neighbourhood, apartments 
came right up to one of the prison walls, a large field with palm trees was along another 
wall, which allowed mortars to target the prison, and major roadways ran along the 
north and south walls.  To go from their quarters to their workspaces, some 




Because of his interrogation experience, Captain Wood put Nelson on the day 
shift Team E, a group of 12 military interrogators and 12 contractor interrogators at the 
ICE, which dealt with the extremists.
1303
 As he began to work with his counterparts, he 
realised many of the interrogators were not qualified.  He complained of CACI’s poor 
hiring and screening standards, something CACI denied.
1304
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To assist the troops on the ground, the US military produced a deck of cards of 
the 55 most wanted members of the Ba’ath party government.1305 The ace of spades, 
Saddam Hussein, was still on the run.  Card by card, the high-ranking officials were 
captured and detained.
1306
 For exploitation and interrogation, they were sent to Cropper, 
the HVD detention camp at the Baghdad airport, run by the US Iraq Survey Group 
commanded by General Keith Dayton.
1307
 
In Tikrit, the 4 ID settled into Saddam’s palace; he was from the nearby village 
of Al-Ouja.  During summer 2003, a fluent Arabic speaking US Air Force Foreign Area 
Officer with a detailed understanding of how Arab tribes and families worked was 
assigned to a military unit based in Tikrit.  He   created a list of potential members of 
Saddam’s family who would support Saddam in hiding.  He narrowed the search to 
Saddam’s maternal cousins, the Muslit brothers, who he grew up with.  At the end of 
his tour, he handed the names to a fresh, inexperienced interrogator named Eric Maddox 
and told him to focus on the list and the Muslits.
1308
 
Maddox, who had just arrived in country, used the names to guide the 300 
interrogations he conducted over the next five months.  Supported by other interrogators 
and analysts, they built a complex organisational family tree of Saddam.
1309
 Combined 
with other information from a variety of supporting units, Saddam Hussein was finally 
captured by US Special Forces on the evening of 13 December in a 600-man mission 
code named Operation Red Dawn.
1310
 Focus on the Muslit family had been the key.
1311
  
Saddam was initially treated as an EPW and interviewed by a joint CIA-FBI 
interrogation-analytical operation codenamed ‘Desert Spider’.  Beginning 7 February 
2004, Lebanese-American FBI agent George Piro gained Saddam’s trust and spent 
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countless hours discussing many topics with him.
1312
 Their twentieth and final interview 
was 1 May.
1313
 On 5 November 2006
1314
 Saddam Hussein was convicted in an Iraqi 
court and hanged 29 December.
1315
 
The watershed moment for prisoner operations in Iraq, and arguably the GWOT, 
was the MP detainee abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib in autumn 2003.
1316
 In response to a 
detainee’s attempt to shoot MPs with a smuggled gun, MPs stripped several detainees 
and humiliated them sexually.  Initially, under questioning, the guards said they were 
just messing around; later, the MPs stated they had been ordered by MI to abuse the 
detainees.  The detainees involved were never questioned.
1317
 
On 13 January 2004, Army Specialist Joe Darby turned photos of the abuse (he 
had received from one of the abusers) in to Army investigators.
1318
 On 19 January, 
CJTF-7 General Sanchez ordered an investigation of the 800 MP Brigade.  Major 
General Antonio Taguba, a CFLCC deputy commanding general, was selected to 
conduct the investigation.
1319
 On 20 January the media was informed of the 
investigation and that it was serious; no cover up was attempted.
1320
 Sanchez said ‘as 
the senior commander in Iraq, I accept responsibility for what happened at Abu Ghraib, 
and I accept as a solemn obligation the responsibility to ensure that it does not happen 
again’.1321 
When the Army CID investigation started, all JIDC members were interviewed.  
Torin Nelson was questioned for three hours and his sworn statement was made a part 
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of the Taguba investigation.  Nelson specifically named two individuals who used 
questionable techniques.  Within 24 hours of his confidential sworn statement, it was 
leaked and he was warned to watch his back.  One of the individuals, who had abused 
an Iraqi two star general, personally threatened him; Nelson contacted the in-country 
manager for CACI, who moved him to a secure location and eventually out of Iraq.
1322
 
When the Taguba report was completed, Nelson, along with Darby, was listed as part of 
the group of eleven who blew the whistle on abuses at Abu Ghraib.
1323
  
On 29 February, General Taguba completed his investigation and submitted his 
final report 9 March.
1324
 The findings were startling; US military officers in Iraq knew 
about major problems and did not stop them.  Taguba was praised for his forthright 
investigation by some general officers and shunned by others.  The CENTCOM 
Commander, General John Abizaid, told Taguba he would be personally investigated 
for his conclusions.  General Miller, who he had known and worked with for years, 
would not look him in the eye, and Secretary Rumsfeld mocked him to his face on two 
occasions.  Taguba’s next major leadership assignment was cancelled and he was 




On 1 April, General Karpinski’s legal counsel submitted a rebuttal to the Taguba 
report and asked it be set aside for inaccuracies.  The rebuttal noted the report relied on 
several individuals who were critical of her leadership and efforts while ignoring others 
who praised her for accomplishing things she was accused of not doing.  Hers was an 
EPW brigade tasked to conduct a non-doctrinal mission and house Iraqi criminals and 
HVDs.  She created an Iraqi Confinement Plan 15 June 2003 to accomplish the new 
mission, which she had been accused of failing to do.  She had also been blamed for not 
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training her soldiers in the Geneva Conventions, but they had all had been trained in 
their regular MP instruction, again at their deployment sites, and again during their 
deployment.  Karpinski’s counsel also pointed to the fact it was her brigade soldiers 
who reported the abuse, itself evidence the training worked, albeit not for the small 
group of abusers.  In response to Taguba’s finding that she had incompetent leaders 
under her, she countered there was no replacement mechanism in the brigade at that 
time.  In addition, she argued, she was severely undermanned and needed everyone to 
complete the expanding mission she had begun to do.
1326
 
Taguba’s findings led to charges filed on 20 March against six soldiers who 
committed the abuses against the detainees.
1327
 A seventh MP was charged 7 May at 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
1328
 Karpinski, had been suspended as CO of the 800 MP 
Brigade, in January 2004,
1329
 blamed the abuses on direction from intelligence 
officers.
1330
 The Schlesinger investigation stated:  
The panel concluded that contrary to speculation, the abuses detailed in the photos 
that flooded the world in April and May [2004] ‘did not come from authorized 
interrogation, they did not come from seeking intelligence. They were “freelance” 
activities on the part of the night shift at Abu Ghraib . . . The panelists stressed 
there was no U.S. government policy of abuse.
1331
 
Karpinski was found guilty of dereliction of duty 5 May 2005 and reduced to the rank of 
Colonel; 27 other officers were punished for their roles in the scandal.
1332
 On 16 October 
2006, eleven enlisted soldiers were sentenced for their parts in the abuse of the detainees 
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 The 800 MP would never lose the stain from its association with Abu 
Ghraib and on 16 June 2012 it was redesignated the 333 MP Brigade;
1334
 they would 
quietly return to detention operations duty in Afghanistan in the autumn of 2012.
1335
  
The contractors involved and cited in Taguba’s report faced years of legal proceedings; 
in June 2011 the US Supreme Court ruled they could not be sued by the Iraqi 
detainees.
1336
 Although they could have had more training, nothing in their training was 
to blame for the sadistic abuses they participated in. 
In a 1971 study funded by the US Office of Naval Research,
1337
 Stanford 
University Professor Philip Zimbardo, conducted a ground-breaking prison experiment 
using 24 students as prisoners and guards.  The study revealed how quickly the 
interaction between guards and prisoners deteriorated.  The two-week study was cut 
short after six days when Zimbardo realised the emotional trauma and dehumanisation 
suffered by the ‘prisoners’ at the hands of the ‘guards’.  He stated:  ‘The key is this, 
once a prison has a veil of secrecy around it, which most do, it’s just open for corruption 
. . . If you know nobody can[’t] get in, nobody can know what you’re doing’.1338 
Zimbardo showed how quickly humans become corrupted when they are in a 
position of authority over others.  Nineteenth century American religious leader Joseph 
Smith similarly experienced harsh treatment by guards while imprisoned in Liberty, 
Missouri.  He said: ‘We have learned by sad experience that it is the nature and 
disposition of almost all men, as soon as they get a little authority, as they suppose, they 
                                                          
1333
 Author Unknown, ‘Soldiers convicted in Abu Ghraib scandal,’ AP, 16 October 2006 
1334
 333 Military Police Brigade, http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil/Heraldry/ArmyDUISSICOA /Army 
HeraldryUnit. aspx?u=3969, Accessed 14 July 2012 
1335
 Spc. Kathryn Summerhill, ‘333rd Military Police Brigade bids farewell to family and friends’, 
DVIDS, 23 August 2012 
1336
 Author Unknown, ‘Abu Ghraib Lawsuit Rejected by Supreme Court,’ AP, 27 June 2011 
1337
 Stanford Prison Experiment FAQs, Available at:  http://www.prisonexp.org/faq.htm, Accessed 23 
December 2011 
1338
 Matthew Stannard, ‘Stanford experiment foretold Iraq scandal’, San Francisco Chronicle, 8 May 
2005 
251 
will immediately begin to exercise unrighteous dominion’.1339 Zimbardo labelled the 
guards’ deviant behaviour the result of a ‘Lucifer Effect’.1340 Only effective training, 
sufficient resources, transparency, clear SOPs and TTPs, and strong leadership oversight 
can prevent what happened at Abu Ghraib; that was exactly what was missing. 
In a February 2004 report, the ICRC had warned of detention problems and 
outlined major violations of the laws of war.  Investigators conducted 29 visits to 14 
internment facilities including:  Camp Cropper, Al-Salihlyye, Tasferat and Al-Russafa 
prisons, Abu Ghraib, Umm Qasr, Camp Bucca, Tallil AB, Camp Condor, Camp 
Amarah, and the Field Hospital in Shaibah.  The report detailed cases of detainee deaths, 
injuries, failure to inform families of arrest, physical or psychological coercion during 
interrogation, prolonged solitary confinement, seizure and confiscation of private 
property, exposure of detainees to dangerous tasks, and holding detainees in dangerous 
places where they were not protected from shelling.
1341
 CENTCOM leadership in Qatar 
claimed they didn’t see the report until May 2004.1342  
The ICRC highlighted incidents of detainee abuse including a 30 April case 
when US forces stormed the home of a Baghdad businessman, Khraisan Al-Abally, 
whose father was mistaken for Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, a senior Ba’ath party leader who 
was wanted by the coalition.  Khraisan, along with his 80-year-old father, was taken into 
US custody at the Baghdad airport.  Khraisan was forced to kneel naked with his hands 
and feet bound with a bag covering his head, forced to stare into a strobe light while 
loud music was blasted at him for eight days.  When he was freed, he filed a complaint 
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with US military authorities in Baghdad who said they would investigate.  These same 
techniques were documented later at Camp Nama.
1343
 
These allegations of abuse were exactly what the judicial-Geneva conventions 
camp feared would occur if the intelligence-collection camp was allowed to conduct 
operations unchecked.  Their greatest fears came to fruition. 
USMC Reservist Dobie McArthur, an Arabic-speaking intelligence officer with 
a master’s degree in Middle East Studies from Oxford, arrived in Baghdad 1 February 
2004 as a DOD representative to work at the CPA on behalf of Deputy SECDEF Paul 
Wolfowitz.  He immediately noted the tug-of-war between the CPA’s soft approach and 
the heavy handed CJTF-7 policies dealing with a growing insurgency.  The CPA 
focussed on dealing with tribal meetings and preparing to hand over ministries while the 
military dealt with security and detention operations.
1344
 Their missions were not 
synchronized at all. 
 One of the first detainee engagements McArthur worked on was the tribal 
guarantor programme.  Ambassador Bremer met frequently with tribal leaders, who 
consistently asked for their people to be released, promising to personally guarantee 
their behaviour when released.  Bremer asked McArthur to lead the effort to develop the 
kafeel programme that eventually became a centrepiece of the US detention release 
policy not only in Iraq but Afghanistan as well.
1345
 
The military worked to identify and release those they had imprisoned through 
the Geneva Article 78 process,
1346
 but it could not move fast enough.  Often, the 
military had difficulty determining whom they even had in custody and why they had 
been detained.  For tracking purposes at Abu Ghraib, detainees were entered into one 
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central excel spread sheet, which was ridiculously inefficient for such a large volume of 
detainees.  Bremer appointed McArthur the senior advisor for detainee and prisoner 
affairs to work with the CJTF-7 SJA Mark Warren to address the detainee crisis and 
coordinate civilian and military detention efforts.
1347
 
McArthur focussed on bringing the Iraqis into the process; on one occasion he 
met with Salem Chalabi, nephew of the controversial Iraqi dissident leader Ahmed 
Chalabi.  Chalabi wanted to see the list of detainees scheduled for release by the 
coalition ahead of time and advise who should be released or not released.  McArthur 
saw through his motive and refused to help him create political detainees.  McArthur 
told him he could not get the list ahead of time but that he could submit a statement to 




McArthur also pushed the CPA to release a detainee list in Arabic on their 
website.
1349
 The site published two lists, one of detainees in US custody, the other, of 
detainees held by the Iraqis.  The lists contained a first name, father’s name, 
grandfather’s name, and a tribal affiliation in order to help clarify exactly who each 
detainee was.
1350
 While the lists were not always up to date, they helped inform the 
Iraqis on the status of their loved ones and helped alleviate the taint of the Saddam era, 
when detainees disappeared without a trace.  The ICRC protested the CPA was 
encroaching on their traditional role, but the CPA continued anyway because they felt it 
was important for transparency.
1351
 
 On 22 March, at Bremer’s request, McArthur submitted a detailed analysis of 
detention operations.  First, he asserted that tactics needed to be harmonised with 
strategy.  Too many Iraqis were detained without cause; between 65 and 80 per cent 
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were eventually released by the HDC phase four DRBs at Abu Ghraib but it was a 
haphazard process.  Detaining Iraqis who should not be held fostered resentment 
towards the coalition and began to fuel the insurgency and affect the overall goals of the 
campaign.  More interrogation and case review resources were required at the beginning 
of the detention process in order to release detainees more quickly instead of sending 
them to Abu Ghraib to be sorted out.  Field commanders needed to understand that 
sending innocent detainees up the chain hurt COIN efforts, especially when no capture 
information was sent along with the detainee to make a case for holding them.  The 




The second major aspect of his memorandum was to improve information 
technology management.  The system to track and record detainee information from 
capture to release was spread across three systems with various security classifications 
and was in a state of disarray.  He proposed the creation of an unclassified, web-based 
system by a team of civilian and military experts.  Last, he added a ‘Recommended 
Language for Response to Detainee Inquiries,’ to the report in order to foster the 
strategic communications message of how CPA rule differed from the Saddam-era.
1353
 
On 28 April 2004, CBS 60 Minutes released abuse photos from the Abu Ghraib scandal 
and created uproar in the US and around the globe.
1354
 The pictures showed the US 
soldiers subjecting Iraqi detainees to severe humiliation.
1355
 It added fuel to a fledgling 
insurgency and ended any hopes the US may have had of leaving Iraq in the near term.  
A few months before the scandal broke, CPA polls showed Iraqi support for the 
occupation at 63 per cent. A month after the photos, the number was down to 
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Iraqi governing council members were outraged at the prisoner abuse but 
questioned why the international and Arab media was fixated on the scandal when they 
had ignored Saddam’s atrocities.1357  
On 24 May The New Yorker published a detailed article on the Abu Ghraib 
scandal and claimed high level sources revealed the abuse at the prison was part of a 
secret special access program (SAP) at the Pentagon named Copper Green.  This 
program, authorised by the Secretary of Defence for operations in Afghanistan to deal 
with the detention of high value detainees, was now approved for the Iraq war.  The 
SAP, according to The New Yorker’s sources, allowed for the systemic abuse of 
detainees to obtain information.
1358
  The Pentagon quickly released a statement saying 
‘These assertions on activities at Abu Ghraib, and the abuse of Iraqi detainees are 
outlandish, conspiratorial, and filled with error and anonymous conjecture’.1359   
In May, US forces cornered radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadar in Najaf and 
were poised to kill or capture him, but because of the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Iraqi 
leadership felt they could not afford to make him a martyr.  They allowed him to leave 
Najaf and the arrest warrant was terminated.
1360
 
HDC Phase III:  Detainee Operations Improve as Corrections Are made 
After the scandal erupted, Bremer suggested sending Iraqi police observers to selected 
prisons and compensating some detainees found to be unjustly incarcerated.  The pace 
of detainee review sped up from 60 days to 15 days and a cap of 30 days was placed on 
the length of time a detainee could be held.  Bremer also suggested curtailing the ability 
of the MI to put a security hold on a detainee; he felt that was the largest stumbling 
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block when it came to detainee releases and wanted detainees screened better before 
being placed in prison.
1361
 
In addition to the Taguba report, the DOD conducted 12 separate investigations 
in an attempt to identify problems as well as best practices.  Ultimately, 492 
recommendations were listed and implemented throughout the US global detention 
system.
1362
 Inside Iraq, the Office of the Judge Advocate General was assigned to 
monitor detention investigations and work with the detention TF to ensure the 
recommendations were implemented.  The recommendations were placed in a matrix 
and followed up on quarterly by an O-6 (colonel) oversight council that reported to the 




During the year following the Abu Ghraib scandal, the detention and military 
intelligence collection missions were in a state of uncertainty.  At times, US personnel 
were scared to do their jobs for fear of making mistakes and getting into trouble.
1364
 The 
Office of the Judge Advocate General tracked the scandal in the press and prepared 
press releases in response to the growing detainee abuse scandal.  They also prepped 
senior Army leadership on breaking detainee issues and how to communicate them to 
the press and Congress.
1365
 This undercurrent persisted well into 2006 as the Iraqi 
insurgency and civil war intensified.
1366
 
General Spider Marks, the head of the US Army intelligence training centre at 
Fort Huachuca, Arizona said of the scandal:  ‘none of the things done to prisoners were 
taught at the center . . . we didn’t have interrogation issues [at Abu Ghraib].  We had the 
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execution of interrogation [detention operations] by ill-disciplined units’ issues’.1367 
Instructors at the MP training centre at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, emphasised the 
same thing; every US MP received a strong grounding in ethics and the proper 
treatment of prisoners, detainees, and refugees.
1368
 MP school leadership stated: 
Military police are responsible for the safety and security of detainees and those 
around them . . . and they’re trained to follow specific protocols. MPs speed 
detainees to places of safety once captured, they ask questions to classify the 
detainees, and they then place them in the appropriate holding areas . . . They 
restrain detainees when appropriate and necessary . . . and they treat detainees 
according to the Geneva Conventions and in accordance with the rules of war.  
Military police do not conduct interrogations, nor do they “soften up” detainees 
for military intelligence personnel.
1369
 
What took place at Abu Ghraib was perpetrated by rogue elements of the US 
military violating established doctrine.  After the story broke, General Marks received 
letters from angry citizens asking why torture was being taught at the school.  One letter 
was from a well-known, highly credible, retired general officer, who accused Marks of 
teaching torture and abuse.  In response, Marks opened the centre to the media and 
invited them to examine instruction; he explained that time tested doctrine delineated 
what MPs and MI soldiers could and could not do.
1370
  MPs were responsible for safety, 
handling, and movement.  The MI led interrogations, but an MP was in the room or 
close by to handle threatening detainee behaviour.  Both the MI and MP soldiers 
worked together to ensure a safe interrogation environment.
1371
 
While Abu Ghraib became the public face of detainee abuse, most detainees 
were treated properly.  Still, other reports of detainee abuse surfaced.  In Mosul, some 
interrogators stripped their detainees in an attempt to shame them into talking.  Others 
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blared rock music at night to cause sleep deprivation and even flicked hot cigarette butts 
at detainees; these interrogators were investigated.
1372
 One interrogator in Tel Afar 
committed suicide after she participated in harsh interrogations.
1373
 Interrogators in the 
field, under pressure to obtain intelligence on the growing insurgency, sometimes sent 
detainees to Abu Ghraib even when they doubted the detainees’ intelligence value 
because they wanted someone else to make the decision.
1374
 
After Abu Ghraib, the most troubling reports of abuse emanated from the SOF 
TF 6-26 detention facility at the Baghdad Airport known as Camp Nama.  Out of reach 
of the ICRC, Nama was a temporary site with prison cells in several buildings.
1375
 
Personnel from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), an organisation that 




Cold water was poured on detainees to induce hypothermia, hastened by being 
rolled in mud and forced in front of an air conditioner.  Other unapproved methods such 
as hooding, sleep deprivation, and stress positions were routine.  The interrogation 
rooms were colour-coded.  Red and blue rooms were for cooperative detainees.  An 
additional soft room with rugs and leather chairs was also available.  Uncooperative 
detainees were sent to the black room and subjected to various environmental controls 
such as hot and cold temperatures, strobe lights, loud music, and dogs.  The JAG 
officers for the TF assured interrogators that ‘blame would never get down to their 
[interrogator] level’.1377 
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With intense scrutiny on detention operations in Baghdad, in the summer of 
2004, the facility closed when the TF moved to Balad.
1378
 As late as 6 September 2006, 
harsh techniques were reportedly employed by the TF.
1379
 General Stanley McChrystal, 
the former JSOC commander whose units were at Camp Nama, stated at his ISAF 
confirmation hearing that he was uncomfortable with many of the techniques he 
inherited from his predecessor and worked to improve the interrogation process.
1380
  




General Miller turned over JTF-GTMO on 24 March 2004 and prepared for his 
next mission in Iraq as the new deputy commander for detention operations at CJTF-7.  
Miller assumed command of operations
1382
 as HDC phase three correction operations 
were ramping up.  Coming from GTMO where he implemented many changes to 
detainee operations he seemed like the perfect fit to take over detention in Iraq.  One of 
his first tasks was to implement the Taguba report’s suggestion to consolidate all 
aspects of prisoner operations, MI and MP, under one command.
1383
 This was 
accomplished administratively 15 April 2004 when TF-134 was stood up.
1384
 He 
became the single point of contact for all ICRC reports in theatre.  Previously, some 
reports had not made it up the chain of command to the attention of senior leadership; 
this change would solve the ICRC/CJTF-7 communications problems.
1385
 
Consolidation was a recommendation he had made during his autumn 2003 
assessment of the fragmented 800 MI Brigade and 205 MI operations.  When he arrived 
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in Baghdad, he reorganised the FOB at Abu Ghraib into two groups along the lines of 
GTMO operations.  The intelligence mission was under one brigade and the detention 
mission was under the other.  General Miller served as the overall TF commander and 
acted as the integrator of the two functions.  As part of the reorganisation, the 16 MP 
Brigade, under the command of Colonel David Quantock, replaced the 800 MP Brigade 





Quantock played a key role in fixing Abu Ghraib prison and eventually became 
commander of TF-134. 
At Camp Bucca, no more interrogations were conducted, only hold and release 
operations.
1387
 By August 2004, General Kern’s investigation reported Miller had 
‘brought discipline, responsibility and order to the [detention] situation’.1388 Colonel 
Larry James, an Army psychologist who worked with Miller at GTMO, came to Iraq to 
assist with the restructuring of detention operations.  Miller told James his orders were 
to teach JIDC personnel at Abu Ghraib how to obtain intelligence without using abusive 
techniques.
1389
 By autumn, Miller reported the new, softer, rapport building techniques 
were reaping better intelligence and providing better treatment for detainees.
1390
 
On 15 May, CJTF-7 was reorganised into two new commands to manage the 
growing war effort.  The Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) was created to focus on 
tactical, day-to-day operations, and the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) was created 
to focus on strategic military operations such as dealing with the national, local, and 
tribal leaders and training Iraqi security forces.
1391
  
In May 2004, the main detainee database at Abu Ghraib prison was scrambled 
by mistake when a sort function was accidentally used and all detainees’ names and 
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information were mixed up.  Subsequently, the US was not sure which detainees’ names 
belonged to the biographical data stored in the spread sheet.  McArthur emailed General 
Miller to inform him of the situation, but no immediate solution was found.
1392
 
As part of the 1 July 2004 turnover of power to the Iraqis, Ambassador Robert 
Blackwell, a transition advisor to Bremer, wanted to hand over the Abu Ghraib 
prison.
1393
 In theory, this seemed like a good idea but in reality, it was ill conceived.  
The US had a prison full of mostly innocent people who had no idea why they were 
being held.  The Iraqi government would assume the detainees were guilty because the 
US had them in custody and they would be mired in the Iraqi prison system.  Bremer, 
Miller, and Blackwell were all in favour of turning the prison over, but McArthur 
approached Dan Senior, the CPA spokesman, and told him he would use a back channel 
option to the President unless Senior stopped the turnover of Abu Ghraib.  It worked; 
the prison stayed under US control.
1394
 
On 27 June 2004, the CPA created the joint detainee committee made up of 21 
high-ranking officials from the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), MNF-I, and coalition 
governments to synchronise detention policy.
1395
 The following day, the CPA turned 
over power to the IIG and was dissolved.
1396
 
On 1 July 2004, General George Casey, the first four-star general officer to 
serve in Iraq, was installed as the MNF-I commanding officer.  He took over from 
General Sanchez who had been at the heart of the Abu Ghraib scandal as the 
commander of CJTF-7.
1397
 Sanchez removed himself as the head of the abuse 
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investigation and was then questioned by investigators regarding his knowledge of what 
happened at Abu Ghraib.  He claimed no foreknowledge of any abuse.
1398
 
Casey was not the first choice to command US forces in Iraq but after the Abu 
Ghraib scandal he was selected for his quiet demeanour, strong intellect, and solid 
knowledge of combined and joint operations in an international setting.  Ironically, 
Casey was born in occupied post WWII Japan where his father served as an officer in 
the Army of Occupation.  He was now the head of an occupying military force as the 
senior military advisor to the US Ambassador.  His mandate was to help rebuild the 




 During this phase, General Miller continued to consolidate detention operations 
under the newly created TF-134, and he also worked to implement recommended 
reforms from the many investigations that took place during his tenure as the TF-134 
commander.  His goal was to create an environment focused on gaining the maximum 
amount of intelligence while detaining prisoners in a humane manner according to the 
Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.  At one of his first press conferences, he was 
asked about his assessment of detention operations in Iraq beginning autumn 2003.  Of 
that visit he said:
1400
 
I am absolutely confident that every recommendation we made was not only 
appropriate, but would have made this [US Iraq detention] operation both more 
effective and more efficient.  We’re a standards-based organization, and that’s 
what we talked about.  And we’re a leadership organization, and we continue to 
focus on what allows both the detention and interrogation missions to work most 
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 [Iraq] Detainee Operations Briefing with Major General Geoffrey Miller, 4 May 2004, Office of the 




General Karpinski had blamed his assessment team for trying to ‘GTMOize’ her 
detention operations by having MPs take an active role in the MI collection mission.
1402
 
Miller’s suggestion was purely doctrinal based on the reality that MPs were passive 
intelligence collectors who observed detainees throughout the detention process; Miller 
never insinuated they should be involved in the actual MI interrogation.
1403
 
Under General Miller, tight controls and procedures were implemented for all 
interrogations; he understood that detention and interrogation required oversight.  
Interrogators only used approved interrogation TTPs and submitted detailed plans to 
their supervisors for approval.  Sleep deprivation could be used if authorised by a 
general officer.  Stripping detainees naked was unauthorised.  Hooding detainees had 
been used as a force protection method when moving detainees around in theatre, but 
after Abu Ghraib it was discontinued.  Beginning in early April, MPs used blindfolds or 




During this phase several more detention investigations were completed and the 
results reviewed by Miller’s TF-134 for opportunities to improve.  On 21 July 2004, the 
Army IG investigation concluded a five-month study into Army detention and 
interrogation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Investigators interviewed 650 military 
personnel at 16 overseas facilities as well as US-based MP and MI schools.  They 
concluded that US personnel overwhelmingly understood that detainees were to be 
treated humanely.  The report emphasised that a few bad soldiers with poor supervision 
caused the problems, rather than training, policies, or a systemic failure.
1405
 The 
investigation recommended full reviews in the areas of physical safety, infrastructure 
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On 24 August 2004, the Schlesinger report concluded there was institutional and 
personal responsibility at high levels that allowed conditions to lead to abuse, but there 
was no pre-orchestrated programme to abuse detainees.  The report indicated the US 
had detained more than 50,000 individuals globally, and had 300 cases under 
investigation.  Of the 300, more than half were for infractions at the point of capture, 
the most dangerous part of the detention process.  The report suggested one cause was 
the low MP to detainee ratio, which was one guard to 75 detainees.  It also cautioned, as 
had General Karpinski in her 1 April rebuttal, that many MPs were not really trained for 
the mission they were doing and they were poorly equipped.
1407
  
Schlesinger and his team found that the sadistic behaviour of the guards at Abu 
Ghraib was not duplicated anywhere else.  He praised US forces for being well 
behaved, patient, and kind, and noted that US troops had performed detention 
operations better than in WWII, Korea, or Vietnam.
1408
 The report suggested adding 
additional JAG resources to expedite the detainee review process and create joint 
doctrine that clearly defined the relationship between MI and MPs in detention 
operations.  It also described the importance of interrogators, linguists, and other 
HUMINT specialists, and suggested the creation of a clearly defined career 
management processes to allow for the growth of these much needed skill sets.  It 
acquiesced that contract linguists and interrogators had to be employed due to the lack 
of these skills in the DOD, but cautioned that vigorous oversight was required.  One of 
the most important suggestions was the establishment of a joint service integrated 
process team to develop new joint operational standards for detention operations in 
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On 25 August 2004, the Fay-Kern investigation into the 205
th
 MI Battalion at 
Abu Ghraib was released.  Investigators examined the period from 25 July 2003 to 6 
February 2004 and found 23 MI soldiers, ten MPs, and four MI contractors directly 
participated in 44 incidents of abuse of prisoners.  Six MI soldiers, two MI contractors 
and one MP knew of the abuses and did not report them, and two medics saw signs of 
the abuses and did not report them.
1410
 The report faulted the leadership of the 205th MI 
and 800th MP at Abu Ghraib for not carrying out their assigned missions properly.  The 
report stated DOD and Army doctrine was not at fault, but, rather, had it been followed 
the abuses would not have occurred.  The report suggested updating the concept of the 
JIDC, increasing more HUMINT posts, clarifying the roles of the MPs and MI, and 
teaching how to work with non-DOD organisations in detention operations.
1411
 
On 8 November 2004, Army General Richard Formica completed an 
investigation into the detention operations of the Combined Joint Special Operations 
Task Force Arabian Peninsula inside Iraq from the period of 15 May 2004 to 8 
November 2004.  Formica’s team interviewed soldiers, commanders, and medical 
personnel in Iraq and screened medical records and interrogation reports. They found no 
evidence of the detainee abuse that had been reported by three detainees, but made 
several recommendations to improve operations.
 1412
 
The report did not suggest disciplinary action, but called for correct detention 
and interrogation policies to be promulgated throughout the TF according to the latest 
guidance.  In addition, TF personnel needed to understand the difference between 
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tactical interrogations and tactical questioning, make sure detainees had adequate 
bedding, food, and medical care, and were sent to a long term holding facility within 24 
to 48 hours.  In addition, a complete file with a record of all that had happened to the 
detainee since the point of capture needed to travel with the detainee.
1413
 
Since many of the units involved in MI and MP activities in Iraq were involved 
in the Abu Ghraib detention abuse were reservists, the head of the Army Reserve, 
Lieutenant General James Helmly, ordered an investigation into the training of Army 
Reserve units in March 2004.
1414
 In December, the investigation, which focused on MP 
and MI units, reported on the frequency, adequacy, quality, and standards for training in 
law of land warfare, detainee treatment requirements, ethics, and leadership.  Based on 
the review, the investigation found a weakness in the training tying the MI and MP 
missions together.  Law of land warfare was taught in training, but courses needed 
developing.  The suggestions were to nurture and preserve a strong ethical and mission-
oriented force, to provide clear training guidance, and offer effective training.  Leaders 
were encouraged to continually strive to improve unit and soldier readiness by 




By September 2004, the military had a good understanding of what needed to be 
corrected in detention operations.  General Ryder, the PMG for the Army, published an 
action plan for detainee and interrogation operations based on the lessons learned and 
the legal and moral requirements to allow the combat leaders to achieve their desired 
end states.  The plan clarified rules for the handling of prisoners, the use of dogs, the MI 
and MP relationship, and how to deal with agents from OGA.  It also redesigned unit 
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structures to more efficiently handle internment and resettlement operations and 
mandated there would be no ‘ghost detainees’ without assigned ISNs.  It required OGA 
personnel to follow DOD detention policies in DOD facilities.
1416
 
The Army MP School added 55 hours of education for soldiers handling 
detainees and sent mobile training teams to various locations to ensure soldiers were 
properly trained.  The Army Training and Doctrine Command readied five core areas of 
training for all soldiers in ethics, leadership, law of land warfare, the Geneva 
Conventions, and values.  Additional training was also added to show soldiers how to 
report any illegal orders or requests.  Lastly, a new Army interrogation manual FM 2-
22.3, with strict limits delineating all the new changes was put into production.
1417
 
One of the major recommendations in several of the reports as well as from the 
CPA supported HDC phase four operations to release detainees that were erroneously 
picked up including low level detainees who were not deemed to be a security risk.  The 
previous MNF-I DRB consisted of only three US officers.  The new boards consisted of 
nine members:  six representatives from the interim Iraqi government and three senior 
officers from MNF-I.  Beginning 21 August 2004, the first combined review and release 
boards (CRRB) were held three days per week.  The final release authority rested with 
General Miller, but he made decisions after consulting with the Iraqi Justice Minister 
and generally accepted the board’s suggestions unless new information came to light 
that merited sending the file back to the board.  Non-security detainees who committed 
crimes were not seen by the board, but sent to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.
1418
  
While General Miller had made significant improvements to detention 
operations in Iraq, the scrutiny placed on him by the judicial-Geneva Conventions camp 
supporters due to his August 2003 recommendations to have the MI and MPs work 
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more closely together at Abu Ghraib continued to haunt him; some even blamed him for 
the abuses at Abu Ghraib.  The publicity proved to be too much for DOD leadership and 
he was removed as the TF-134 commander after only eight months and relegated to a 
Pentagon staff job as the Army’s assistant chief of staff for installation management.1419 
With his reputation tarnished and his chances for promotion slim, he was allowed to 




General William Brandenburg became the first general officer to be put in 
charge of detention operations in Iraq without any previous experience in that area on 
29 November 2004.
1421
 By this time, many of the early challenges within the detention 
system had been worked through and TF-134 was in need of a leader without any 
detention baggage to manage the growing prisoner population.  Plus, he had MI and MP 
experts on staff to help him deal with the TF’s challenges. 
Brandenburg’s baptism by fire came 31 January 2005, when prisoner riots broke 
out at the largest US internment facility, Camp Bucca.  Guards shot and killed four 
detainees as they fought to bring the facility under control.
1422
 Brandenburg realised 
conditions at Bucca had become unmanageable and change was needed.  He said the 
US had to better understand who they had in custody and take back the facility from the 
extremist detainees, both Sunni and Shiite, who ruled the inside of the camps and meted 




During General Brandenburg’s tenure, two more major investigation results 
were released.  On 7 March 2005, Admiral Albert Church completed a nine month 
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investigation into US detention and interrogation operations for all US facilities 
globally; his team interviewed more than 800 personnel who were, or had been, 
involved in detention operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and GTMO.  The Church 
investigation validated findings from previous investigations and made many of the 
same recommendations.  The report underlined the fact that there was no national policy 
to treat detainees improperly, but that all the policy and training supported proper 
treatment consistent with the Geneva Conventions.  Nevertheless, failure to provide 
specific guidelines for changes to detention operations in Afghanistan and Iraq caused 
confusion when changes, meant only for GTMO, were passed around to the other 
theatres. 
Church also discovered that not a single lesson learned from recent conflicts 
including the Balkans, the Gulf War, and Vietnam had been adopted in detainee 
operations guidance,
1424
 in essence, proving the reality of the eighth phase of the HDC.  
He affirmed ICRC had sent detailed warnings to US commanders about detainee abuse, 
and had their warnings been heeded some of the abuse may have been avoided.  His 
final report helped push the finalisation of tightened interrogation rules that would be 
updated as doctrine for interrogators and incorporated into FM 2-22.3.
1425
 Had leaders 
examined the historical record, they could have avoided tragic, strategic, operational, 
and tactical missteps. 
 On 24 May 2005, Army Surgeon General Kevin Kiley completed the last major 
DOD detention operations report by auditing detainee medical operations in 
Afghanistan, GTMO, and Iraq.  With the hindsight of previous investigations, Kiley’s  
team interviewed 1,182 personnel over a five-month period regarding medical treatment 
of detainees in US custody.  The overall conclusion was that detainee medical 
personnel, despite some initial challenges, provided a high level of care across the 
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various theatres to all detainees.  The team found areas for improvement such as 
training medical personnel to better understand detention and interrogation operations 
and to provide exercise support.
1426
 
One issue that caused concern at GTMO was the use of the Behavioural Science 
Consultation Teams (BSCTs).  No BSCT had ever provided support in Afghanistan, 
although one was headed there at the time of the investigation.  BSCTs had provided 
support in Iraq and Cuba.  The main recommendation from the assessment team was to 
establish clear SOPs for the BSCT members, many of whom felt conflicted in their role 
supporting interrogation operations and being medical professionals.  Kiley’s team 
recommended the use of only senior, experienced psychologists, and not physician-
psychiatrists.
1427
 General Kiley agreed with the findings and recommendations except 
for the prohibition of physician-psychiatrists and asked that it be further reviewed.  He 




During the remainder of General Brandenburg’s tenure he continued to 
implement changes to improve detainee care.  In the area of medical treatment, 
detainees received excellent services at Abu Ghraib.
1429
 Other challenges persisted, such 
as continued insurgent attacks on coalition detention facilities.  On 2 April 2005, an 
attack involving car bombs and mortars on Abu Ghraib wounded 44 US soldiers and 13 
detainees.
1430
 Several civilians were killed a few days later in another attack.
1431
 
Detainees who attempted escape were often successful.
1432
 At the brigade and division 
levels, review boards released more than 7,000 detainees in the first six months of 2005 
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before ever making it to Abu Ghraib.
1433




Despite these challenges, detention operations provided valuable intelligence to 
the coalition forces.  In July 2005, a courier from Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri, 
was intercepted with a letter intended for the Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi.  The letter instructed him to focus on the Iraqi populace as a strategic COG.  
He said:  ‘I say to you that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is 
taking place in the battlefield of the media.  And that we are in a media battle in a race 
for the hearts and minds of our Umma [Muslims in the Islamic world]’.1435 This key 
intelligence capture illuminated Al-Qaeda’s strategy and revealed tension between their 
leadership and their tactical commanders. 
In December 2005, US forces continued to make HDC phase three 
improvements and 159,000 soldiers were now stationed in Iraq;
1436
 this far outstripped 
the 2002 plan, which pre-supposed only 5,000 US troops left to assist with stability and 
withdrawal operations.
1437
 On 1 December, General John Gardner replaced General 
Brandenburg as TF-134 commander in charge of 3,700 US military personnel guarding 
more than 14,000 prisoners in four major prisons operating at 119 per cent capacity and 
growing.  Gardner oversaw detention operations during a large-scale uptick in fighting 
as Sunni versus Shiite violence began to escalate and detainees became more violent.  
During this period the US was unable to turn over a majority of the prisoners to the 
Iraqis whose prisons and courts did not yet meet international standards; for the short 
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term, the US was stuck with them.
1438




Another HDC phase three correction was to find more space to house detainees. 
With the Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, and Camp Cropper prison camps overflowing, the 
US opened a new maximum-security prison in an old fort built in 1977 by the Russians 
in Northern Iraqi Kurdistan 25 kilometres north of Suleimaniya.
1440
 The fort had been 
the base of operations for Saddam’s military during the bloody Anfal campaign against 
the Kurds in the 1980s.  Several HVDs were sent to the new prison including Ali 
Hassan Al-Majid, also known as ‘Chemical Ali’.1441 
 Preparations to move to the facility began in October 2005 when Fort Suse 
underwent eight weeks of renovations to become a top-tier facility;
1442
 the US spent 
US$45 million to upgrade the existing infrastructure.  During the renovation process, 
local Kurdish contractors did the work and one worker stole the plans for the base and 




The Army, short on MPs, requested manpower from the Navy to run the facility.  
The Navy established the 500-sailor Navy Provisional Detainee Battalion One (NPDB-
1) as the guard force and worked with the 43
rd
 MP Company responsible for detainee 
operations.  The Navy guard force was also known as TF 2-6 in honor of the last Navy 
detainee battalion stood up in 1919 during WWI that ran a pier side prison ship called 
the X-Two-Six.  The plan for the 2,100-bed Fort Suse facility was to establish 
operations, train the Kurds to run it, and then turn it over to them.
1444
 The USAF set up 
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The battalion received 90 days of Army detention training at Fort Jackson, 
South Carolina and Fort Hood, Texas, and was certified in detainee operations 
according to Army TIF doctrine.  On 14 February, they deployed to Fort Suse.  The 
prison, commanded by a Navy O-6 captain with an Army lieutenant colonel deputy, sat 
on a 6,000-foot hill against the mountains with a six-mile secure vantage point all 
around.  To avoid car bombs, no non-US vehicles were allowed up the hill.  There were 
several layers of outside security with a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) on constant 
standby.  Titan Corporation contracted 300 local linguists to support prison operations, 




Inside the prison, MPs were constantly counting detainees; there were 70 per 
room.  They were mostly high threat level detainees awaiting trials, spending life in 
prison, or sentenced to be hanged by the Iraqis.  Because they had nothing to lose, 
detainees scuffled regularly with the guards, especially the female guards whom they 
were especially violent towards; they continually attempted to take hostages, so guards 
were constantly on edge.  A 10 to 12 person emergency reaction force (ERF) was 
established to counter the violence.  Because the facility was a maximum-security 
prison, prisoners were escorted everywhere, unlike traditional TIFs where detainees had 
some freedom of movement.  Only one prisoner escaped Fort Suse, an Iranian who 
slipped over the border.  Arab detainees did not attempt escape because they were in 
Kurdish territory and knew they would be treated harshly by the locals if caught.
1447
 
In search of retribution against those who participated in the killing of Kurds 
under Saddam’s regime, the Peshmerga intelligence incessantly attempted to obtain full 
                                                          
1445
 Joseph Romano, ‘Air Force breaks new ground at Camp Bucca, Iraq,’MP, October 2005 
1446




prisoner lists.  US forces trained about 1,200 Kurdish correctional police, Peshmerga 
dropouts, to take over the facility, but the Kurds made it clear they planned to kill the 
detainees once they were in charge.  Some detainees released from Fort Suse spread 
rumours of torture at the facility, and because it was so remote it began to have a bad 
reputation despite the efforts of four ICRC representatives stationed there permanently.  
A decision was made to shut it down rather than turn it over to the Kurds.
1448
 
In October 2006, the last detainees were sent to Camps Bucca and Cropper
1449
 
and the empty facility was turned over to the Kurds in November.  As the last US 
personnel helicoptered out, they watched the Kurdish Peshmerga engage in a fire fight 
with the Kurdish correctional police they had just trained, contending over the items 
that had been left behind.
1450




The spark that launched Iraq into major Sunni-Shiite ethnic conflict was lit 22 
February 2006 by Al-Qaeda’s bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra.1452  The 
US strategy of fighting a kill-capture kinetic heavy war had led to the death and 
detention of tens of thousands of Iraqis, but the Iraqi government had not provided 
sufficient security to allow ground forces to withdraw.  While effective in capturing 
former Ba’ath party leaders, US strategy also created many ‘accidental guerrillas’1453 or 
Iraqis who resisted the occupation.  The bombing of one of the holiest shrines in Shiite 
Islam was the tipping point towards a sectarian war between Iraqi Sunnis and Shias.  As 
clashes intensified, hundreds of Iraqi civilians were killed in religious and ethnic 
fighting.  The US looked to the fledgling Iraqi government for a top down solution but 
they could not provide it.  It took US leadership in Iraq months to understand what was 




 Joel Roberts, ‘Abu Ghraib Prison Totally Empty,’ AP, 28 August 2006 
1450
 Military #17 Interview. 
1451
 Author Unknown, ‘Fort with long history now successful Iraqi prison,’ MNF-I, 3 January 2007 
1452
 Ellen Knickmeyer and K.I. Ibrahim, ‘Bombing Shatters Mosque In Iraq ‘, WP, 23 February 2006 
1453
 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, (Oxford, UK:  Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 119-
122 
275 
going on and develop a new plan. On 7 June, US SOF hunted and killed Zarqawi, a 
main instigator of violence, after extensive intelligence work based on the interrogation 
of many detainees.
1454
 In addition to foreign Arab and Iraqi fighters some of the 
detainees interrogated during this time period were US citizens such as Joe Andrew 
who was initially told he was held as an enemy combatant
1455
  along with US citizens 
Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel.
1456
 All were eventually released and no charges were 
filed against them for supporting terrorism despite having earlier been accused of 
supporting the insurgency.   
After Zarqawi was killed, General Casey and Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki altered 
the plan to invade the Sunni extremist city of Ramadi, just as Fallujah had been seized 
street by street, in favour of an attempt to work with the tribes.  Police recruitment 
among the tribes in June 2006 yielded a paltry five recruits.  Most Iraqis were still too 
scared to work with the US and distrusted the Maliki government.  But in June and July, 
the bodies of dead Al-Qaeda operatives began appearing on the streets of Ramadi.  The 
US did not know who was responsible.  Sunnis, tired of the intimidation campaign, 
were killing Al-Qaeda members themselves.  Once the foreign Al-Qaeda fighters made 
it clear they wanted to marry into the local Iraqi tribes to develop a Salafi state, the Iraqi 
Sunni alliance with the foreign Al-Qaeda fighters was over.
1457
 
The key to the turnaround was Sheikh Abdul-Sittar who said Al-Qaeda was an 
enemy he shared with the US.  He suggested police stations be built in the areas the 
police were recruited from to protect their families and held recruiting drives in his 
home.  The new population centric counterinsurgency strategy worked; the first 60 
police were recruited from Ramadi on 9 September 2006 and the ‘Awakening’ or 
Sahwat Al-Anbar was born.  By December, there were 6,000 police in Ramadi linked to 
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the Sunni tribes who wanted Al-Qaeda out of Iraq.  As security increased, Abdul-Sittar 
told the tribes to keep working with the US since this is what would help the US to 
withdraw their troops from Iraq.
1458
 
On 15 August 2006, in preparation for the turnover of Abu Ghraib, 3,000 prisoners 




A TF from the 66 MI Group in Germany replaced the 524
th
 MI at Abu Ghraib in 
January 2006.  Their pre-deployment training ill-prepared them to take over the JIDC 




 Three years after the abuses, the interrogation booths were located in containers 
equipped with monitoring equipment that continually broke down.  The 66 began fixing 
the media and document exploitation capability.  They coordinated with the SOF and 
OGA elements, which also worked with detainees.  In coordination with TF-134 and the 
civilian contractor KBR, the 66 MI moved JIDC operations to the new detention facility 
at Camp Cropper.  The superior facilities at Cropper allowed for better morale among 
interrogators and improved detention and intelligence operations.
1461
 
On 1 September, TF-134 relinquished control of the vacant prison to the 1st 
Iraqi Army, who secured it for the Ministry of Justice.  US Marines remained at Abu 
Ghraib to assist the Iraqis with training during the transition.
1462
 It later reopened as the 
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Baghdad Central Prison under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of Justice
1463
 who 
struggled to provide proper living conditions for the detainees.
1464
 
Between March 2003 and December 2006, 58,000 Iraqis had been in US 
custody; only 15,000 were in custody by the end of 2006.  After the first year of the 
war, the Odierno policy of rounding up every military aged Iraqi male in cordon and 
sweep searches was replaced with a more methodical process after HDC phase three 
corrections were implemented via the results of the major investigations.  Arrest forms, 
sworn affidavits, digital photographs, and evidence were all collected into an arrest 
package and reviewed at the battalion and brigade level before a detainee was sent to a 
TIF.
 1465
 Most detainees were released before they made it to a TF-134 TIF.
1466
  
In his 2004 CPA memorandum, McArthur envisioned providing resources to 
point of capture units to enable the release of detainees who did not belong in custody.  
One in five of all detainees did end up at a TIF; they spent an average of 300 days in 
prison, and it became crucial to release as many as possible.  However, this enthusiasm 
to release prisoners quickly created a new problem called ‘catch and release’.  Iraqi 
police officers and US soldiers complained the insurgents they rounded up were 
released too hastily, only to be caught again.  This was demoralising for coalition 
soldiers and their Iraqi partners as they struggled to quell the violence.
1467
 Other Iraqi 




In Ramadi, Sheik Abdul-Sittar ran a prison in his own house.  He complained 
that if he turned a suspect over to US custody, they were sent to Camp Bucca, released 
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in a few weeks, and would return to kill them.  He conducted his own interrogations 
before turning over his prisoners to the US.
1469
 
Detention operations based in the Mosul area supported both kill-capture teams 
and conventional units.  Iraqi interrogators produced useable intelligence from 
detainees, but once in US custody, many detainees refused to talk and several denied all 
the information they had provided previously.  US SOF teams captured training 
documents instructing Al-Qaeda on counterinterrogation techniques based on US 
interrogation rules.  The instructions guaranteed if a detainee said nothing, a review 
board would release him in three to nine months. To US war fighters on the ground, this 
was distressing; violent prisoners knew they could wait out several months in prison, 
resist interrogation, and then re-join the fight.
1470
 While this was often the case, as 
capturing units improved documentation and arrest packets became more robust, there 
was evidence to keep them in custody longer.
1471
 Catch and release was not finally 
corrected until General Stone took over detention operations in May 2007.
1472
 
On 10 January 2007, President Bush announced a surge of US troops would be 
sent to Iraq to stop the violence.  The next day the first troops arrived
1473
 and by June, 
all additional troops were in place
1474
 to implement the new COIN strategy of clear, 
hold, build, and secure.  Bush appointed General David Petraeus to be the MNF-I 
commander; his first act was to assemble a joint strategic assessment team to study and 
create a combined civil-military security plan comprised of 24 experts led by Colonel 
H. R. McMaster and David Pearce from the State Department.
1475
 
Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General Petraeus planned the combined 
operation and urged the Iraqi government to protect its citizens regardless of religious 
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or ethnic background.  Both realised political stability was the endgame once security 
was established.  A key COG was the creation of joint security stations where Iraqi 
security personnel and US soldiers worked together in Baghdad and other cities.
1476
 
As the surge moved forward, more detainees moved through US detention.  The 
system was extremely stressed by the new detainees produced by intensified operations.  
Ultimately, General Gardner decided to ban the media from the detention camps until 
further notice.  By the end of his tour in March 2007, detainees controlled the inside of 
the prisons and he interfaced with detainee representatives to resolve problems.
1477
 The 
scenario was reminiscent of the US detention disaster on Koji-do Island during the 
Korean War where the prisoners controlled the inside of the camps.
1478
 
The blueprint for the new Iraq strategy was detailed in General Petraeus’ 2006 
revised COIN manual, Counterinsurgency:  FM 3-24, but besides reaffirming that 
detainees must be treated according to the Geneva Conventions and interrogations were 
governed by the Army interrogation manual, few specifics were addressed in the three 
pages dedicated to detention.
1479
 For the surge to work, interrogators needed a new 
approach to detainee operations.  
With surge operations moving forward, detention in disarray, and General 
Gardner’s tour almost over, the selection of the next TF-134 commander was critical.  
Marine Reserve General Douglas Stone was a graduate of Culver Military Academy, 
the Naval Academy, and the Ranger, airborne, and scuba schools.  After several years 
on active duty he moved into the reserves.  He was an entrepreneur, a CEO of several 
start-up companies, and known as a practical, outside the box thinker, and successful 
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change management leader.  In addition, he had several graduate degrees which 
included an MBA and a PhD.
1480
 
In 2003, Stone was mobilised to Pakistan as the senior US DOD representative 
to work with the US forces overall commander in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General 
David Barno.  His experience in the AFPAK region convinced him the critical factor for 
successful operations was for US forces to understand the languages, cultures, and 
religions of the region.  General Mattis tapped him to create and lead Mojave Viper, a 
Marine Corps training exercise focussed on the cultural training aspect of combat 
operations.  He built mock villages, incorporated tribal concepts into exercises, and 




Stone was ready to retire when he was offered the job of Chief of Staff of MNF-
I, but asked not to do a staff job if something else was available; he interviewed with 
General Petraeus for command of TF-134.  Critics told Petraeus that Stone had no 
detention or interrogation experience, was a reservist with AFPAK experience, not Iraq 
experience.  Marine General James Mattis, commander of the 1
st
 Marine Expeditionary 
Force, endorsed Stone and Petraeus hired him; he appreciated Stone’s education and 
business qualifications and realised the TF needed a paradigm shift.
1482
 Stone asked his 
AFPAK colleague, Colonel Anthony Lieto, to serve as his deputy.
1483
 Stone would end 
up implementing the most thought out, deliberate detention corrections to date and 
would prove his detractors wrong. 
On 7 April 2007,
1484
 General Stone deployed to Iraq to assume command of TF-
134’s 9,000 personnel.1485 General Petraeus mandated that incoming commanders 
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overlap one month with their predecessor in order to fully understand their job 
requirements.  During his month with Gardner, Stone visited all the detention facilities, 
read books on US historical detention, COIN, human rights organisations, international 
law, and the ICRC.
1486
 During April, there were 10,178 acts of detainee violence inside 
the prisons
1487
 and recidivism rates were between six and nine per cent.
1488
 Stone 
understood a new strategy was needed
1489
 since the US detention camps had become ‘a 
breeding ground for extremists where Islamic militants recruit[ed] and train[ed] 
supporters, and use[d] violence against perceived foes.’1490  Stone said his mission was 
to save lives by keeping hard-core militants from killing US troops.
1491
 
General Stone assumed command of TF-134 on 5 May 2007.
1492
 Four days later, 
the worst riot to date in the US detention system in Iraq erupted at Camp Bucca.  The 
camp commander called Stone and said he was about to be overrun by 10,000 
detainees; he would have to resort to using live rounds and kill prisoners.  The detainee 
to guard ratio at Bucca was 22 to one; by comparison, that ratio at GTMO was one to 
22.  Admiral Bill Fallon was vising the camp that day when detainees set a fire and 
burned parts down.  Stone refused to negotiate with the detainee leaders as Gardner had; 
he let them know they no longer controlled the camp.  Stone phoned Petraeus during the 




The riot involved 5,000 to 10,000 detainees; several were killed and many were 
injured.  This was a turning point for Stone.
1494
 Two weeks later, he gave a 
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comprehensive briefing including photographs and video of the fighting inside Camp 
Bucca to Petraeus, Crocker, and other senior officers.  Stone’s intent was to demonstrate 
that the current detainee warehousing policy was a strategic liability for the surge and 
could sabotage the entire campaign.  When Stone finished, the room was silent.  
General Petraeus told the group:  ‘The president will be impeached, the surge will end   
. . . What do we do’?1495 Stone’s strategy would catapult detention operations to the end 
of phase four of the HDC and into phase five.
1496
 
The prison was a terrorist university.  The TF did not have sufficient information 
on the detainees; once captured, a basic file was opened, and the prisoner was thrown 
into a pen.  When the pens were too full, detainees were released to make room for the 
next batch.  This process supported HDC phase four objectives to relieve an 
overwhelmed system but often let detainees go who should not have been freed.
1497
 
Stone approached the dilemma as a CEO.  He analysed the problem as a 
businessman studying a challenging market.  He said: 
Everyone agreed that detention operations could destroy the surge but if the surge 
could be destroyed in a moment by what happened in detention, why couldn’t it 
be made [succeed] in a moment in detention?  What is the market opportunity 




Stone consolidated all lessons learned and launched an exhaustive study of 
every detainee in order to understand who the US had in custody; he wanted to know 
what drove them, what they believed, and why they fought.
1499
 Stone was an 
unconventional lateral thinker who rearranged information, flipping it on its head, in 
search of a new strategy.
1500
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Stone and his staff crafted a survey to obtain a comprehensive profile of each 
detainee including education, employment, family history, religious, and ideological 
views.  They were given to new detainees as they were processed in, and to detainees 
already in custody during their review.
1501
 
Detainees appeared before the newly established Multi-National Forces Review 
Committee (MNFRC), a three-member board that provided them an opportunity to 
present their story and learn why they were being held.
1502
 The MNFRC did not win the 
approval of the human rights groups but it did provide the coalition with valuable 
information about insurgent networking and financing through the surveys.  Every six 
months their case was reviewed.
1503




During this time, the detainee population in Iraq bulged to its high water mark of 
more than 26,000, but Stone didn’t release anyone until his study was complete and he 
knew whom he was releasing.  In the meantime, surge operations continued and the 
cells filled up.
1505
 (Appendix M) 
After a few months of separating the hardcore ideological detainees from the 
moderates, the TF saw a marked change in detention operations; they began to have 
confidence the new strategy would actually work.
1506
 After months of data collection, 
the TF learned that detainees viewed detention as another front in the war.  Prison was a 
valuable place to recover, train, recruit, and spread radical Islamist ideology.  The study 
also revealed some 70 per cent of detainees should not have been imprisoned at all.  
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The study confirmed a diverse foreign fighter population of more than 300 
detainees
1508
 from Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon, Sudan, Spain, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Yemen, and 
France.
1509
 It also indicated there were roughly 4,000 hardcore Iraqi insurgents.  As 
these elements were identified, they were segregated from the rest of the prisoners in 
hardened modular detainee housing units removed from the general population.  This 
allowed the moderates to cooperate with the coalition without the fear of reprisals; it 




The majority of the insurgents said they received permission from their family to 
engage in violence.
1511
 The profile of the average insurgent was a 29-year-old Iraqi 
male, married with kids, unemployed, illiterate, and living at home.  Crime and 
insurgency paid between US$300 and US$600 per month.  A few fought for 
nationalistic reasons and a few fought because they were unemployed.
1512
 Some fought 
to protect their families and communities since the Iraqi government and US troops 
were not able to protect them.
1513
 The least common reason was fighting for religion.  
The survey results convinced Petraeus that fixing detention was integral to the success 
of the strategic COIN plan.
1514
 
Stone named his new detention paradigm ‘COIN inside the wire’ and 
determined the ‘the battlefield of the mind’ was the crucial COG.  US troops and their 
allies were fighting the extremists for the minds of the moderates in the Islamic world.  
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The exponential effect of winning over one individual who had an average of 100 
people in their social network times the tens of thousands in custody could have an 
overwhelming effect on the overall surge strategy.
1515
 
The TF knew what did not work in the past and needed to take the new 
information and craft the way ahead.  Interrogation of hard-core insurgents was key 
because they had the information that drove the insurgency.  Just as General Miller’s 
2003 recommendations articulated, Stone knew the war would be won through 
HUMINT; ergo, detention and intelligence collection were key and it was imperative 
they work together.
1516
 Stone crafted into his strategy a robust collection effort through 
the TF’s JIDC.1517 
The old detention paradigm indicated all detainees in custody were valuable 
because they were no longer a threat.  In reality, only a few had value in terms of the 
information they held.  The assessment illuminated who should be interrogated and who 
should be released.
1518
 After Abu Ghraib, it was politically incorrect to discuss the 
notion that MI and MPs should work together.  But by the time General Stone took 
over, enough reform had taken place that it was safe to talk in these terms again even 
though this doctrine predated the events at Abu Ghraib. 
The new plan had three phases:  first, align detention operations with the greater 
COIN strategic plan and apply COIN principles inside the TIFs, separate extremists 
from the general detainee population, and protect the moderate detainees.  Second, 
defeat the insurgency within the TIFs and focus on the ‘battlefield of the mind’ through 
identification of ideas contrary to extremist ideology.  Third, engage detainee families 
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and release rehabilitated detainees.  Moderate detainees returned home and empowered 
the ‘moderate ummah to marginalize the violent extremists within Iraq’.1519 
Borrowing from the US-Nazi re-education programme of WWII, Stone began a 
de-radicalisation programme for moderate detainees.  Many had been indoctrinated with 
Al-Qaeda and Takfiri teachings that twisted the moderate Islam on which they had been 
raised.  To incorporate lessons learned, Stone visited the de-radicalisation programs in 
Saudi Arabia Singapore, Indonesia, Yemen, and Egypt.  TF-134 added a host of 
initiatives for both adult and juvenile detainees including courses in English, Arabic, 
Math, science, civics, geography, arts, and athletics, and started voluntary religious re-
education discussions, a women’s programme, a mental health programme, textile and 
brick work-for-pay programmes, Sunni-Shia reconciliation discussions, and most 
importantly, family visitation programmes.
1520
 
For some detainees, the income they earned was crucial to their families’ 
survival; their loved ones showed up at the prisons to collect their pay.  Stone was 
adamant the moderate detainees were given opportunities to touch their families, which 
had been prohibited in the past.  The goal was to reestablish the familial bond and foster 
the detainees’ goal of returning home as their main objective.1521 
Stone understood the need to strategically communicate his plan to multiple 
audiences among Iraqis, the Arab and Islamic world, US public opinion, and the US 
military.  The Iraqis loved the plan; the old system bred extremists who wreaked havoc 
once released.
1522
 Stone met with each new TF-134 unit to personally explain the 
concept of COIN ‘inside the wire’ and convince them that educating detainees was 
crucial to the war effort.
1523
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Not everyone agreed with Stone’s strategy; as word spread, critics attacked him 
for trying to make such sweeping changes.  Reporters and military officers alike said his 
ideas would get soldiers killed.  Attacks became ugly and personal; some told lies and 
tried to ruin Stone in order to stop him.  This went on for nearly a year until some of the 
positive effects of his reforms took root.  Right before he finished his tour, some of his 
most bitter critics praised him and admitted he had been right.  Petraeus was the only 
one in the leadership who completely supported him through his whole tour of duty.
1524
 
Before he left he said:  ‘I’m not out here … for social work . . . We’re out here because 
war is an act of force, and we’re going to compel this enemy to do our will [a]nd our 
will is that the moderates are going to win out’.1525 
Detainee releases accelerated under the new programme.  Even though the 
number of detainees in custody had climbed, the numbers of escapes, murders, tunnels, 




A key component of the detainee programme was to work closely with the Iraqi 
government.  Iraqi Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi endorsed the new programme in a 
joint agreement between MNF-I and the Iraqi government.
1527
 In their research, Stone’s 
staff found a 1954 Iraqi law that required a citizen who took an oath to abide by it.  An 
Iraqi judge reworked the language slightly and when detainees were released to their 
families and tribes, they signed an oath in front of a judge to not return to their former 
life that led them to prison.
1528
 In December, the TF started to step up detainee releases 
and released 850 as part of the Eid holidays.
1529
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Another key to Iraqi cooperation was the Central Criminal Court of Iraq that had 
jurisdiction over the detainees.  Stone said the judges were fair, judged evidence, 
imposed sentences and let people go if the evidence was not enough.  The main 




As Stone’s programmes were implemented, he stressed clarity and transparency 
when communicating the TF’s goals and activities.  He opened operations to inspection 
by any credible organisations; the ICRC, DOD, US Army, Iraqi Ministry of Human 




In March 2008, Stone announced that the reforms of the previous year were 
trending in a positive direction.  More than 6,000 detainees were released and only 12 
were recaptured. Iraqi detainee-on-detainee violence in US facilities dropped 
drastically
1532
 from 10,178 in April 2007 to just 178 a year later.
1533
 Stone was satisfied; 
he said the recapture rate was low because detainees committed themselves to rejecting 
violence and re-joining communities that embraced peace.
1534
 
After 12 months, the Iraqis were satisfied the US was finally releasing the right 
people.  Families were reunited.  Some detainees enjoyed the reforms and new 
programmes so much they did not want to be released; other families tried to get their 
loved ones into programmes at the prisons.
1535
 
General Stone hoped many of the reforms implemented in Iraq could be 
exported to Afghanistan where detention operations faced many challenges.
1536
 In June 
2008, he appraised his 14-month tour of duty and what his command accomplished with 
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a sense of pride and relief.
1537
 Before he left, he tried to implement one last reform:  to 
pay released detainees between US$200 to US$300 to return to the TIFs and report on 
how they were doing.
1538
 
Stone said Petraeus was his greatest support, allowing him to do what needed to 
be done to turn things around.
1539
 He would leave the command and the war effort in a 
better place after putting into effect an HDC phase three process that supported phase 
four releases and ultimately would help the US leave Iraq to the new Iraq government. 
At his change of command ceremony, Petraeus said: ‘[Stone] revolutionized the way we 
perform detainee operations in Iraq . . . his biggest idea was counter-insurgency inside 
the wire, because that was where the enemy was conducting its insurgency as well’.1540  
Despite great strides, detention operations were not risk free.  By the time Stone 
left, 400 Purple Hearts for wounds received in detention operations had been awarded 
and 80 military personnel had lost their lives fighting ‘inside the wire’ since the war 
began.
1541
 After TF-134, Stone was offered a third star and command of all Marines 
Reserves,
1542
 but he chose to retire and return to the private sector.
1543
 
Admiral Wright assumed command on 6 June 2008
1544
 and was a natural choice 
to succeed General Stone and lead detention during phase five of the HDC.  Wright, a 
Naval Academy graduate and experienced commanding officer, had served as Stone’s 
deputy during the previous past year and helped implement the new detention strategy.  
However, his command was cut short due to personal health reasons.
1545
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 By the time he left, the re-internment rate was down to less than one per cent
1546
 
from more than nine per cent in 2007
1547
 and the detainee review committee was 
dealing with 700 cases per week.  An average 37 detainees were sent home each day, 
many armed with literacy and new trade skills learned inside camp schools; some even 
left with monies earned while working in camp job programmes.
1548
 Most significantly, 
detainee attitudes towards the US changed ‘inside the wire’.  As US MPs treated 
detainees with respect and humanity, detainee behaviours changed and violence 
dropped inside the camps.  Many detainees became pro-American as they learned to 
trust US soldiers and took advantage of the programmes offered the prisoners.
1549
 




On 8 October 2008, Brigadier General David Quantock, a career Army MP and 
Admiral Wright’s deputy was appointed Commander of TF-134.1551 His professional 
background prepared him to run detention operations and monitor the changes that had 
been implemented.
1552
 He explained:  ‘The reconciliation [of detainees] starts inside the 
camps . . . we take the [COIN] model and we apply it to detainees . . . so the camps 
don’t become a recruiting ground and then they can reconcile for the most part among 
themselves before they get released’.1553 
On 31 December 2008, the UN mandate that authorised MNF-I since 2004 
expired.
1554
 The Bush Administration and the Iraqi government signed a new status of 
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forces agreement (SOFA) as part of a three-year phased withdrawal from Iraq.
1555
 The 
new SOFA had a significant impact on US detention operations and for the first time 
since 2003, the Iraqis were truly in charge of detention policy.  Several key provisions 
affected detention operations from that point onward:  Article 5(2) stipulated that US 
combat forces would withdraw from Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009.
1556
 This drastically 
decreased the US footprint and put Iraqi security units fully in charge of their own 
cities, detainees, anti-government operations, and criminal elements.  Article 3(2) 
specified that no person should be transported in or out of the country without express 
permission from the Iraqi government.
1557
 This prevented detainees from being 
removed from the country without government approval. 
Article 22 of the SOFA specifically dealt with detention and contained five main 
points:  first, US forces could not detain Iraqis without government approval, based on 
Iraqi law.  Second, if US forces detained an individual, they must be turned over to the 
Iraqis within 24 hours.  Third, the Iraqi government may request US assistance in 
detaining certain individuals.  Fourth, the US must provide to the Iraqi government a list 
of all detainees in US custody.  The Iraqi government must issue arrest warrants for 
individuals wanted by the US government and the US must release detainees in US 
custody or turn them over to the Iraqi government.  Fifth, except in the case of actual 
combat in support of official Iraqi operations, US forces may not enter Iraqi properties 
without an Iraqi warrant.
1558
 These rules reasserted Iraqi sovereignty and paved the way 
for the US to withdraw from Iraq.  The US drafted plans for an orderly transition that 
involved training Iraqi detention and security personnel and creating a schedule for 
facility turnover. 
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Under General Quantock, HDC phase four turnover of detention facilities and the 
release of the 16,000 remaining prisoners were accelerated when the Iraqi government 
formed a special detainee commission to study each detainee case and release those held 
without sufficient evidence.
1559
 Beginning February 2009, 1,500 detainees were 
transferred every month
1560
 to one of the nine Iraqi government detention facilities 
inspected and approved of by the US Department of Justice.
1561
 
Although the Iraqi prison system included several good facilities, namely those 
the US had set up and trained Iraqis to run, abuse and poor treatment was widespread 
under the Iraqis.
1562
 Detainees’ level of care depended on what prison they were held in; 
the Iraqi Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Defence all had separate detention facilities, 
even though the CPA transferred all prisons to the Ministry of Justice.
1563
 The Iraqi 
Human Rights Ministry recorded 500 instances of abuse in Iraqi prisons in 2009.
1564
 
General Quantock worked with the Iraqi justice ministry to allow the admission 
of forensic evidence, such as bomb residue and fingerprints, in Iraqi courts in addition to 
the standard two witness statements or a confession that was used to convict detainees.  
Since the change in the rules of evidence, conviction rates rose from 30 per cent in 
October 2008 to more than 90 per cent in 2009.
1565
 
In March 2009, Camp Taji TIF and Reconciliation Centre (TIFRC), part of the 
overall FOB Taji, expanded and upgraded its facilities in order to absorb detainees from 
Camp Bucca in preparation for its closure.  It was a first class detention facility with its 
own airfield; detainees were flown directly to the TIFRC.  Detainees were initially held 
in modular detainee housing units, but were eventually moved to cell blocks in larger 
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hangers known as k-spans, a term deemed more politically correct than prison or cell.  
Eventually 5,000 detainees were brought in and 20 men were placed in each cell; each 
k-span held 200 to 300 detainees, segregated by security risk such as Takfiris, Sunni, 
Shiite, and various threat levels.  Detainees wore coloured clothing based on their level 
of compliance.  Green meant compliant, red indicated hard-core Takfiri, yellow 
signified moderate compliance; most Shiite detainees wore yellow.  Cameras recorded 
every move the guards and prisoners made.
1566
 
When there were issues inside the k-spans, detainee zone chiefs helped resolve 
problems; although they did not run the prison as they had prior to General Stone, they 
still served a useful purpose liaising with US MPs.
1567
 Detainees who wanted to learn to 
read, write, and do basic math could take classes.  MPs continued to train Iraqi 
correctional officers to handle detainees once the final handover was completed.
1568
 
In April 2009, the Iraqi government asked the US to slowdown the transfer of 
detainees from 1,500 to 750 per month; they had trouble absorbing the prisoners so 
quickly.
1569
 To promote Iraqi holding capacity, the eleventh and final class of US-
trained Iraqi correctional officers graduated in May and assumed their duties at Camp 
Bucca.
1570
 Going forward, Iraqis trained their own correctional officers at their training 
academy at Camp Victory.
1571
 The US assisted with training in non-lethal tactics such 
as tasers, rubber bullets, stun grenades, and running the vocational programmes.
1572
 
Release involved some element of risk; reports from police chiefs, officials in 
the Interior ministry, and residents indicated some recently released detainees returned 
to fighting in Sunni and Shiite militias.  Others were recruited while in prison.  One 
detainee from Camp Bucca claimed to have recruited 80 others in prison.  When deadly 
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bombings began just weeks after the detainee releases, the Iraqi government combed 
through lists of recently released prisoners for clues.
1573
 
In April, during the release of 4,500 detainees, the Iraqi government issued 400 
arrest warrants in order to prevent the release of dangerous prisoners.
1574
 The US 
scrambled to assemble evidence to stop another 3,000 high threat detainees from going 
free.
1575
 Attacks continued throughout summer 2009 as more violent detainees were 
released.
1576
 Other detainees were killed in tribal retribution as soon as they got out of 
prison and some families paid blood money to keep their sons alive.  This caused some 
detainees to return to extremist groups for protection or attempt to stay in prison.
1577
 
In August 2009, in keeping with the Obama Administration’s policy of detention 
transparency, the DOD authorised a major change for SOF holding detainees.  Previously 
the SOF temporary screening detention site at Balad Air Base held detainees without 
notifying the ICRC until they were turned over to a TIF.  The new policy mandated that 
every unit must provide the ICRC with detainees’ names and ISNs within two weeks of 
capture.  The ability to request a custody extension was terminated.
1578
 
A major milestone achieved during Quantock’s tenure was the closing of Camp 
Bucca.  On 17 September 2009, the last 180 detainees were flown to Baghdad and the 
camp was shuttered.
1579
 The only remaining US detention facilities were Camps Cropper 
and Taji near Baghdad.
1580
 By the end of November 2009, the total recidivism rate of US-
released detainees since 2004 averaged four per cent; it had risen due to the release of 
violent detainees the Iraqis refused to lock up.
1581
 The NPDB 2 and 3 stationed at Bucca 
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moved to support Taji operations once Bucca shut down.
1582
 The Basra Investment 
Commission leased the facilities at Bucca to a joint US-Iraqi investment group for 
US$245 million for 40 years; it was turned into a commercial industrial centre.
1583
 
On 1 January 2010, General Quantock cased the colours and formally 
deactivated TF-134 as part of the deactivation of MNF-I and the creation of the new 
command, United States Force-Iraq (USF-I).  Since 15 April 2004, the TF had served a 
vital function in the war effort.
1584
 In February the US government announced that OIF 
would officially end on 1 September and the new mission would be called ‘Operation 
New Dawn’.1585 Quantock served a few more months and transitioned the remaining 
detention operations to the incoming head of detention operations and PMG for USF-I, 
Major General Nelson Cannon.
1586
 At this point, the Iraqi government held 44,000 
detainees and struggled to manage their detention responsibilities.
1587
 
On 15 March 2010, the US turned FOB Taji TIFRC, with 2,900 mostly low-
level detainees, over to the Iraqis.  The US only had one detention facility left in Iraq, 
Camp Cropper, with 2,900 detainees.
1588
 The facility underwent a US$70 million 
upgrade and was transformed into a rehabilitation centre to teach detainees new skills 
and help them become productive citizens upon release.
1589
 
General Nelson Cannon, a Vietnam War Marine combat veteran and Army 
National Guard MP,
1590
  served as the JDOG at GTMO from July 2003 to August 2004, 
and as the Director General for the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team in Iraq 
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from May 2008 to May 2009.
1591
 To facilitate the transfer of Camp Cropper, he held a 
detention transfer conference 21 to 23 April at FOB Taji.  The conference addressed 
proper detention operational procedures and the transfer of custody of detainees from 
the US to the Iraqis.  Cropper was a top tier facility, with sophisticated life support 
equipment, logistical functions, medical care, staff support, and correctional officer 
facilities.  The ability to handle these essential functions was critical to a successful 
transfer to the Iraqis.
1592
 
 In May 2010, an Iraqi General said 80 per cent of former US detainees had 
returned to fighting.
1593
 Under the SOFA, detainees were turned over to the Iraqis 
within 24 hours with a detainment file, but if the Iraqis let them go, there was nothing 
the US forces could do about it.  The US detention operations task force estimated that 
the Iraqis should not have released close to 4,000 high threat detainees; the outcome 
was predictable:  an uptick in violence.  Once some of these former detainees were re-




 On 15 July 2010, the last US detention facility in Iraq, TIF Cropper,
1595
 was 
turned over to the Iraqis and renamed Karkh Prison.
1596
 At the request of the Iraqi 
government, the US retained control of the HVD section until US forces left the country 
at the end of 2011. The US continued to train Iraqis in detention operations and 
international standards for human rights.  The US wanted to do all it could to help the 
Iraqis provide a similar standard of care to their detainees as the US had provided them, 
but between 2008 and 2010, the Iraqi Human Rights Ministry confirmed hundreds of 
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torture cases at Iraqi facilities including one secret prison.
1597
 Just five days after 
Cropper was turned over, four Al-Qaeda members escaped.  The Karkh warden was 
also missing.
1598
 In September 2010, four more Al-Qaeda detainees escaped.
1599
 
HDC Phase V:  End of Conflict Detention Operational Lessons Are Recorded 
On 31 August 2010, President Obama declared the end of major combat operations in 
Iraq, the end of OIF,
1600
 and the beginning of Operation New Dawn on September 1; the 
US began transitioning all remaining operations to the Iraqi government.
1601
 Secretary 
of Defence Robert Gates said history would judge whether the mission was worth it, but 
the US military could be proud of what it had accomplished.
1602
 Despite the end of US 
combat operations, two US soldiers were killed 7 September.
1603
 
 On 13 September, a report by Amnesty International confirmed allegations of 
Iraqi prison mistreatment including:  abuse by interrogators and detention personnel 
such as rape, the threat of rape, beating with cables and hosepipes, prolonged 
suspension by the limbs, electric shocks, breaking of limbs, removal of toenails with 
pliers, asphyxiation using a plastic bag over the head, piercing the body with drills, and 
being forced to sit on sharp objects.
1604
 Detainees who had previously been in US 
custody acknowledged treatment by the Iraqi government was more abhorrent.
1605
 
The Amnesty report said the turnover of detention facilities to Iraqi control by 
the US was a violation of international law and ‘In carrying out the transfer of more 
than 10,000 Iraqis into the hands of the US-backed regime in Baghdad, the Obama 
Administration is complicit in crimes even more horrific than those committed under 
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the Bush Administration by US forces at Abu Ghraib’.1606 Amnesty claimed US 
officials had been sufficiently warned of what the Iraqis would do to their prisoners.  




One of General Cannon’s last acts as detention commander was to oversee the 
transfer of millions of dollars of equipment to the Iraqis.  The US donated 100 vehicles 
including small-motorised carts and buses to the Iraqi Corrections Service, a division of 
the Ministry of Justice.  These vehicles were crucial to prisoner transport operations.  
The US contributed an additional 22 shipping containers of detention-related equipment 
to help the Iraqis run operations.
1608
 
On 14 February 2011, the DOD announced the assignment of the last detention 
commander for USF-I, Major General Adolph McQueen,
1609
 a former JDOG leader at 
GTMO and commander of all Army Reserve MPs;
1610
 He would lead detention 
operations through the end of HDC phase five in–country ensuring the knowledge 
gained would be brought back home for future conflicts. It is ironic that a reserve 
general (BG Hill) led detention operations at the outbreak of the war in 2003 and that 
another (MG McQueen) was the last at the end of the war in 2011.  McQueen oversaw 
the final training and transitioning of Iraqi corrections and interrogation officers and the 
turnover of the last 200 US detainees. On 1 May, McQueen presented graduation 
certificates to the ninth and final class of graduates of the basic interrogator course and 
the third interrogator instructor course. The US trained a total of 88 basic interrogator 
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students and 21 interrogator instructors.
1611
 In April, he visited Karkh Prison, (formerly 
Camp Cropper) where US forces still controlled 200 HVDs at the Iraqi government’s 
request.  McQueen said his goal was to maintain high standards and ensure a smooth 




On 14 November 2011, Army Specialist David Hickman was the last US soldier 
to die in Iraq; he was killed by an IED.
1613
 One month later on 15 December 2011, the 
final USF-I commander, General Lloyd Austin, cased the American colours and 
declared the US mission in Iraq over.
1614
 The next day, Camp Adder near Nassariya, the 
last of 505 US bases, was turned over to the Iraqis.
1615
 
Later that day, the last US enemy combatant in Iraq,
1616
 Ali Musa Daqduq, was 
taken into custody by Iraqi authorities.  Daqduq was a Lebanese Hezbollah commander 
who killed five US Soldiers in 2007
1617
 and the Obama Administration asserted their 
intention to prosecute him in a military tribunal in Charleston, South Carolina, but cited 
the 2008 SOFA restrictions on transferring prisoners out of the country without 
permission.
1618
 The following day, Iraqi authorities charged Daqduq with illegally 
entering the country on a forged passport, a charge that carried a five-year prison 
term.
1619
 The detention mission in Iraq was finally over.  
Sunday morning, 18 December 2011, the last 500 US troops crossed the border 
into Kuwait just before 8:00 AM and locked the gate behind them.
1620
 Only 157 soldiers 
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remained in Iraq as part of a US Embassy training team.
1621
 Approximately 100,000 to 
120,000 POWs, ECs, and detainees were held in US custody during the course of the 





On 20 December 2011, General Austin returned the US colours to Andrews Air Force 
Base.  He said:  ‘What our troops achieved in Iraq over the course of nearly nine years 
is truly remarkable . . . Together with our coalition partners and core of dedicated 
civilians; they removed a brutal dictator and gave the Iraqi people their freedom’.1623 
The war in Iraq followed the predictable phase one of the HDC, with the 
exception, or rather, addition of an element of foreign fighter enemy combatants mixed 
into standard POW operations.  Phase two of the HDC was a watershed event, not only 
in Iraq, but for the entire DOD, as events at the Abu Ghraib prison impacted the GWOT 
effort at all levels, strategic, operational, and tactical, and greatly influenced the Iraqi 
population, the American public, and international opinion. 
Phases three and four of the HDC saw dramatic shifts in detention policy as the 
US adapted to the insurgency that swept the country.  General Douglas Stone made 
extensive changes to detention operations, moving policy from detain, hold, release to 
detain, segregate, hold, rehabilitate, and release.  His COIN ‘inside the wire’ strategy 
saved the surge campaign from collapsing as detention operations reached a violent 
climax in spring 2007.  In phase five of the HDC, the US began Operation New Dawn, 
transitioned detainee operations to the Iraqi government, and concluded with the 
withdrawal of US forces in December 2011 per the SOFA signed in December 2008 by 
President Bush.  In phase seven of the HDC, units returned home and began 
documenting the lessons learned from the Iraq war. 
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It was fitting that General Quantock, who took over Abu Ghraib prison from 
General Karpinski in 2004 after the scandal and later led TF-134 toward the end of the 
war, became the PMG for the Army, based at the Pentagon, and would be responsible to 




Any discussion of interrogation techniques must begin with the simple reality that their 
purpose is to gain intelligence that will protect the United States, its forces and interests 
abroad . . . Interrogations are inherently unpleasant, and many people find them 
objectionable by their very nature. 
- James R. Schlesinger, Former US Secretary of Defence1624 
 
From General George Washington’s implementation of humane treatment policy for 
Hessian and British soldiers during the Revolutionary War to the reforms implemented 
globally in US detention operations following the Abu Ghraib scandal in Iraq, the US 
detention experience has been wide ranging.  While the reforms of the past decade are 
typically credited to the leadership of senior military officers and civilian policy 
makers, much of the praise should be doled out to the young soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
and marines who went ‘inside the wire’, to conduct transparent and humane detention 
operations in extremely dangerous and difficult conditions.  Only a few violated their 
oaths of service and abused detainees in their custody.  Some paid with their lives, 
others were seriously wounded, all walked away forever changed by what they 
experienced. 
 Getting detention right in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations is 
a key component to winning the overall effort and potentially shortening a conflict.  In 
comparing Dr. David Kilcullen’s accidental guerrilla syndrome with the historic 
detention cycle, the third phase, intervention by the counterinsurgent, is directly linked 
to the phase three of the HDC, mistakes are made in detainee handling.  These intersect 
at a critical moment in a counterinsurgency campaign that can prolong or pare a war 
depending on what actions are taken.  If detention operations are done correctly and the 
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303 
right people are detained, the population can potentially be won over.  If innocents are 
detained and the policy persists, detention facilities become a breeding ground where 
insurgents recover, rebuild, and recruit, lengthening the war, and raising the costs to the 
counterinsurgent force in terms of blood and treasure. 
Afghanistan 
Thus far, the war in Afghanistan has followed the HDC similar to wars past.  The US is 
still working through the cycle, stalled in phase three and four, awaiting Afghan 
detention training and turnover of facilities to catch up to international standards.  In 
phases one of the HDC, the US invaded Afghanistan and US forces detained Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda fighters and sent many to GTMO.  A large percentage of those detained 
were of minimal intelligence value and should have been released in Afghanistan before 
ever leaving the country.  The historical record indicates there was some thought to 
initial tactical detention operations, but very little planning of long term strategic 
detention or determination of what the status of non-Geneva Convention detainees 
would ultimately be. 
Just as in wars past, detainees overwhelmed the system in Afghanistan; the two 
initial theatre level detention-holding facilities in Bagram and Kandahar were 
inadequate for the sheer number of detainees.  In phase two, detainees were moved to 
GTMO and the Kandahar short term holding facility was closed, but detainees 
continued to be held at the Bagram Collection Point.  It was a spartan, secretive facility, 
and those factors contributed to the deaths of several detainees.  In phase three of the 
HDC, JTF-180 instituted corrections in detention operations at Bagram.  While the 
debate over legal status of detainees continued in the courts, there were on-going 
discussions as to what techniques beyond the Army interrogation field manual were 
allowed and the military re-asserted better control over those who conducted detention 
operations. 
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Phase three continued for many years as the US worked to get the detention 
process right.  While care and feeding improved quickly at GTMO and the Iraq 
facilities, the Bagram Collection Point continued to lag behind in reforms and received 
few upgrades compared to facilities in Iraq and Cuba.  
During phase three, General Stone, the detention turn-around commander from 
Iraq, completed an extensive study of both the US and Afghan prison systems and 
recommended radical changes based on the success of his 2007 Iraq detention strategy.  
Many detainees were released, a state of the art facility was built, and hard core 
insurgents were segregated from the accidental guerrillas; many detainees were 
equipped with educational and vocational training and took an oath not to return to the 
fight.  Afghan guards and rule of law and intelligence personnel were trained, which led 
to the best detention situation since the invasion. 
Guantanamo Bay 
The US prison facility at GTMO is one of the most transparent prisons in the world.
1625
 
A Belgian official who inspected GTMO five times called it ‘a model prison offering 
better treatment than Belgian prisoners receive’.1626 Since January 2002, the ICRC has 
been on the ground engaged with US detention officials to oversee the needs of the 
detainees;
1627
  it has not visited a Cuban government prison since 1989.
1628
 
Just as Spandau Prison was set aside for a specific purpose after WWII to house 
war criminals of the Nazi regime,
1629
 GTMO was built for a specific purpose:  to detain 
enemy combatants of the GWOT, produce actionable intelligence, and serve as a long 
term prison for those who have gone through military tribunals and are not releasable. 
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The first two phases of the HDC dominated the first ten months of operations at 
GTMO.  As old and new doctrine and policy collided, the situation was at times a 
perfect storm of confusion.  Law enforcement agencies, the US military, and other 
government agencies were tasked with separate and competing missions and were under 
extreme pressure to do it right, do it quickly, and do it during a debate of unclear legal 
and operational guidance that changed and evolved as the operation progressed.  Human 
resources with the right skill sets to fulfil mission requirements were extremely limited; 
as a result, unskilled, mostly well-meaning personnel, attempted to do the best they 
could.  Additionally, CENTCOM focussed only on the tactical and operational 
detention mission and completely ignored the strategic interrogation mission they had 
wrongly pushed off on an ill-equipped SOUTHCOM. 
 Under General Dunlavey, Miller and Hood, GTMO passed through the initial 
HDC phases and entered phase three just as he left command; the detention and 
intelligence task forces were combined and many corrections were made.  General 
Miller completed many of the initiatives of his predecessor and detention operations at 
GTMO ran more smoothly.  Lessons learned from the mistakes made at Abu Ghraib 
and the recommendations from 12 major detention operations investigations were 
synthesised and provided ample course corrections to make GTMO an efficient, 
humane, and transparent facility.  Although President Obama vowed to close GTMO in 
his 2008 campaign, the US public and Congress supported keeping it open for the 
foreseeable future.  Facilities continued to be upgraded to care for the long-term 
detention of inmates and prepare for upcoming commissions. 
Iraq 
In 2002 and 2003, the US prepared for a traditional, tactical detention mission in Iraq, 
which was carried out during phase one of the HDC.  With the exception of some 
foreign fighter enemy combatants, most of the detainees were Shiite Iraqi Army 
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conscripts who were happy to be captured and sent home.  The mostly Sunni-Ba’ath 
party officials and officer corps were the HVDs.  Phase two of the HDC was a 
watershed for detention operations in Iraq and throughout all US detention facilities in 
the GWOT.  As the insurgency got underway and lawlessness reigned on the streets, US 
facilities were quickly overwhelmed with ‘security detainees’ comprised of criminal 
elements and Iraqi and foreign insurgents. 
The events that took place at Abu Ghraib prison in autumn 2003 impacted the 
war effort at all levels:  strategic, operational, and tactical.  It prolonged the war, turned 
many Iraqis against the US, diminished American popular support, and devastated the 
image of the US internationally.  Any goodwill the US was credited for capturing 
Saddam Hussein in December 2003 by the Iraqi people evaporated in early 2004 in the 
wake of media reports of abuse of detainees in US custody. 
Phase three of the HDC in Iraq saw dramatic shifts in detention policy as the US 
adapted to the insurgency that swept the country and implemented hundreds of 
recommendations from a dozen detention investigations.  General Stone made sweeping 
changes in detention operations; the US moved from the ‘detain, hold, release’ policy to 
a ‘detain, segregate, hold, rehabilitate, and release policy’.  Detention facilities had 
become recruiting and training grounds for the insurgency; the new COIN ‘inside the 
wire’ strategy mandated that hard-core insurgents be separated from the general prison 
population.  The new strategy saved the surge campaign, diminished violence inside the 
prisons, and provided rehabilitation for detainees interested in educational and 
vocational training administered at detention facilities. 
In phase four of the HDC, the US transitioned from OIF to Operation New 
Dawn and prepared Iraqi troops for the withdrawal of US forces per the SOFA signed in 
December 2008 by President Bush.  By 18 December 2011, US troops had withdrawn 
from Iraq, save a few advisors working out of the US Embassy.  The Iraq war was the 
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first conflict since 9/11 to reach phase five of the HDC where military historians and 
analysts could begin to record the end of campaign lessons learned in detainee handling 
operations. 
What Matters Most in Detention Operations? 
The lessons learned throughout US detention history have been purchased with the 
blood of US military personnel and the treasure of the citizens of the nation; therefore 
the lesson learned should not be forgotten.  In order to prepare for future conflicts and 
not repeat mistakes of the past, these lessons must be recorded, codified into doctrine, 
taught, studied, and practiced.  During peacetime, units must continue to train for the 
detention mission.  The crux of phase seven of the HDC is that the US military is a 
learning organisation and military doctrine evolves based on experience.  The following 
major lessons learned in detention operation are vital considerations for future war 
planners and policy makers. 
The Historic Detention Cycle (HDC) Matters 
Mistakes in detention are repeated throughout history.  Since the Revolutionary War, 
the status of captured prisoners has been recurring in most US conflicts.  Within five to 
ten years of the end of each conflict, the US military forgets many of the hard learned 
lessons in detention.  Personnel with detention expertise retire and new priorities push 
to the front of the Department of Defence agenda.  War planners should bring detention 
experts out of retirement to advise and assist operations early on before bad decisions 
are made. 
Human Psychology Matters 
Those who work in detention operation are asked to do a thankless, and what often 
times seems unimportant job; in reality, it is integral to the war.  Human nature is such 
that even moral people, when given a little authority, tend to abuse their power if not 
properly supervised.  As the Stanford prison study demonstrated and Abu Ghraib 
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confirmed, the situation can deteriorate quickly.  It is vital that leaders safeguard 
provisions of oversight, adherence to standard operating procedures, and understanding 
of doctrine to ensure humane, legal, and transparent detention operations. 
Planning Matters 
Deliberate long-term planning needs to take place.  US strategic guidance calls for 
planning at the unified command level.  It should not be an afterthought buried in some 
war plan annex.  The Provost Martial General (PMG) and Intel (J-2) should be involved 
from the start.  Detention planners must beware of inexperience and reach out to retired 
experts if available.  They should not underestimate the number of prisoners, how long 
they will remain in custody, or the cost of detainee care.  When in doubt, over estimate 
on the high side of how much resources will be needed. 
Unity of Command Matters 
There are two main functions of detention operations:  to collect intelligence and to hold 
detainees away from the fighting.  Early on at GTMO, the functions were separated by 
competing command structures in two TFs with separate missions.  This caused 
confusion and harmed the operation, but the problem was eventually overcome by 
merging the TFs and appointing a single commander.  Had the historical record been 
consulted, planners would have noted a similar error was made and overcome in US 
strategic detention operations during WWII.  The detainee task force should have been 
set up as a CJIATF since law enforcement agencies and international partners 
participated in the detention mission.  While the CJIATF construct had not been fully 
delineated in doctrine at the start of the war, the combined and joint lessons learned 





Mistakes in detention can have far reaching ripple effects on the military operation and 
political apparatus at home.  Selecting the right leader for the detention mission sends 
the message to US forces as well as the enemy that detention operations are integral to 
the war effort.  High ranking war fighters such as General Stone, Admiral Harward, and 
General Huber left no doubt about the US commitment to doing detention correctly.   
Strategic Communications and Transparency Matter 
Countries involved in war have the right to detain enemy combatants and belligerents.  
They do not have to apologise for taking prisoners; however, by working with the ICRC 
and being open with the media, the detaining power ensures the cultivation of a safe, 
humane, and transparent operation.  The less secretive a facility, the less the enemy can 
exploit it for propaganda. 
Detention Resources Matter 
War planners must budget for expensive long-term detention.  Detainees must be placed 
in a safe, transparent, and humane environment; if not, the cost will be far greater in the 
long run.  Language, cultural, and HUMINT resources must be dedicated to detention 
operations, even in peacetime.  When transitions occur, new personnel need time to get 
up to speed by overlapping with experienced personnel; a proper relief in place transfer 
of authority/handover-takeover (RIPTOA/HOTO) is crucial and also prevents 
experienced detainees from gaining the upper hand.  Public perception is easily 
manipulated and a poor facility is not worth the strategic ramifications if something 
goes wrong. 
Permission Matters 
Before deviating from doctrine or experimenting outside of standard operating 
procedures, new ideas must be thoroughly vetted at the highest levels of the chain of 
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command.  Before implementing new tactics, techniques, and procedures, leaders must 
sensitise and train everyone up and down the chain.  Innovation in detention operations 
can lead to disaster; detention personnel protect themselves by following the rules. 
Quality Detainees Matter 
The policy of apprehending all military aged males in cordon and sweep operations is 
counterproductive and potentially catastrophic to detention operations.  Prisoners with 
no intelligence value should be released immediately, or rather, never be apprehended 
in the first place.  The practice of war fighters taking vast quantities of prisoners and 
relegating the task of sorting through them to detention and intelligence personnel, as 
practiced early on in Iraq and Afghanistan, is costly and immoral; it creates enemies out 
of the very people whose help is vital to the end state of winning the war. 
Detainee Classification Matters 
Properly classifying detainees is an important first step in detention operations.  At a 
minimum, all detainees should be afforded fair treatment under Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions even before their final status has been determined. 
Detention Location Matters 
Detainees should be left in theatre if feasible.  Detaining powers should commit the 
necessary resources to facilitate this course of action.  This allows for an easier and 
cheaper intelligence collection, detention, and release process; it also prevents legal 
dilemmas, as evidenced by the detainee status quandary at GTMO. 
Detainee Segregation Matters 
The segregation of detainees based on ideology has been commonplace in detention 
operations throughout history.  During the Revolutionary War, captured Hessian 
mercenaries were separated from the British prisoners.  In WWII, hard-core Nazis were 
eventually isolated from the regular German soldiers after wreaking havoc in US 
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detention facilities.  In the Korean War, North Korean communist soldiers were 
separated from regular conscripts in US custody.  Extremist Islamic fighters were 
ultimately sent to GTMO, but General Dunlavey fought the detention commander who 
refused to separate the hard-core mujahadeen from the moderates.  Separation reduces 
violence and encourages cooperation with intelligence collectors.  
Detainee Re-education Matters 
Long-term detention should include re-education, even if it does not prove effective for 
every detainee; idle, ideological detainees provided with religious materials, per the 
spirit of the Geneva Conventions, self-radicalise.  Experience shows detainees who are 
provided educational and vocational opportunities are willing to improve themselves.  
Saudi Arabia has had success in de-radicalising some Islamic extremists.  Opportunities 
should be offered early on. 
Cultural Literacy Matters 
The more experience detention personnel have with the languages, cultures, and 
religions of the detainees, the better they will be able to understand them and work with 
them.  Organic cultural assets within the military must be identified, leveraged, and 
prized.  When these resources have been exhausted, civilian contractors should be 




The Lieber Code of 1863 
CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, REPORTS, AND RETURNS OF THE UNION AUTHORITIES  
FROM JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1863.--#7  
O.R.--SERIES III--VOLUME III [S# 124] 
GENERAL ORDERS No. 100. 
WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
Washington, April 24, 1863. 
        The following "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in 
the Field," prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., and revised by a board of officers, of 
which Maj. Gen. E. A. Hitchcock is president, having been approved by the President of 
the United States, he commands that they be published for the information of all 
concerned. 
By order of the Secretary of War:      
E. D. TOWNSEND,  
Assistant Adjutant-General. 
*Note:  Only section 3 and 4 are in this appendix. 
SECTION III.--Deserters--Prisoners of war--Hostages--Booty on the battle-field. 
        48. Deserters from the American Army, having entered the service of the enemy, 
suffer death if they fall again into the hands of the United States, whether by capture or 
being delivered up to the American Army; and if a deserter from the enemy, having 
taken service in the Army of the United States, is captured by the enemy, and punished 
by them with death or otherwise, it is not a breach against the law and usages of war, 
requiring redress or retaliation. 
        49. A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to the hostile army for 
active aid, who has fallen into the hands of the captor, either fighting or wounded, on 
the field or in the hospital, by individual surrender or by capitulation. 
        All soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to the rising en 
masse of the hostile country; all those who are attached to the Army for its efficiency 
and promote directly the object of the war, except such as are hereinafter provided for; 
all disabled men or officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who have 
thrown away their arms and ask for quarter, are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to 
the inconveniences as well as entitled to the privileges of a prisoner of war. 
        50. Moreover, citizens who accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as 
sutlers, editors, or reporters of journals, or contractors, if captured, may be made 
prisoners of war and be detained as such. 
        The monarch and members of the hostile reigning family, male or female, the 
chief, and chief officers of the hostile government, its diplomatic agents, and all persons 
who are of particular and singular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government, 
are, if captured on belligerent ground, and if unprovided with a safe-conduct granted by 
the captor's government, prisoners of war. 
        51. If the people of that portion of an invaded country which is not yet occupied by 
the enemy, or of the whole country, at the approach of a hostile army, rise, under a duly 
authorized levy, en masse to resist the invader, they are now treated as public enemies, 
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and, if captured, are prisoners of war. 
        52. No belligerent has the right to declare that he will treat every captured man in 
arms of a levy en masse as a brigand or bandit. 
        If, however, the people of a country, or any portion of the same, already occupied 
by an army, rise against it, they are violators of the laws of war and are not entitled to 
their protection. 
        53. The enemy's chaplains, officers of the medical staff, apothecaries, hospital 
nurses, and servants, if they fall into the hands of the American Army, are not prisoners 
of war, unless the commander has reasons to retain them. In this latter case, or if, at 
their own desire, they are allowed to remain with their captured companions, they are 
treated as prisoners of war, and may be exchanged if the commander sees fit. 
        54. A hostage is a person accepted as a pledge for the fulfillment of an agreement 
concluded between belligerents during the war, or in consequence of a war. Hostages 
are rare in the present age. 
        55. If a hostage is accepted, he is treated like a prisoner of war, according to rank 
and condition, as circumstances may admit. 
        56. A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is 
any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or 
disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other 
barbarity.  
        57. So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier's 
oath of fidelity he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are no 
individual crimes or offenses. No belligerent has a right to declare that enemies of a 
certain class, color, or condition, when properly organized as soldiers, will not be 
treated by him as public enemies. 
        58. The law of nations knows of no distinction of color, and if an enemy of the 
United States should enslave and sell any captured persons of their Army, it would be a 
case for the severest retaliation, if not redressed upon complaint. 
        The United States cannot retaliate by enslavement; therefore death must be the 
retaliation for this crime against the law of nations. 
        59. A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed against the 
captor's army or people, committed before he was captured, and for which he has not 
been punished by his own authorities. 
        All prisoners of war are liable to the infliction of retaliatory measures. 
        60. It is against the usage of modern war to resolve, in hatred and revenge, to give 
no quarter. No body of troops has the right to declare that it will not give, and therefore 
will not expect, quarter; but a commander is permitted to direct his troops to give no 
quarter, in great straits, when his own salvation makes it impossible to cumber himself 
with prisoners. 
        61. Troops that give no quarter have no right to kill enemies already disabled on 
the ground, or prisoners captured by other troops. 
        62. All troops of the enemy known or discovered to give no quarter in general, or 
to any portion of the Army, receive none. 
        63. Troops who fight in the uniform of their enemies, without any plain, striking, 
and uniform mark of distinction of their own, can expect no quarter. 
        64. If American troops capture a train containing uniforms of the enemy, and the 
commander considers it advisable to distribute them for use among his men, some 
striking mark or sign must be adopted to distinguish the American soldier from the 
enemy. 
        65. The use of the enemy's national standard, flag, or other emblem of nationality, 
for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in battle, is an act of perfidy by which they lose 
all claim to the protection of the laws of war. 
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        66. Quarter having been given to an enemy by American troops, under a 
misapprehension of his true character, he may, nevertheless, be ordered to suffer death 
if, within three days after the battle, it be discovered that he belongs to a corps which 
gives no quarter. 
        67. The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war upon 
another sovereign State, and, therefore, admits of no rules or laws different from those 
of regular warfare, regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, although they may 
belong to the army of a government which the captor may consider as a wanton and 
unjust assailant. 
        68. Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the enemy is the 
object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself, are 
means to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war. 
        Unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful. 
        69. Outposts, sentinels, or pickets are not to be fired upon, except to drive them in, 
or when a positive order, special or general, has been issued to that effect.  
        70. The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is 
wholly excluded from modern warfare. He that uses it puts himself out of the pale of the 
law and usages of war. 
        71. Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already wholly 
disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall 
suffer death, if duly convicted, whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or 
is an enemy captured after having committed his misdeed. 
        72. Money and other valuables on the person of a prisoner, such as watches or 
jewelry, as well as extra clothing, are regarded by the American Army as the private 
property of the prisoner, and the appropriation of such valuables or money is considered 
dishonorable, and is prohibited. 
        Nevertheless, if large sums are found upon the persons of prisoners, or in their 
possession, they shall be taken from them, and the surplus, after providing for their own 
support, appropriated for the use of the Army, under the direction of the commander, 
unless otherwise ordered by the Government. Nor can prisoners claim, as private 
property, large sums found and captured in their train, although they have been placed 
in the private luggage of the prisoners. 
        73. All officers, when captured, must surrender their side-arms to the captor. They 
may be restored to the prisoner in marked cases, by the commander, to signalize 
admiration of his distinguished bravery, or approbation of his humane treatment of 
prisoners before his capture. The captured officer to whom they may be restored cannot 
wear them during captivity. 
        74. A prisoner of war, being a public enemy, is the prisoner of the Government and 
not of the captor. No ransom can be paid by a prisoner of war to his individual captor, 
or to any officer in command. The Government alone releases captives, according to 
rules prescribed by itself. 
        75. Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or imprisonment such as may be 
deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to be subjected to no other 
intentional suffering or indignity. The confinement and mode of treating a prisoner may 
be varied during his captivity according to the demands of safety. 
        76. Prisoners of war shall be fed upon plain and wholesome food, whenever 
practicable, and treated with humanity. 
        They may be required to work for the benefit of the captor's government, according 
to their rank and condition. 
        77. A prisoner of war who escapes may be shot, or otherwise killed, in his flight; 
but neither death nor any other punishment shall be inflicted upon him simply for his 
attempt to escape, which the law of war does not consider a crime. Stricter means of 
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security shall be used after an unsuccessful attempt at escape. 
        If, however, a conspiracy is discovered, the purpose of which is a united or general 
escape, the conspirators may be rigorously punished, even with death; and capital 
punishment may also be inflicted upon prisoners of war discovered to have plotted 
rebellion against the authorities of the captors, whether in union with fellow-prisoners 
or other persons. 
        78. If prisoners of war, having given no pledge nor made any promise on their 
honor, forcibly or otherwise escape, and are captured again in battle, after having 
rejoined their own army, they shall not be punished for their escape, but shall be treated 
as simple prisoners of war, although they will be subjected to stricter confinement.  
        79. Every captured wounded enemy shall be medically treated, according to the 
ability of the medical staff. 
        80. Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giving to the enemy 
information concerning their own army, and the modern law of war permits no longer 
the use of any violence against prisoners in order to extort the desired information, or to 
punish them for having given false information. 
SECTION IV.--Partisans--Armed enemies not belonging to the hostile army--Scouts--Armed 
prowlers-- War-rebels. 
        81. Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but 
belonging to a corps which acts detached from the main body for the purpose of making 
inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured they are entitled to all the 
privileges of the prisoner of war. 
        82. Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads 
for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being 
part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the 
war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with the 
occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of 
the character or appearance of soldiers--such men, or squads of men, are not public 
enemies, and therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, 
but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates. 
        83. Scouts or single soldiers, if disguised in the dress of the country, or in the 
uniform of the army hostile to their own, employed in obtaining information, if found 
within or lurking about the lines of the captor, are treated as spies, and suffer death. 
        84. Armed prowlers, by whatever names they may be called, or persons of the 
enemy's territory, who steal within the lines of the hostile army for the purpose of 
robbing, killing, or of destroying bridges, roads, or canals, or of robbing or destroying 
the mail, or of cutting the telegraph wires, are not entitled to the privileges of the 
prisoner of war. 
        85. War-rebels are persons within an occupied territory who rise in arms against 
the occupying or conquering army, or against the authorities established by the same. If 
captured, they may suffer death, whether they rise singly, in small or large bands, and 
whether called upon to do so by their own, but expelled, government or not. They are 
not prisoners of war; nor are they if discovered and secured before their conspiracy has 
matured to an actual rising or to armed violence.
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Twenty Eight Articles: Fundamentals of a Company-level Counterinsurgency 
1.  Know your turf. 
2.  Diagnose the problem. 
3.  Organize for intelligence. 
4.  Organize for interagency operations. 
5.  Travel light and harden combat service support (CSS). 
6.  Find a political / cultural advisor. 
7.  Train the squad leaders, then trust them. 
8.  Rank is nothing: talent is everything. 
9.  Have a game plan. 
10.  Be there. 
11.  Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions. 
12.  Prepare for handover from day one. 
13.  Build trusted networks. 
14.  Start easy. 
15.  Seek early victories. 
16.  Practice deterrent patrolling. 
17.  Be prepared for setbacks. 
18.  Remember the global audience. 
19.  Engage the women, beware the children. 
20.  Take stock regularly. 
21.  Exploit a single narrative. 
22.  Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves. 
23.  Practice armed civil affairs. 
24.  Small is beautiful. 
25.  Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces. 
26.  Build your own solution, only attack the enemy when he gets in way. 
27.  Keep your extraction plan secret. 
28.  Whatever else you do, keep the initiative.1631 
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Formula:  COIN (Clear, hold, build, transition) + CT (F3EAD) = End state 
 
COIN = Counterinsurgency; strategy to defeat insurgent guerilla forces. 
 
Clear = Remove insurgents from population centers. 
 
Hold = Provide security living in Afghan populated areas with Afghan security forces. 
 
Build = Provide infrastructure to improve local populations lives such as roads, schools 
etc. 
 
Transition = When ready, turn over security of population to Afghan government. 
 
CT = Counterterrorism; destroying terrorists and their infrastructure. 
 
Find = Locate the enemy. 
 
Fix = Pinpoint exactly the location of enemy forces. 
 
Finish = Kill or capture enemy forces. 
 
Exploit = Gather up all available information and clues. 
 
Analyse = Using JIPOE, analyse intelligence information newly gleaned with additional 
information to create a broader picture of the situation. 
 
Disseminate = Share information with those who need to know in order to prosecute the 
next target. 
 
JIPOE = Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment 
 
End state = Leave Afghanistan when the Afghan government is able to defend itself 
from outside aggression and from allowing the Taliban and other counter government 





David Gallula’s Eight COIN Steps for Clearing an Area of Guerrilla Insurgent Forces 
1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of 
armed insurgents. 
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback 
in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where 
the population lives. 
3. Establish contact with the population; control its movements in order to 
cut off its links with the guerrillas. 
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organisations. 
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. 
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks.  Replace 
the softs and the incompetents; give full support to the active leaders. 
Organise self-defence units. 
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. 
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.1632 
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T. E. Lawrence Letter to B. H. Liddell Hart 
26.6.33 
Dear L.H. You talk of a summing up to come. Will you (if you agree with my feeling) 
in it strike a blow for hard work and thinking? I was not an instinctive soldier, 
automatic with intuitions and happy ideas. When I took a decision, or adopted an 
alternative, it was after studying every relevant - and many an irrelevant - factor. 
Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs language, appetites, standards - all 
were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side. I risked myself 
among them a hundred times, to learn.   
The same with tactics. If I used a weapon well, it was because I could handle it. Rifles 
were easy. I put myself under instruction for Lewis, Vickers, and Hotchkiss (Vickers in 
my O.T.C. days, and rifles, and pistols)  If you look at my article in The Pickaxe you 
will see how much I learned about explosives, from my R.E. teachers, and how far I 
developed their methods. To use aircraft I learned to fly. To use armoured cars I learned 
to drive and fight them. I became a gunner at needy and could doctor and judge a camel.  
The same with strategy. I have written only a few pages on the art of war - but in these I 
levy contribution from my predecessors of five languages. You are one of the few living 
Englishmen who can see the allusions and quotations, the conscious analogies, in all I 
say and do, militarily.   
Do make it clear that generalship, at least in my case, came of understanding, of hard 
study and brain-work and concentration. Had it come easy to me I should not have done 
it so well.  
If your book could persuade some of our new soldiers to read and mark and learn things 
outside drill manuals and tactical diagrams, it would do a good work. I feel a 
fundamental, crippling incuriousness about our officers. Too much body and too little 
head. The perfect general would know everything in heaven and earth.  
So please, if you see me that way and agree with me, do use me as a text to preach for 
more study of books and history, a greater seriousness in military art. With 2,000 years 
of examples behind us we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well.  
I like your little book – whatever it does not repeat a told tale. It starts at Chap. II by the 
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Authorized US DOD Interrogation Approaches 1992 to 2006 
1. Direct Approach 
2. Incentive Approach 
3. Emotional Approach 
4. Emotional Love Approach 
5. Emotional Hate Approach 
6. Increased Fear Up Approach  
7. Fear Up (Harsh) 
8. Fear Up (Mild) 
9. Decreased Fear Down Approach  
10. Pride And Ego Approach 
11. Pride And Ego Up Approach 
12. Pride And Ego Down Approach  
13. Futility Technique Approach  
14. ‘We Know All’ Approach 
15. ‘Establish Your Identity’ Approach  
16. Repetition Approach 
17. File And Dossier Approach  
18. ‘Mutt And Jeff’ ("Friend And Foe") Approach  
19. Rapid Fire Approach 
20. Silence Approach1635 
  
                                                          
1635





















Appendix L  
Key US Government Decisions Regarding Detention Post 9/11 
 
Key Decision Branch Date Summary 
Military Order:  Detention, 
Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism 
Executive 13 November 2001 Established Military 
Commissions Under 
the SECDEF 
Military Commission Order #1 DOD 21 March 2002 Established first 
rules and procedures 
for commissions 
Hamdi vs. Rumsfeld SCOTUS 28 June 2004 US citizens have 
access to the courts 
even if caught in the 
battlefield.  Habeas 
Corpus. 
Rasul vs. Bush SCOTUS 28 June 2004 US can detain 
persons in the 
GWOT but US 
courts have 
jurisdiction because 
GTMO is US 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 Congress 5 October 2005 Prohibits cruel 
detainee treatment 
and says the US 
Army FM is the 
standard for 
detention 
Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld SCOTUS 29 June 2006 Military 
Commissions violate 
the UCMJ and the 
GC 
Military Commissions Act 
(MCA) of 2006 
Congress 17 October 2006 Guarantees detainee 
right to see evidence 
and be present at 
hearings 
Military Commissions Manual DOD 18 January 2007 Implements the 
MCA of 2006 
Boumediene vs. Bush SCOTUS 12 June 2008 Detainees at GTMO 
have Habeas rights. 
MCA of 2006 
unconstitutional. 
Military Commissions Act 
(MCA) of 2009 
DOD 28 October 2009 Obama campaign 
pledge changes: 
Hearsay and info 
obtained through 
rough treatment 
removed as evidence 
Military Commissions Manual DOD 18 May 2010 Implements the 




Major US DOD Detention Investigations and Assessments 
1. MG Ryder,Report on Detention and Corrections Operations in 
Iraq, November 5, 2003 
2. General Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military 
Police Brigade, March 12, 2004 
3. LTG James R. Helmly,  USAR, Special Assessment of Training 
for Army Reserve Units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee 
Treatment Requirements, Ethics and Leadership, (Fort 
McPherson, GA: OIG-USARC, May to December 2004) 
4. Vice Admiral Church, Review of Department of Defense 
Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques, 
March 7, 2005 
5. MG Miller, Assessment of DoD Counterterrorism Interrogation 
and Detention Operations in Iraq, September 9, 2003 – Reviwed 
as part of the Church investigation) 
6. General Jacoby, CFC-A AO Detainee Operations: Report of 
Inspection, June 26, 2004 
7. LTG Mikolashek, Detainee Operations Inspection July 21, 2004 
8. Secretary Schlesinger, Final Report of the Independent Panel to 
Review DoD Detention Operations, August 24, 2004 
9. General Fay and Jones, Investigation of Intelligence Activities at 
Abu Ghraib, August 23, 2004 
10. General Formica, Article 15-6 Investigation of CJSOTF-AP and 
5th SF Group Detention Operations, November 8, 2004 
11. LTG Kiley, Final Report: Assessment of Detainee Medical 
Operations for OEF, Gitmo, and OIF, April 13, 2005 
12. General Schmidt and Furlow, Army Regulation 15-6: Final 
Report - Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility, amended June 9, 
2005 
13. Review of DoD-Directed Investigations of Detainee Abuse, 












Contractor #1, Author Interview, Tampa, FL, 1 April 2009 
Contractor #2, Author Interview, Washington, DC, 21 September 09 
Contractor #3, Author Interview, Virginia Beach, VA, 6 June 2009 
Military #1, Author Phone Interview, 2 November 2010 
Military #2, Author Interview, Virginia Beach, VA, 7 and 8 February 2009 
Military #3, Author Interview, West Bethesda, Maryland, 11 December 2009 
Military #4, Author Interview, Lansdowne, VA, 4 February 2009 
Military #4, Author Phone Interview, 6 March 2009 
Military #5, Author Interview, Norfolk, VA, 6 April 2011 
Military #6, Author Interview, Draper, UT, 22 July 2009 
Military #7, Author Interview, Fort Walton Beach, FL, 23 March 2009 
Military #8, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA, 19 April 2009 
Military #9, Author Interview, Virginia Beach, VA, 7 March 2009 
Military #10, Author Interview, Lansdowne, VA, 15 April 2009 
Military #11, Author Interview, Tampa, FL, 1 April 2009 
Military #12, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA, 15 March 2009 
Military #13, Author Interview, Tampa, FL, 1 April 2009 
Military #14, Author Interview, Tampa, Ashburn, VA, 2 January 2011 
Military #15, Author Interview, Freeport, Maine, 15 December 2009 
Military #16, Author Interview, Freeport, Maine, 15 December 2009 
Military #17, Author Interview, Virginia Beach, VA, 24 and 26 August 2009 
Military #18, Author Interview, Virginia Beach, VA, 6 February 2009 
Military #19, Author Interview, Purcellville, VA, 28 February 2009 
Military #20, Author Interview, Email, 23 and 24 January 2010 
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Military #21, Author Interview, Reston, VA, 13 February 2009 
Military #22, Author Interview, Washington, D.C, 9 December 2009 
Military #23, Author Interview, Virginia Beach, VA, 27 January 2009 
Military #24, Author Interview, Draper, UT, 22 July 2009 
Military #25, Author Interview, Norfolk, VA, 24 April 2011 
Military #26, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA, 26 March 2009 
Military #27, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA 5 August 2009 
Military #28, Author Interview, Tampa, FL, 1 April 2009 
Military #29, Author Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, 21 July 2012 
Abbas, Rushan, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA, 22 March 2009 
Azarva, Jeffrey, Author Interview, Washington DC, 5 February 2009 
Baer, Robert, Author Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 3 April 2009 
Bar, Dr. Shmuel, Author Interview, Arlington, VA, 14 April 2009 
Barrett, Michael, Author Interview, Arlington, VA, 30 March 2009 
Barrus, Roger, Author Interview, Midlothian, VA, 2 October 2009 
Bricker, John, Author Interview via Phone, Ashburn, VA 24 June 2010 
Carter, Phil, Author Interview, Rosslyn, VA, 31 October 2011 
Coleman, Dan, Author Interview, Fredericksburg, VA, 14 February 2009 
Dunlavey, Michael General, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA, 14 March 2009 
Fromme, Bob, Author Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 11 June 2009 
Fromme, Bob, Author Interview, Fort Bragg, NC, 12 June 2009 
Gerges, Fawaz, Author Interview, London, UK, 27 October 2009 
Ghneim, Jabra, Author Interview, Fort Walton Beach, FL, 3 June 2009 
Giduck, John, Author Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 11 March 2009 
Hartman, Robert, Author Interview, Culver, IN, 15 May 2009 
Hessler, Stephanie, Author Interview, New York City, New York, 17 December 2009 
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Howard, Robert Colonel, Author Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 11 September 2009 
Jensen, Sterling, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA, 28 March 2009 
Joscelyn, Thomas, Author Interview, New York City, NY, 24 February 2009 
Kilcullen, David, Author Interview, Washington, DC, 27 May 2009 
Lake, Steve, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA, 27 March 2009 
Lippold, Kirk, Author Interview, Crystal City, VA, 29 September 09 
Marks, MG James ‘Spider’, Author Interview, Falls Church, VA, 23 February 2009 
McArthur, Dobie, Author Interview, Crystal City, VA, 15 December 2010 
Mendez, Antonio, Author Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 13 August 2009 
Miller, Judy, Phone call with author, Ashburn, VA, 26 February 2009 
Nelson, Torin, Author Interview, Salt Lake City, UT, 3 March 2009 
Olsen, Gordon, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA, 19 March, 2009 
Parvaz, Dan, Author Interview, Orlando, FL, 31 March 2009 
Pippenger, William, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA 18 June 2010 
Rester, Paul, Author Interview, Crystal City, VA, 27 February 2009 
Sageman, Marc, Author Interview, Herndon, VA, 27 March 2009 
Schroeder, Marvin, Author Interview, Washington, DC, 9 March 2009 
Stimson, Charles ‘Cully’, Author Interview, Washington, DC, 17 February 2009 
Stone, Douglas General USMC, Author Interview, Arlington, VA, 10 March 09 
Trimpert, Joe, Author Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, 22 March 2013 
Waugh, Billy, Author Interview, Fort Belvoir, VA, 25 July 2008 
Waugh, Billy, Author Phone Interview, McLean, VA, 5 July 2010 
Waxman, Mathew, Author Interview, New York City, NY, 24 February 2009 
Weimann, Gabriel, Author Interview, Salt Lake City, UT, 2 March 2009 
Wong, Wesley, Author Interview, Ashburn, VA, 18 March 2009 
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